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10 December 1985

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

REPORT ON HUGE MILITARY BUILD-UP ON SOUTH AFRICA'S BORDERS

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 3 Nov 85 p 17

[Article by John D'Oliveira and Peter Mann]

[Text]

DESPITE their poverty, South Africa's black neighbours are increasing their military potential — and they are doing so at a dramatic rate.

Over the past eight years, billions of rands worth of military equipment has been bought from Russia, most of it paid for with hard currency earned by exports to the West.

Much of the equipment is inappropriate to the reasonable defence needs of the countries concerned.

Ground forces have more than doubled to almost 350 000 men, armour has more than quadrupled to more than 1 600 units, the number of combat aircraft has almost trebled to 280 while the number of helicopters has quadrupled to 240.

The helicopters include 37 of Russia's devastatingly effective Mi-25 gunships, although some of these have been shot down in the recent battle between Dr Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebels and the Angolan Government's defence force, FAPLA.

Aircraft include the MiG-21, the most widely used fighter in the world, which, for many years, formed the backbone of Soviet tactical air power and which has been produced in a number of versions from 1956 onwards. Also in evidence is the more sophisticated MiG-23 first deployed in large numbers in 1973.

Tanks range from the Russian T34s of World War 2 vintage to the later T54/55s (originally deployed in the 1950s) and the more modern T62s which were seen in quantity for the first time in the 1960s. Some countries also have the Chinese versions, designated T59 (T54/55) and T69 (T62).

In contrast, the latest statistics from the respected Institute of International Strategic Studies in London show that South Africa has a fighting force of 106 400 regular troops (of whom 64 000 are conscripts) and that there are 21 000 members of the

South West African Territorial Force. Earlier published statistics give South Africa 2 850 armoured vehicles (including 250 Centurian tanks, 1 400 Eland armoured cars and 1 200 Ratel armoured vehicles) and almost 300 combat aircraft (including Mirages, Buccaneers and Impalas).

No precise statistics are available for southern Africa's military capabilities but a reasonably accurate picture can be pieced together from published information and from reports reaching western diplomatic and intelligence sources.

While the military threat to South Africa seems formidable on paper, military capability must be seen within the context of a country's economy and its infrastructure.

For instance, the South African military machine is backed by Africa's most sophisticated infrastructure and by an economy which generates 72 percent of the Gross National Product of Africa south of the equator.





Next in line is Zimbabwe, which generates only 5.2 percent.

Angola, which has spent billions on sophisticated Russian armaments (including surface-to-air missile systems which South Africa itself envies) contributes only 3 percent to the region's GNP, mostly from petroleum sales to the West.

And, while South Africa has its own high-technology armaments industry, Angolan equipment requiring major repair has to be shipped back to the Soviet Union.

When all this is taken into account, the SADF would have little difficulty in overwhelming any conventional military attack from the Frontline States.

However, any calculation of military power could be totally



Graphic: David Anderson

upset by the involvement of one (or both) of the world's superpowers.

Whereas South Africa is cut off from all foreign military aid (and, increasingly, contact with Western military services) the Frontline States have close links with communist defence forces and armaments industries.

For instance, communist military equipment has flooded into Angola where there are more than 30 000 Cubans, 1 000 East Germans, 900 Russians and 1 250 North Koreans helping FAPLA (the Angolan Defence Force).

Already South African Minister of Defence General Magnus Malan has wondered in public whether the flood of Russian weapons into Angola does not amount to the "prepositioning of military equipment to be used, ultimately, against South Africa?"

General Malan said he believed the Russians wanted to develop a firm, stabilised base in Angola and then use the equipment and the personnel positioned there "wherever necessary in the sub-continent".

He said that, in the five years ending in 1982, something like \$10 000 million worth of military equipment had been transferred from Russia to Angola. More came in each year than the entire South African military budget, of

which only a portion went on the purchase of military weapons.

"Not much of this was necessary to cope with South Africa's series of limited military actions against Swapo or to cope with the guerilla war being waged by Unita..."

Against this background, South Africa's military planners are keeping a close watch as the Frontline States spend more of their scarce hard currency on weapons which many observers (in South Africa at least) believe are unnecessary for reasonable requirements.

The following is the most up-to-date picture available for each of the Frontline States:

ANGOLA — Fighting force: 132 500, including about 35 000 from the Eastern Bloc and 100 Portuguese. Tanks: 490, including 150 T34 and 250 T54/55 main battle tanks but serviceability believed to be low. Strike aircraft: 583, including 22 MiG-23 and 62 MiG-21. Surface-to-air missile installations: 70, including 14 SAM9 installations costing about \$2.3 million each. Helicopters: 54.

BOTSWANA — Fighting force: 5 100. Tanks: 5, including four T34.

LESOTHO — Fighting force: 3 500 (including 1 500 paramilitary).

MOZAMBIQUE — Fighting force: 77 230, including about 18 000 foreign troops of which about 12 000 are committed by Zimbabwe and 2 000 from Tanzania together with about 2 200 Eastern Bloc military advisers. Tanks: 474, including 250 T34 and 175 T54/55. Armoured cars: 200. Combat aircraft: 68, including 36 MiG-17 and 36 MiG-21. Helicopters: 40, including 25 Mi-25.

SWAZILAND — Fighting force: 3 000 (light infantry, including reserves).

TANZANIA — Fighting force: 68 880. Tanks: 505, including 18 T34, 350 T54/55, 22 T59, 22 T60, 40 T69. Serviceability believed to be low. Combat aircraft: 69, including 14 MiG-17, 20 MiG-19 and 35 MiG-21. Helicopters: 14.

ZAMBIA — Fighting force: 29 300, including police. Tanks: 92, including eight T54/55, 34 T59 and 50 PT76 light tanks. Combat aircraft: 43, including five MiG-17, seven MiG-19, 15 MiG-21. Helicopters: 54. SAM missile installations: 26, including 12 Rapier, 14 Tigercat.

ZIMBABWE — Fighting force: 58 989, including 14 800 police and including about 12 000 troops committed to Mozambique. Tanks: 120, including 30 T54/55, 52 T59, 10 T69 and 20 PT76 light tanks. Combat aircraft: 21, including three Canberras, 10 Hunters and seven BAE Hawks. Helicopters: 35.

And on the World Front Things are Slowing Down...

LONDON — The Soviet Union has increased its strategic nuclear warheads by 37 percent, giving it approximate parity with the United States, the Military Balance survey says here.

The encyclopaedic survey of world military developments also says the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) is falling behind the Warsaw Pact and has largely lost "the technological edge".

But, it says military aggression is "a highly risky undertaking for either side" with incalculable dangers of nuclear escalation.

And Nato "could lose aircraft to friendly air defence fire for some years to come" because it has not adopted a common Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system.

There is also a worrying spread of "increasingly sophisticated weapons to many Islamic militia factions beyond state control, especially in Lebanon".

And forget the "arms race". Researchers at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which produces the survey, find "no evidence to support the widespread use of the emotive term

'arms race' to describe what has actually occurred during the past year in the deployment of military weapons around the world".

This finding is, however, "distinct from what is on order in the US and USSR".

The survey says: "Military budgets, with the important exception of the superpowers, are generally showing slow or no growth and in a number of cases budgets are actually declining."

"Overall numbers of deployed weapon systems, or of men in uniform, show little change over 1984."

"Strategic nuclear weapon research and development is proceeding on both sides, at a considerable pace. While there have been no dramatic changes in the past year in the deployed nuclear weapon systems on either side, both superpowers will be deploying new systems during the next few years."

The military balance guide to the rest of the world is:

- The Middle East. Gulf Co-operation Council states have invested heavily in air defence systems reflecting their fear of the Iran-Iraq war spreading. The Lebanon is in a state of virtual anarchy with sophisticated weapons going to militia groups. Israel, with a large military budget, maintains conventional superiority over her neighbours.

- Asia and Australasia. China is reducing its army considerably to one million men. India has enhanced its quantitative and qualitative military strength. Japan has been steadily increasing her capacity but is underfunded while the future of the Anzus Alliance is in doubt due to New Zealand's ban on US nuclear warships. North and South Korea are modernising — especially their air forces.

- Africa. Angola is improving its air defences with Cuban and Russian assistance. Mozambique is struggling to contain the MNR but has no money.

- Latin America. Overall there is great economic difficulty. Only in central America is there a general increase in armaments due to unsettled politics and internal wars.

/9317

CSO: 3400/422

INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

AFTERMATH OF GHANA-IVORY COAST SOCCER RIOT EXPLAINED

Dakar LE POLITICIEN in French 21 Sep 85 pp 1,8

[Text] The broad coverage which our national daily has unwittingly given to the "Ivory Coast affair," as well as the alarmist commentaries put out by certain professional pedagogues about the supposed massacre of Ghanaians living in that country--a land with a reputation for hospitality and tolerance--can be attributed to a desperate attempt to tarnish the image of the uncontested father of the Ivorian nation, a man who has used all his knowledge and energy to further the cause of African unity.

A wise African once said that the difference between Senghor and Houphouet is that the former first became acquainted with Africa at the age of 40, while the latter--a peasant and Baoule traditional chief--did not know Europe until he was 40. That man cannot be an enemy of Africa.

Accordingly, our journal has decided to shed some light on these "events."

The Ivorian ambassador to Dakar repeated for us the terms of the clarification from the Ivorian Ministry of Information that was published by LE SOLEIL, and our special correspondent in Ivory Coast now has a complete picture of the true and naked facts.

The falsification of these facts and their emotional and political exploitation have come at a time when Ivory Coast is at a decisive turning point in the implementation of a creative democracy founded on the free decisions of the people and national consensus on the ideals embodied in the Single Party.

It is not by accident that detractors of the Ivory Coast have chosen the eve of the pre-congress to pour out their torrents of misinformation and fairy tales.

The frantic press campaign against the Ivorian system and its leader is also no coincidence. We know that behind all these little tricks can be dimly discerned the silhouette of a certain man named Beaulin: a Frenchman, one-time associate of President Houphouet who was dismissed some time ago...for incompetence.

Incidents in the Ivory Coast: The Real Truth

So, then, efforts are being made to convince people that the recent so-called anti-Ghanaian incidents in Abidjan had a political coloration that at bottom was xenophobic. Well, President Houphouet-Boigny is 100 percent right when he denounces those who fish in troubled waters, those who exaggerate, distort and dramatize the facts.

As tenacious as such people may be, the facts are even more stubborn. Simply stated, it was nothing but hooliganism--something which is in any event not an exclusive Ivorian monopoly.

Certainly the country is paying a heavy price for its admirable expansion.

It is not irrelevant to note in this regard that the U.S., because of its level of development, has the largest number of vandals of any country in the world.

Now after the victory of the Elephants over the Black Star of Ghana, which opens up a chance for Egypt '86, the "grapevine"--a new social phenomenon whose consequences are difficult to assess--reported that two Ivorian fans who had made the trip to Kumasi had been killed.

This rumor was undoubtedly fed by many things: the stopping of the match by the umpire after the incontestable attack on one of the touch-judges, the flurry of projectiles that created a really dangerous situation on the playing field, the long wait in Accra of fans before their return to Abidjan.

Nevertheless, it has been denied both by organizers of the Ivorian fans and by the authorities. But to fringe elements it was a golden opportunity. It was too good to pass up. And on the pretext of taking reprisals against "those who killed our brothers," these individuals indulged themselves in looting and vandalism.

Nobody--and least of all the Ivorian authorities--challenges the fact that Ghanaians were wounded. But they were not the only victims of these acts of hooliganism: there were also Ivorian landlords whose housing blocks rented to Ghanaians were also damaged.

Is that not enough to convince anyone that these events were only the deeds of vandals?

The rapid and appropriate response of the Abidjan police put an end to the looting and vandalism which lasted several hours and was condemned immediately by the political bureau of the Ivorian democratic party.

The response included the arrest of 150 people, the majority of them Ivorians. But among them were also nationals of Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, Mauritania, Senegal and Ghana.

These people were brought before a judge, and the court found them guilty of high misdemeanors. The sentences were not light; sentences ranged as high as 2 years.

In light of all these facts, can one still doubt the sincere determination--clearly expressed in the actions taken by the Ivorian leaders, and first of all by President Houphouet-Boigny--to protect the lives and property of all residents of the Ivory Coast?

For this reason it is regrettable that one of Ivory Coast's neighbors, and one we respect considerably, finds in what it calls the "sufferings" of the Ghanaians, a "gulf of hatred and division fomented by Africa's enemies."

To go even further, finding the matter of enough political importance to create an emergency fund for "Ghanaian victims," is neither fair nor reasonable.

It would require believing that events always take on a wholly different dimension when they happen in Ivory Coast. Some people are always happy to exaggerate and distort, in an effort to discredit that country, whose only fault has been that of being one of the most hospitable and tolerant countries in all of black Africa.

Some Ghanaians, calling on their embassy for assistance, have returned to their native land. But their numbers are very far from the 10,000 claimed by the president of the mobilization committee in Accra.

According to the Ghanaian embassy in Abidjan--which under the circumstances cannot be suspected of minimizing the facts--about 1,200 Ghanaians have been repatriated at their own request.

It is thus not unreasonable to think that there has been an attempt to give the false impression of a massive exodus of Ghanaians. Close to 300,000 of them live in Ivory Coast in peace and harmony, just like the other immigrant communities.

At least 2 million out of Ivory Coast's 8 million population are foreigners. And 50 percent of Abidjan's 2 million inhabitants are foreigners.

Ivory Coast itself has no sizeable colony abroad, and does not feel at all vulnerable to reprisals.

But there you have it: just like their president, the Ivorians remain warmhearted and hospitable people. Temperate.

Is this perhaps why, even after the attacks that have been made on their athletes in certain African countries recently, they have refrained from taking revenge?

And it is fortunate that this is how things are, in a country which, despite a brutal decline in coffee and cacao earnings, was able to cope with the crisis and launch its economic recovery program without significant social unrest.

The country has won its cacao gamble, becoming the world's leading producer of that commodity. Twenty-five years ago it produced only 8,000 tons of cacao. Nowadays it produces more than 500,000 tons. And Ivory Coast is close to winning another gamble: food self-sufficiency. In 1983 it imported 450,000 tons of rice. This year it will import 150,000--approaching, if not actually attaining, self-sufficiency in this sector.

Had it not been for the imported foods demanded mostly by the foreign community (whose customary diet is different from that of Ivorians), which drain the country's foreign exchange reserves, Ivory Coast would already have reached the objective of self-sufficiency, since anything can be grown there.

During the eighth congress of the Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (9-12 October) President Houphouet-Boigny will have an opportunity to underline--without boasting--the remarkable progress achieved in Ivory Coast, which according to international experts did not commit the mistake of so many developing countries: neglecting agriculture.

President Houphouet-Boigny will also have an opportunity to remind everyone--as if there were any need to do this--that the Ivorian is a friend of all and the enemy of none.

9516
CSO : 3419/20

BENIN

BRIEFS

FLOODS LASH ATLANTIQUE PROVINCE--Some 200,000 people are homeless in the wake of flood-tides in Atlantique Province. That estimate was announced after a meeting yesterday (Tuesday) at the Ministry of the Interior, Public Safety, and Territorial Administration, the members of the National Civil Protection Committee (CNPC), and delegations from the flooded districts. District chiefs personally headed their delegations. Political and administrative authorities from the stricken districts told the CNPC of their plight. They urgently need medicines, food, clothing, and blankets. During the working session, the plight of the school children was the focus of particular attention, for the very good reason that 23 of Atlantique Province's schools are under water, just as the new scholastic year begins. As a temporary solution to the problem, there were suggestions for transferring classes to other premises which would be vacated for the duration of the emergency. Another possible solution would be to build temporary straw-thatched structures on stilts for use as classrooms. [Text] [Cotonou EHUZU in French 20 Oct 85 p 1] 6182

6182
CSO: 3419/54

BURKINA

REVITALIZATION OF KOSSODO INDUSTRIES REPORTED

Ouagadougou CARREFOUR AFRICAIN in French 6 Sep 85 pp 12-17

[Article by B.B. and J.C.: "The Resurrection of Kossodo"]

[Text] The Kossodo industrial area is very depressed and has been for a rather long time. Of the 23 industrial installations there, more than approximately 10 have shut down operations. Those still on their feet are practically on crutches. What does this mean? That Burkina Faso does not have a mind for business? Of course not! Perhaps it doesn't have enough experience in this area, but it cannot be said that its experience is nil. Even if we have to deal with a middle class that reflects the country's backwardness. Kossodo is a veritable cemetery of industrial plants today. Whose fault is it? Comrades of the Directorate of Industrial Development and Crafts [DDIA] and OPEB [Office for Promotion of Burkinabe Business] trace the industrial area's history from its birth to its total collapse. Although it is true that dead men don't walk again, Kossodo will be revived very soon by the CNR [National Revolutionary Council]. This is the wish of all Burkinabe people and the working class in particular.

The Kossodo industrial area is located 6 km outside Ouagadougou on the Ouagadougou-Kaya highway. It is one of the largest industrial areas in the country because of the number of industries with installations there. It has, in fact, more than approximately 20 industrial plants. These plants include large industrial facilities such as a refrigerated abattoir, SOBBRA [expansion unknown], SAMFA [expansion unknown] (Push, Senisot brand bicycles factory), etc. There are also PME (small and medium-size businesses) such as the National Shoe Company (SINAC), the Faso Cannery (COFA), the Burkinabe Company for Trade and Industry (SOBICOM), etc.

The Kossodo industrial area was established in 1974 because of the need to relieve the Gounghin area, which was saturated. The latter area is now in the middle of the city, which is rather impractical and even dangerous. Kossodo was selected as the new industrial site. A vast amount of land was set aside for this purpose: part of Kossodo's population even had to be moved. The area of the land provided for this industrialization plan totals

1,810,698 square meters, comprised of 90 parcels. The area's development cost the government a total of 3.2 million CFA francs, which was provided by the Netherlands. In addition to this Dutch subsidy, which made possible the site's general development, the Office for Promotion of Burkinabe Business (formerly OPEV) received a loan of 166 million CFA francs from the WADB [West African Development Bank] to help property developers get started. Thus this amount enabled OPEB to implement a number of projects on the land allocated to it for the establishment of PME. The reasons for such aid to property developers were justified by authorities' concern about how much time the country would require to make up for its lag in industrializing.

In this industrialization plan, the property developers were provided with enormous accommodations. In addition to the developed areas, feasibility studies for the industrial plants were conducted by OPEB with assistance from the DDIA. Such practical measures made possible the rapid emergence of processing, manufacturing, tool and various equipment industries. Most of the businesses had opportunities for subcontracting among themselves, which was an asset for getting off to a good start. However, all of the plants for which studies had been conducted were not completed. A total of 23 companies were actually established. At present, only about 10 of them are operating. Among those completed, we might mention, for example, the Kossodo Machine Shop (AMK), the Voltan Sack Manufacturing Company (SOVIS), the Metal Processing Industry (ITM), the Voltan Wire-Nail Manufacturing Company (SUPI), the Faso Cannery (COFA), the Burkinabe Company for Trade and Industry (SOBICOM), etc. Amid all these expectations, some property developers could not meet all the conditions for launching a business. In order to launch a production plant, bank loan agreements (at the BND [National Development Bank] in particular) stipulated that the developer must finance up to one-third of the total construction costs. A good number of developers were unable to meet this condition.

In Kossodo, all developers with companies established with OPEB's aid are Burkinabe. Some of them have ties with foreign partners. Such ties have been very limited, however, because of the limited size of these industrial plants.

Revival of Economic Activity

The Kossodo industrial area has made a substantial contribution to our country's industrial development. It represents 37 percent of the country's total industrial plant and 15 percent of all jobs. This large-scale operation has given the national economy greater vitality. During the period when all was going well, the Kossodo area was very active. The city of Ouagadougou experienced a revival of economic activity, an active economic life readily observable from the traffic between Kossodo and Ouagadougou. Markets were also filled with several articles "made in Upper Volta." This vitality was to end almost as soon as it began. Kossodo began to empty, finally becoming a desert in which a notable silence contracts with the deafening rumblings of the past. From staff reductions, in fact, it moved on to the next stage, i.e., the closing of plant doors. As a result, products "made in Upper Volta" also began to disappear from the markets. Such were the signs of the death

of the Kossodo industrial area, which today can be compared only to a veritable industrial graveyard. This harsh reality had multiple causes.

In general, it may be noted that the situation of Burkinabe business has deteriorated a great deal on the whole. Most Burkinabe companies are going through an unprecedented crisis. Filings for bankruptcy, plant closing and staff reductions are common. Statistics show that the profitability of businesses has declined and we are witnessing a sharp increase in expenses in comparison to revenues. Similarly, 70 percent of the companies in operation are operating at only 60 percent of their capacity. In Kossodo, most businesses have closed their doors and many others are preparing to do so. The causes of this crisis are both foreign and domestic.

Foreign causes stem from the unfavorable market trends of recent years. Such trends have resulted in an increase in the prices of raw materials and energy, a growing decline in import-export trade and socioeconomic structures. This is not accidental: it is related to the very nature of the world economic system, characterized by a crisis of capitalism. Our country is suffering overwhelmingly from the repercussions of this crisis, which is having a very negative effect on harmonious industrial development. The Kossodo industrial area, which was begun and launched at the beginning of this crisis, became bogged down from its inception. This was one of the factors hampering the development of the young industries installed there. Beyond these structural causes, the domestic causes of their failure should be noted. Despite these unfavorable conditions, some of Kossodo's industrial plants had started off well and their products were in demand in the market. Gradually or suddenly, they had to shut down or operate almost at a loss, for several reasons. The area had been developed hastily; perhaps because the project was tied to political motives! This flaw, however, resulted in the poor technical design of some plants, unnecessarily entailing very heavy investment costs. Such was the case, for example, of the Industrial Building Materials Company (SIMAC), which required an investment of 80 million CFA francs. The immediate consequence of this flaw was that the market price of the bricks and other materials produced by SIMAC was very high. We should also note the mistake made by the developers in not following the feasibility studies. To a large extent, the developers made their own decisions in choosing equipment. Thus a large number of the companies were equipped with secondhand machinery, obsolete machinery often without any spare parts. Thus from the beginning, the developers faced repair expense or a total shutdown of their plants. This situation was aggravated by the fact that employees were also unskilled. In the best of cases, it was possible to hire expatriate engineers to launch plant production. The developers' evident refusal to hire Burkinabe managerial personnel to provide maintenance and train workers threw the equipment on the scrap heap. These very gross errors were related solely to the developers' concern of not having to pay managerial personnel. In keeping with the logic of this practice, friends and relatives were hired, since they could be treated as the developers wished, without being able to protest. This is readily understandable; in order to get as much as they could, they wanted to circumvent necessities, believing they had found the shortest path to success.

The financial management of Kossodo's industrial plants, particularly in the case of OPEB, left much to be desired. Accounting records were either non-existent or poorly kept. The developers managed the plants like retail stores, as shown by an examination of this shameful situation. It is no secret that the middle class in our country is characterized by extreme backwardness. In Kossodo, this was characterized by a taste for fast profits and irresponsibility in maintaining the industrial plants.

How is it possible to understand that responsible people, who decided to invest large sums in an activity as delicate as the industrial sector, allowed themselves to spend all their funds before even purchasing a single machine? Their projects were forced to end there and many parties, including the government, emerged as losers. Another group of developers of the Kossodo area, believing they had found paradise, began to build villas and luxurious administrative buildings. Before even one machine had arrived, they and their close associates had begun spending equipment funds. Those who did open their plants granted themselves very high monthly salaries with many benefits. A PDG [President-General Manager] who, according to the standards established by OPEB, was supposed to receive a salary of 500,000 CFA francs per month, instead received the paltry sum of 1 million CFA francs each month. And since his wife was employed by the same company, she received the same amount, with the opportunity of switching vehicles at any time. Financial vandalism was a common practice, since in the developers' minds their lifestyles had to correspond to their PDG titles. To achieve this, they decided to be both PDGs and administrators. In this way, the cashbox was within reach, without any go-betweens: they could drain it as they wished for their own motives. The number of mistresses increased for some, exotic trips for others, without neglecting their daily lifestyles. Such irresponsible management took its toll on the company, and on the workers, who were paid miserably.

But they had had a great deal of support and more seriousness would have been required for those companies to establish themselves in the domestic market, which was fiercely saturated with very competitive products. Kossodo's products were hit by the competition; they were more expensive and inferior in quality due to the inexperience of the various production units. In industry, starting off is always difficult and prices are set as high as possible for amortization reasons.

If there was such poor management, it was because the plants evaded the supervision of government agencies entrusted with their supervision. OPEB, which is responsible for supervising PME, shoulders a large part of the blame. But according to OPEB agents, it was because the developers, even now, never wanted OPEB's supervision. The agents assigned to carry out their duties in Kossodo were sent packing by the PDGs, who felt they did not have to give an account of themselves to anyone. OPEB, which had an office for monitoring the operations of these companies in Kossodo, had to abandon it. This practice by the developers was accentuated by the complicity of OPEB's former general director. Violating the legal provisions and ethics of his profession, he held stock in most of the companies. Thus he caused a great deal of confusion over the issues of Kossodo's management. At present it is difficult to make an accurate assessment of the condition of the Kossodo industrial area. Such organized confusion enabled OPEB's former director to get

rich. At the same time he offered his agents, through his complicity, all the developers' misappropriations of funds. If that was also possible, it was because no legislative provision enabled the government to exercise control over manufacturers' activities. No government agency, whether the DDIA or OPEB, had specific authority to legally combat the developers' exactions.

Customs Fraud

This abdication of responsibility by authorities at that time was also noticed in the marketplace. To enable the young industries to develop, no accompanying arrangement had been made to guarantee them a market. The launching of the Kossodo industrial area's production was hit by the competition of foreign products (from the Ivory Coast and Nigeria). Intense customs fraud resulted in the foreign goods being much more accessible to consumers. With the youth of our industries, an economic slump began and led to the premature death of most of the industrial plants.

The consequences of Kossodo's failure are great. Besides the current interest on unpaid loans (166 million from the WADB and 3.2 million from the Netherlands), it should be noted that the Kossodo area is also in arrears in paying what it owes to many domestic companies. OPEB is presently carrying arrears of 80 million in electricity charges. Why? Quite simply, because the developers never thought they had to pay their electricity bills. And since their plants are connected to OPEB's installations, OPEB is responsible for those arrears.

Economically, Kossodo's failure has added to the country's economic decline and has produced an industrial lag that will be difficult to make up for. There is a deep crisis of confidence in business circles, which are beginning to lose faith in industry. Socially, the sources of income of many households have suddenly been taken away. There has been a loss of more than 10 percent of jobs, which is very significant for Burkina Faso. This has definitely contributed to intensifying the social crisis of the last few years.

After this assessment of the Kossodo industrial area, we might wonder whether we could hope for any resurrection of this area.

Kossodo Will Be Revived

Kossodo will be revived with the determination of the CNR, which has decided to inject 2 billion [CFA francs] into this industrial area. This will be for the greater good of our economy, especially for many comrades who lost their livelihoods there through the fault of our backward middle class that assassinated Kossodo by confusing small-scale commerce of the business world with industrial management.

This is why the government has decided to take over this industrial area. Among other measures, it has decided to establish a new company with a goal similar to that of the bankrupt business. This company's capital will be open to anyone wishing to invest and the government will be able to subscribe as well. This capital, as soon as it is paid, wholly or partially as needed, will constitute the working capital, whose absence in the past led many of

the area's companies to the grave. The government has also taken the step of requisitioning all or part of the fixed assets (buildings, equipment) and possibly purchasing the current assets (raw materials) of the bankrupt business for the new company. The act of requisitioning will make it possible for the new company to ultimately buy back the requisitioned assets.

There are in fact nearly 90 parcels of land in Kossodo, of which 23 have been developed and 35 have been partially developed. Considering the list of required conditions, whose Article 2 stipulates that "the industry or the company agrees to erect on the land granted to it its production plant within a maximum period of three years from the date of signing the sale pledge (at present and later the bill of sale)...," many companies would simply be removed. In any case, the last 17 mentioned above will be removed by the government. A two-year period is being granted to the owners who have erected administrative buildings on their parcels.

At the DDIA, measures are being formulated to make the area aware of its responsibilities. Actually, the parcels allocated were too large for the size of the businesses to which they were granted. In addition, such re-parceling will make it possible to respond to the numerous pending requests for land.

From now on it will no longer be enough to wish to establish a business in the industrial area in order to receive a parcel of land. A request alone will not be sufficient. It will be necessary to have in hand a complete file on the technical and very reliable plan to enable those in authority to make a decision.

With regard to the reorganization, it should be noted that not all companies will have to be taken over. The reorganization concerns those whose productions contribute to satisfying the basic needs of the people, which is therefore in keeping with the CNR's industrial policy.

Under these conditions, it is certain that a company like SOVORES, which is involved in the production of sanitary covering and tile manufacture, will be restored, since it is in keeping with the CNR's housing policy and this company also uses 30 percent domestic materials (clay) in manufacturing tile. Its revival could reduce our dependence in this respect. There is also SOVOPPI [expansion unknown], which manufactures wire-nails, and SIMAC [expansion unknown], which produces building materials.

Among the defunct businesses, those such as SARI [expansion unknown], which produced lamps, SIB [expansion unknown] (biscuits), MAVIE [expansion unknown] (insecticides and plastics), SOVIS (sack manufacturing), Voltan Metal Company, which became TTM [expansion unknown] (metals), VOITEMH [expansion unknown] (enameling) and AMK (machine shop), there is hope for their revival because they can make a substantial contribution to our economy. But they must avoid fast profits and take steps to produce high-quality, competitive goods. Therefore, they must not seek to purchase obsolete equipment from capitalist countries.

At present, DDIA is in the process of establishing contacts with officials of the closed companies so that together they can try to formulate reorganization plans and find solutions for reviving as many businesses as possible, in keeping with the 5-year plan.

As a further remedy, a management company for the area will be established. Industries will also be grouped together by sector, so that they are complementary and can engage in subcontracting.

In view of all this, there is great hope for Kossodo's real revival. This is the wish of many Burkinabe families and hundreds of young people left unemployed by the death of the Kossodo area. It will therefore be necessary to do everything possible so that within a short time we can say "once upon a time there was Kossodo."

11915

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BURKINA

LIFE IN DESERT AREAS DESCRIBED

Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French 25 Sep 85 p 2

[Article by Michel Bavarek]

[Text] In power for 2 years now, Captain Thomas Sankara is fighting a two-front war: one on drought, the other to transform society. In the land of Sahel, the desert is advancing at the rate of 4 kilometers per year. Without international help and, above all, without the efforts of the disaster-stricken countries themselves, desertification would be irreversible very soon. In Burkina Faso (whose name means "land of righteous men"), the population has been mobilized and officered by the Revolutionary Defense Committees in an attempt to lift the country out of dependency and to fight the sand that threatens to swallow everything.

The stump of a baobab tree, surrounded by a shapeless mass of broken branches. On the endless, empty plateau lies the carcass of a cow. Further off in the distance stoops a woman with her baby. She is gathering the leaves from one of the few trees still green.

Five tons of millet and maize -- bought in the country thanks to a gift from German Caritas -- rides in the bed of our Toyota pickup and in the one following us. A team from the "Fraternal Union of Believers" -- made up of Muslims and Christians -- will distribute the food in villages in Seno province, in the northern part of the country, where two thirds of the inhabitants are classified as "disaster victims."

A skeletal old woman squats before her earthenware pot that has just been filled with millet. She gazes off into the middle distance, absent-mindedly playing with the grain. Will she have the strength to get it home? Her husband, as decrepit as she, comes to the rescue. With one hand he steadies the bowl on his head, and gives the other to his wife who tags along behind him.

I would also see old men and children frightfully emaciated. It is nothing like the images we know from Ethiopia, though, nor yet like the starving people we saw in Mozambique last year. Thanks to outside help, the famine here seems to be under control. Before the onset of the rains, which will make transport difficult, emergency stores were built up. "This drought," said National Solidarity Minister Josephine Ouedraogo, "is at least as grave as the one that showed the world the tragedy of Sahel in 1973." It has lasted for 2 years, and the granaries have long stood empty. Even though the seasonal rains (June through September) were good this year, the weeks from now until the first harvest may be just as hard.

"Our Friends the Reds"

A sandy plain where rudimentary tents are pitched -- actually nothing but tattered canvas propped up on six sticks. We invite their occupants to come up to the grain-laden Toyota. The Burkinabe who take over the distribution call them "our friends, the Reds." These people are Tuaregs from Mali, light-skinned, accompanied by their black ex-slaves.

There is nobility in their appearance and larveny in their eyes. A man approaches us and draws a symbol in the sand. That means that his children are dead. Then, with a gesture of his thumb to his jaw, he makes us understand than he has nothing to sink his teeth into.

The cattle have all been sold or died. There is nothing left but a few donkeys. He has only a few years left. The women go into Dori, the provincial capital, to beg. They have brought cholera with them: 21 people have already died. Emergency measures have been taken to try to get rid of the epidemic.

Nomads are coming in from Mali and Niger in hopes of finding grazing-land in Burkina. Some Burkinabe cattlemen and farmers from the six northern provinces stricken by the drought are emigrating to better-watered regions. Others -- in far greater numbers -- are going to look for work in Ivory Coast. In this way, little by little, the Sahel population is drifting to the south.

The Sahel itself is spreading: it now covers the entire center of the country. A million and a half people are victims of the drought.. Why? The dwindling and maldistribution of the rains, of course, but also the deforestation, the brushfires, and the degradation of the soil by intensive agriculture and over-grazing.

A Cow for 10 Francs

Beneath a broiling sun, a hundred or so women are gathering stones they will shortly be loading onto a truck. The temperature stands at 40°C in the shade. I have gone to shelter beneath a mango tree in the village of Silimidougou, more than 100 kilometers north of Ouagadougou.

The villages in this region look like fortified castles: the extended family lives in a warren of cabine, held together by an encircling wall. Last year, the harvest was not even a quarter of the normal yield. The people can buy millet if they sell chickens or goats, but there is nothing left here to sell. As for large cattle, the prices have dropped to nothing: a cow goes for 10 francs! There is nothing here to feed the poor beasts.

A little bit away from the village, people are at work on a 100-meter dam. Its height, now only 2.50 meters, will be doubled next year with the addition of the stones picked up by the women and packed into baskets. They are hurrying to tamp the soil down so it will insure that the dam will be watertight. This is a race against the clock: the dam must be finished before the rains come.

This is one of the 250 dams the Ouagadougou government has sought from the non-governmental organizations working in the country. They are providing machinery units consisting of two trucks, a tanker, a Caterpillar tractor, and a road-roller.

The manpower is provided by the people of Silmidougou. They are showing both enthusiasm and courage. Robert Sawadogo, the job foreman, says he never thought it would go so quickly. This is the first dam ever built in the region, and the villagers fully understand the purpose of the work.

"Three Struggles"

The rain will run down the hills and form a lake where the cattle can drink, around whose shores they can plant rice or vegetables, and which will raise the water-table. This is all the more needed now that the water level in the wells is sinking. People in some villages must walk 10 or 12 kilometers from their homes to find water.

In addition to the dams, they have begun managing the ravines and building anti-erosion mini-dams, low walls of stone and earth that follow the contour lines. The aim is to stem, as best they can, the runoff that carries away the thin layer of topsoil, and to keep the soil where it is. The effect of such modest structures on vegetation and crops is sometime nothing short of spectacular.

"It's better to bequeath a little dam to your son than a herd of cattle," says one peasant. Hyenas or lions may devour cattle, but a little dam improves the fields.

In another campaign, the government has taken vigorous measures to halt deforestation. In April, Captain Sankara announced the start of "three struggles"; one against brushfires, one against stray livestock (goats wreak tremendous havoc), and one against illegal cutting of firewood. The government is doing its best to get people to use improved, high-efficiency fireplaces to conserve energy.

The cabinet this spring launched an appeal to each Burkinabe to plant a tree to mark each milestone in his life (baptism, marriage...). All villages are also asked to plant a tree-nursery that will one day be a shady grove. Visiting heads of state are invited to plant their tree, "to commemorate their solidarity in the struggle against desertification."

Handouts of Free Food Are a Trap

At Silmidougou, beside the construction site, the women are busy over great boiling pots of maize. This is the meal the workers will take together, when the day is over.

"We are opposed to free food handouts," says the man in charge of the drought-fighting commission. Even so, we must resort to them to feed half a million souls who have lost everything and are often too weak even to till their own fields. Meanwhile, we prefer the "food for work" approach, which is less likely to create a welfare mentality. We are also selling grain at reduced prices, but right now the people have almost no money at all.

"We are hoping to appeal for the last time for international aid to give you something to eat, we keep telling the people who are getting assistance," insists Josephine Ouedraogo. To the National Solidarity Minister, food assistance is no solution. There are some solutions, though. "It is truly weird that in the 20th century there are whole populations who have nothing to eat because of the lack of rain. There are countries where it rains less than it does here whose people have enough to eat!"

What do the people expect from the European countries?

"We expect that they will show some willingness to help us put an end to hunger." Mrs Ouedrago shoves that international aid will respect Burkina's development priorities. She is particularly emphatic about the urgent need to rescue the Sahel region from isolation: "The disaster areas suffer more from isolation than they do from the drought. They are cut off from know-how, from technologies, from the change-oriented mindset, which cannot get to them."

The Battle of the Railroad

It is Sunday morning. some 30 kilometers from Ouagadougou. Two hundred people are busy laying metal ties or lugging rails. They have begun building a railroad to the Sahel.

The crews today are made up of waiters and waitresses from the bars and snack-shops, plus the high commissioners of all 30 provinces. Tomorrow, it will be the electric company employees' turn. The volunteer crews spell each other this way, day after day, in the "battle of the railroad."

Foreign experts are clearly skeptical as to the profitability of the undertaking, but its thrust is political: "Be self-reliant," is the order of the day in Capt Sankara's outfit. The entire population is officered by the Revolutionary Defense Committees (DRC) and mobilized behind the "people's development program." This program involves reservoirs, wells, and little dams, but it also involves grain banks, dispensaries, schools, housing, athletic fields, and movie-houses.

That is not all. Still to be done are such things as changing farming methods, expanding irrigation zones where people can grow rice or potatos or vegetables in the dry season -- which is going to involve some changes in dietary habits... A profound economic and social upheaval is under way here, and inevitably it runs into resistance.

"The revolution is doing some good things," says a professor, "but it is going too fast for the people to assimilate it."

Very true, but time is pressing. "If we keep on the way we have been going, instead of advancing 4 kilometers a year, the desert will be advancing 10 kilometers a year," says Mrs Ouedraogo. And in the southern part of the country, which is more fertile, people are already worrying about the ecological consequences of the influx of populations from the north.

6182
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CHAD

NATIONAL DIVISIONS, DISARRAY LAMENTED

Paris POLITIQUE AFRICAINE in French Sep 85 pp 91-94

[Article by B. Bahuana Lebbeorrunk]

[Text] In this political and human tragedy Chad is suffering, everything under the sun has been imagined, reported, and said on behalf of a cause that will forever be irrelevant to the interests of the Chadian people and state. In some ways, one might tend to agree with that Chadian politician who will not be named here, that Chad is the victim of a "huge conspiracy." Accordingly, we fine, to our distress, that the die has been cast and that there are those who would have us fatalistically accept the notion that Chad is doomed to disaster. And yet, Chad is no more deserving than the other French-speaking or English-speaking African States of such harsh treatment from history.

To call attention to the fact that the data upon which the analysis of Chad's problem were based were tainted from the outset, as much by the media as by the French military leaders and civilian administrators who served in Chad (1), is to restate the way things truly are; the recent trend in political life in Chad bears out that assertion. It has also resulted from an imperfect and fragmentary concept of the nature of the problem.

In the area of the social sciences, any research, if it is assumed to be a useful paradigm for the decision-makers, ought necessarily to give precedence to the eclectic or multidisciplinary aspect of the analysis: the dominant factors observed should then be helpful as criteria in the quest for a final solution. One positive, albeit incomplete, step was taken in this direction by "The Chad File," which appeared in POLITIQUE AFRICAINE magazine in December 1984, were, for the first time a fairly exhaustive and systematic (not to mention systemic (2)) attempt was made to analyze Chad's problem; that article unearthed a specific trend in thinking and opened the door to a better understanding of the crises. One might have hoped to see attention directed at other factors in the problem, including those relating to the economic and military aspects, rather than to come yet again upon the blurred old boilerplate repetitions of acts or assertions (3), which as we have pointed out, have been given the lie by Chad's recent history. What is so damaging about dredging up old tales is that doing so panders to the conventional wisdom and swaddles its authors in a chimerical nostalgia for an unstable Chad they purposely invented out of whole cloth. Take for example Buijtenhaijs' assertion when calls

FROLINAT [Chadian National Liberation Front] an African Revolution" that was thwarted once it had acceded to power; the author bases his argument on FROLINAT's rise to power through military victory attributable to the combative skills and elan of the "Goran warriors." FROLINAT was never a revolutionary organization; and its victories were made possible only by the criminal alliances it deliberately contracted at the time with outside interests. (4) We merely note that after Sudan (1964-1965), beginning in 1968, FROLINAT "would become increasingly the spearhead for Libyan infiltration into Chad." (5) In this context, the creation of FROLINAT was a historic mistake in Chad: we can find no justification for a movement claiming to "liberate" its country while in fact it ensloves it, divides it, and allows its military occupation by other countries. This check to FROLINAT was predictable: Chad is a diversity; you cannot govern it on any single religious or ethic basis.

We are more than a little taken aback at the all-but obsessive attitude of Lanne, when he avers that, "The preponderant place it (southern Chad) held in the state "provoked" the crisis that reached its peak in 1979." (6) The crisis in Chad is not administrative in nature; it is political in origin. Chadian officials in the North, South, East and West recognize this fact. They are the victims, not the authors, of the present tragedy. They cannot identify with the multiplicity of politico-military faction we have. (7) We would note, in this connection, that Lanne was present at the creation in Chad of the National Administration School (ENA) in 1964, in other words, 4 years after Chad became independent. Does he imply that he has been able to attract only Southern students to that school? Historically, the first indications of the crisis in Chad emerged in September 1963 at Fort-Lamy (N'djamena) where, for the first time, Chadian blood was shed for political reasons: the demands at the time had nothing to do with the form of the State, but rather focused on religious considerations or based on the interests of ethnic groups and exploited from outside. We know for certain today that the creation of FROLINAT is a link in the straight chain of events leading up to September 1963.

We should like to believe, and we continue to hope that thinking about Chad's problems will focus simultaneously on three areas: our peoples, our land, and our regional environment. These areas are so many forces whose contradictory interaction has spawned what we now call the Chadian syndrome. We find that at this particular juncture in its history Chad is discovering its misfortune in having begotten sons that cannot govern it: this weakness is due to the societal backgrounds of those who claim to rule Chad; we have witnessed the wholesale invasion of cupidity, corruption, and the lust for money. (8) With relations among the nations what they are, there is an increasing appetite abroad among our neighbors and those farther away, and it has swept over the land of Chad, thanks to the fatuous incompetence of its leaders. Our most solid alliances have been weakened owing to the international economic climate. (9) Despite all that, one of the eternal verities still stands: you cannot rewrite history. Chad belongs to Chanians as Senegal does to the Senegalese, Morocco to the Moroccans, or France to the French. In this context, what are we to make of the following statement from Qadhafi: "In the past, Nasser floated the idea that the land of the Arabs belongs to the Arabs, exactly as France belongs to the French. Accordingly, what we have here are interests that we will have to understand"! (10) The interests he is talking about in

That statement cannot be made to augur the death of Chad. We would note that Chad is not an Arab country, and therefore may not be treated as fertile soil for the expression of Arab or Muslim ambitions. Arabs in the past have made contact with divers and sundry populations throughout the world: in Africa, in the Indian Ocean, and even in Europe: just stop for a moment to think what territorial upheavals declarations like Qadhaffi's could trigger in the world of today!

In conclusion, should like very much to understand just what has happened: at the precise point in the history of Chad that concerns us here, did Malloum, Kamougue, Abba Siddik, Hissein Habre, and Goukouni Weddeye really measure and fully appreciate the impact of their acts on the life of the Republic and State of Chad? Would not governing Chad inevitably have implied for each one of them direct and immediate or foreseeable consequences based on the date of their accession to power? Did these essential questions never occur to anybody? It would appear that they did not; and the upshot is there for all to see: a divided and occupied Chad.

Letter To The Editor

The bitter tone of our correspondent provides a yardstick for the dismay felt by many Chadians.

If we are willing to stop and look carefully, we cannot deny that the South held a preponderant place in the government prior to 1978--the government, by which we mean the political leaders and administration cadres. Insofar as the ENA [National School of Administration] (founded on 20 May 1963) is concerned, of the 267 students who graduated between 1965 and 1975, 77 percent came from ethnic roots in the south. If that is not preponderance, what, pray, is the meaning of that word?

Granted, preponderance is not paramount to monopoly or exclusivity. Northern Chad has paid for its "rejection of the school" in the debased coin of exclusion from the political scene and from the ranks of the administrative world. But there lay the seeds of an exquisitely political crisis from which emerged the tragedy we suffer today.

To explain the genesis of FROLINAT is not to condone its views or its actions. Obstinate, when it compels us to look reality squarely in the eye, is a virtue.

B. Lanne

19 February 1985

Our correspondent raises an essential issue: Is FROLINAT, or has it been a revolutionary movement? For my part, I still believe it is. To argue that FROLINAT is "the result of the cresting wave of Muslim Brethren fundamentalism" and assert that it was rooted in "anti-Zionist prejudice" is perhaps not too wide of the mark, but it is nevertheless only a scrap of the truth. As we learn from numerous FROLINAT documents, the movement was a shaky alliance among several rag-tag and bobtail factions, one of which was regionalist-Muslim in cast, but another of which was rooted in a socialist and Third-World-oriented analysis of Chad's problem. The question calling for an answer now is why

this trend succumbed, somewhere along the way, to the weight of Chad's peculiar sociological burdens. The answer to that question may prove to be of interest ranging far beyond the merely national context, and one of serious concern to the whole of Black Africa.

R. Buijtenhuijs
6 March 1985

FOOTNOTES

1. H. Bourges et al: "ALL 50 AFRICAS," Vol 1, Paris, Le Seuil, 1980.
J. Chapelle: "The Chadian People: Their Roots, Their Daily Life, and Their Battles," Paris, L'Harmattan, 1980.
2. Mr Brandily's taking account of the conflicting reactions inside the muslim populations and the preponderant influence of the external environment cited by Otayek, Gerard, and Bach refer respectively, to relations between Chad and Libya, Chad and Sudan, and Chad and Nigeria.
3. R. Buijtenhuijs, "FROLINAT Flunks The Test of Governing: The Failure of An African Revolution," POLITIQUE AFRICAINE, 16 Dec 84, pp 15-29, and B. Lanne, "The South, the State, and the Revolution, idid., pp 30-44.
4. Offspring of the creasing wave of Muslim Brotherhood's fundamentalism during the fifties, FROLINAT was founded in 1966 in Sudan and rooted in anti-Zionist prejudices. "FROLINAT" stood for the Front of Liberate Chad from Zionism and not for the front to liberate Chad from French imperialism: Chad through the diplomatic relations it maintained with Israel and as a result of the Anya-Nya rebellion in south Sudan, was perceived as a menace to the Arab and Muslim nations.
5. B. Lanne: "Relations Between Chad and Libya," ENJEUX SAHARIENS, Paris, Editions CNRS, 1984, p 246. (CRESM Roundtable, Aix-en-Provence, 1981).
6. B. Lanne: "The South, the State, and the Revolution," art. cit., p 43.
7. We would point out as well that, besides 12 traditional factions, there are in France and elsewhere in Africa several other political movements.
8. We would stress here, unlike what Buijtenhuijs asserts in connection with corruption under the National Union Transition Government (GUNT), which the Northern Armed Forces (FAN) seem to have put an end to, that this practice was broadened under the FANs thanks to a massive influx of foreign aid. What can only be described as a race to riches was joined within the N'Djamena government beginning in December 1983 and still going on, despite the wretched prverty of the rural populations.
9. POLITIQUE AFRICAINE, 16 Dec 1984, p 102.
10. Interview with al-Qadhdhafi on French TV Channel 1, Tuesday, 18 Sep 1984.

6182/13045
CSO: 3419/64

CHAD

MAHAMAT NOUR MALAYE APPOINTED MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH

Ndjamena INFO TCHAD in French 5 Oct 85 pp 3-5

[Text] CHADIAN PRESS AGENCY--A transfer ceremony was held yesterday, Friday, at the Ministry of Public Health. Outgoing Minister Koibla Djimasta officially handed on the post he has held for almost 3 years to the new minister, Mahamat Nour Malaye. A number of department officials and health technicians, as well as representatives of bodies accredited to our country, attended the ceremony, which was marked by two addresses.

Mr Koibla Djimasta, who spoke first, took the opportunity to assess the achievements of the health department he has headed for 3 years. "Since the beginning of the Third Republic, public health has been in the front ranks of the priority actions of the government," the outgoing minister said. Our health units are operational today, and the health situation has definitely improved, thanks to the very special attention devoted to this sector by the chief of state. For example, national programs have been inaugurated to enable our people to benefit from primary health care, with such components as mothers' and infant health (SMI), the expanded vaccination program (PEV), water and sewage, the training of middle and higher cadres, village health workers and traditional midwives, and the supply of essential medicines. The contribution of the international community has not been lacking in this burdensome task, Mr Koibla Djimasta said. "Our activities," he stressed, "have been pursued in the search for the means of rehabilitating the entire hospital network, including the central hospital in Djamena, and the building of premises for the National Public Health and Social Services School, in order to resolve the thorny problem of skilled personnel, of which there is a cruel shortage and the establishment and commissioning of an epidemiological studies and diagnostic laboratory in Djamena, in order to combat endemic illnesses efficiently."

In addition, the development of a water laboratory, the commissioning of the outfitting center for the handicapped and disabled servicemen, the campaign against disease carriers and the campaign against pollution are some of our projects, some of which are under way while others are awaiting financing, according to Mr Koibla. Such a program of action requires tremendous human, material and financial resources, which Chad, bled white by the war imposed on us by the terrorist in Tripoli, cannot mobilize without recourse to international, multinational and bilateral cooperation. To achieve these

goals, "the mobilization of all the energies of the nation is also needed, because the problem of health in our country is first of all our own affair," he added.

The most urgent tasks to be carried out in the public health department with a view to harmonious operation and meeting the needs of our people, the outgoing minister stressed, include the establishment of health structures staffed by competent personnel and equipped with medical-technical equipment and the essential medicines in the zones where displaced persons are concentrated and in the BET [Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti] prefecture. Similarly, the creation of a mobile team of epidemiologists to take rapid action in the event of an alert, the acceleration of basic and advanced training of personnel, as well as a study or review of the regulatory texts, with a view to adapting them to the current situation, are necessary and useful projects.

Despite these achievements, the minister expressed the view that much remains to be done, and that the task of his successor is a noble one, for it is a question of the health of all the citizens of Chad. "I am persuaded that you will lead the department of public health toward a system which will enable the people of Chad to achieve a level of health which will make of them the true agents of the development of our country," he said. Addressing himself to his former colleagues, he asked that they spare no effort to aid the new minister in his burdensome and delicate mission.

In response, the new head of the Ministry of Public Health promised not to fail in this noble mission and the new task assigned to him. "I will make my own the urgent tasks which you have just described, and I will work to see them realized, in accordance with the recommendations of the second regular session of the Central Committee of our great movement, UNIR," Mr Mahamat Nour Malaye said. Every activity pursued in this direction is designed to improve life and alleviate the sufferings of man, representing the center around which our entire development undertaking should be articulated, he added. This noble task, the preservation of the physical and moral health of man, requires the use of substantial financial, material and human resources. It is here that the active solidarity and unselfish aid of international bodies and friendly countries find their full meaning, in view of the meager resources our country has for the improvement of the health of the citizens of Chad, after 20 years of suffering, the new minister of public health concluded.

5157

CSO: 3419/44

CHAD

HUNGER ORGANIZATION OFFICIAL MAKES INSPECTION TOUR

Ndjamena INFO TCHAD in French Oct 85 pp 5-7

[Text] CHADIAN PRESS AGENCY--International Action Against Hunger (AICF) Secretary General Jean-Manuel Pietri, on assignment in Chad, held a press conference last evening in the gardens of the Chari Hotel in Ndjamena. Mr Pietri is visiting Chad for the fourth time, and the purpose of his visit is to assess the work done by his organization in our country. The AICF, which has a resident delegation in Ndjamena, is active in three of our prefectures--Guera, Salamat and Mayo-Kebbi. Its main field of activity is agricultural development, with a view to conquering hunger and thus achieving self-sufficiency in food.

Describing the origins of his institution, Mr Pietri said that the AICF is a young nongovernmental organization (ONG) established at the end of 1979 by a group of humanists, including the French journalist Giroud, who were tired of the war which rages in our world. An apolitical organization, the AICF has as its sole purpose the battle against hunger, responding to the dramatic need created by this scourge. In short, it is devoted to conquering underdevelopment. Since its establishment, it has been active in a number of countries experiencing a situation of war or famine. Thus the organization undertook its first work in Uganda in 1980, during the terrible famine in Karamoja. It was active in Afghanistan during the Russian invasion, and has worked in Thailand and in Brazil, in Latin America.

Active in Chad since 1981, the AICF passed its first test with the reconditioning of the ferry service across the Chari, thanks to financial assistance from the Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC). Since that time, it has broadened its field of action, and it is thus that since 1982 it has been established in the Guera region, where it has undertaken very praiseworthy work with the development of wells, dams, pressed brick, village nurseries, draft animals, and community granaries--in short a whole wide range of means of combatting desertification, the consequences of which are always harmful to the country. It is for this reason that, jointly with the European Economic Community (FED [European Development Fund]), with a 50 percent share for each, plus human investments, the AICF has undertaken a vast 2-year project which will cost a total of 100 million CFA francs. It has already built 50 dams, 10,000 improved homes, 60,000 product plants, numerous dikes and some 200 wells in Guera. All of this was done under the direction of an agronomical

engineer, and according to Mr Pietri, the institution plans to strengthen this team between now and the end of the year by sending another engineer, another large tanker, and also new working equipment. The secretary general emphasized that the activities of the AICF supplement those of other bodies such as the Red Cross, Doctors Without Frontiers (MSF) and Catholic Aid for Development (SECADEV).

But in view of the adjacent location of the two regions and above all the urgent needs, the AICF has since then expanded its activities to Salamat, a zone regarded as the breadbasket of Chad, if it were truly developed. Since its establishment in this area, the AICF has set itself the major goal of maintaining some 3,000 hectares and, according to Mr Pietri, it is functioning in close collaboration with the other missions located there, specifically the German Farm Mission and Doctors Without Frontiers. Mr Pietri went on to say that his organization has, since April 1985, using its own resources, been engaged in a vast farm project supervised by an agronomical engineer. As a result, the repair work on the dam over the Barh Azoum, undertaken some 20 years ago, has been begun again.

The AICF has also been established in Bongor since 1983. There is a special mission here financed by a local committee, and its task is the development of fish breeding, also supervised by an agronomical engineer. However, Mr Pietri explained, "This project is in the experimental phase, and we are finding our way, since fish breeding is not an activity very well known in Chad as yet." Because of this, he added, an effort is being made to try a little of everything for the time being, to wit the raising of hogs, poultry, etc., while awaiting a more favorable period.

Assessing the achievements during his visit, and above all the actions of the AICF in Chad since its establishment, the secretary general stated that his organization in France is very satisfied with its undertakings. Mr Pietri said that this satisfaction is the result of the fact that the AICF has long experience more or less everywhere in Africa (Burkina Faso, Senegal, Zaire, Sudan, Niger, Uganda, Mali, Ethiopia, etc.), but that in Chad has been very instructive. "The country is stabilizing and the administration is perfect," he said, seemingly very pleased.

The AICF, which has the slogan "we will conquer hunger," seeks above all to give the peasants confidence and to put them at ease. This is done solely through consciousness raising. This official added that "the harvests for the coming year are estimated at 500,000 tons of grains, which indicates that Chad will succeed in achieving self-sufficiency in food. However this will in no way lead the AICF, cautious and humanitarian institution that it is, to abandon its efforts. We need the greatest possible margin of safety, because experience has taught us that nature is full of about-faces and whims." He explained that the "nature of the AICF is to be pragmatic and realistic, and all of its energy is oriented in this direction," so as to avoid being caught by surprise by weather hazards.

As to the sources of financing for his organization, Mr Pietri said that two-thirds of the total is international, and the other third comes from 10,000 donors, from mayors' offices and from a recently established industrial club.

In addition, he said, from time to time his organization receives subsidies from the United Nations High Commissariat for Refugees (HCR), the European Development Fund (EDF), the Saudi Arabian Fund, Credit de France, foundations, etc. In order to obtain such gifts, the AICF uses mailings. In other words it sends letters to organizations and foundations, and it also carries out poster campaigns with slogans, press campaigns, etc.

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CHAD

NGUELI BRIDGE OPERATION DESCRIBED

Mdjamena INFO TCHAD in French 10 Oct 85 pp 3-4

[Article: "Continuity in Change, According to the Council Chamber"]

[Text] Since 30 July 1985, Chad has been officially linked with Cameroon by a bridge, that work of art located in Ngueli, 8 km from the Chagoua bridge, allowing passage from the Chadian side of the Logone River to the Cameroonian side without a long wait for a ferry crossing which would be made only after several hours if not days of waiting.

At the opening ceremony for the Ngueli bridge, many of the road's users, especially traders, felt ready to breathe a sigh of relief. They waited in vain for the bridge over the Chari which China was to build, but a small detour around the duck's beak to enter Cameroon or Nigeria was not unpleasant, so burdensome had the ferry crossing become because of the wait, the fare and the "duties" which all kinds of agents demanded and haggled over at length without receipts being given.

The motives which provided the impetus for the realization of the Ngueli bridge were basically humanitarian. After many weeks crossing the sea and waiting at the Douala or Nigerian ports and a long trip by road, the emergency aid unfortunately had to wait longer on the other bank of the Chari. The means for delivering it quickly had to be found. Thanks to financing from the UNDP and the Federal Republic of Germany, the construction of the bridge and two asphalted sections was decided upon and carried out. But as the Chadian minister of public works, mines and petroleum stressed, this bridge also constitutes a positive factor in opening up our country.

Recently, however, carriers have been singing a somewhat different tune. It is not that they are not using the Ngueli bridge, but simply that the use of this route is not free as is that via the Chari bridge or the Manda and Lere routes. According to an official of the Chad Council Chamber, the operation of the Ngueli bridge is their responsibility. As a matter of fact, its

use has reduced if not done away with the ferry trips which yielded a profit (Fr 1,000 per ton). The profit from these trips made up a substantial portion of the revenue of the Council Chamber which employed some people to take care of operations. Clearly, discontinuing the Ndjamena-Kousseri ferry would at worst involve layoffs and at best compensation for loss of work for a certain number of people.

The Council Chamber therefore requested and received authorization for the ferry crossing fees to be transferred to the Ngueli bridge at the same time as the Ndjamena-Kousseri ferry continues to operate. For the latter will stay in service on a reduced scale, of course with lower revenues because it will be mainly pedestrians and cyclists, deterred from using the Ngueli detour on account of its length, who will use the ferry. But some here and there are asking the question, From the point of view of the construction of the bridge over the Chari, what do the authorities of the Chad Council Chamber have in mind? Would such a clause be included in the administrative plans for this bridge? At the moment, these questions have no answers.

The second operator of these two communication routes is the National Office of Roads (OFNAR). In an interview, Djime Ahmat, a National Office official, acknowledged that most of the office's revenues came from the bridge and ferries. These revenues are derived exclusively from tanker trucks transporting petroleum products (diesel oil, gasoline). For a 3,000 liter tanker, the duty comes to a bit more than Fr 500,000. Even if only five tankers come through per day, this represents more than Fr 2 million in earnings for the National Office. The rationale put forward by Djime was that these trucks are very hard on the roads for which maintenance costs are extremely high. (ATP) [CHAD PRESS AGENCY].

9824
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CHAD

LAC PREFECTURE AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS OUTLINED

Ndjamena INFO TCHAD in French 16 Oct 85 p 5

[Article by Mboudou Seid: "Deplorable Agricultural Situation in the Lac Area"]

[Text] The Lac prefecture has again experienced an agricultural shortfall this year, despite the fact that the beginning of the rainy season had aroused the hopes of the farmers as they contemplated their corn, wheat and the various secondary crops which were still growing at a normal rate. A sudden halt in rainfall in August throughout nearly the entire Lac prefecture, particularly Bol, Baga-Sola, Liwa, Ngarangou, Issemirom and Ngouri-Badari, resulted in a more or less general withering of the new growth. This situation was brought about by the poor distribution of rain in the previously mentioned areas.

In the Ngouri subprefecture, for example, the Agriculture Department recorded a dry period, resulting in a sharp drop in crops. To this situation must be added the fact of the variety of plants with long cycles which are not suited to this area, and which have not managed to reach maturity. Furthermore, some farmers have made substantial reductions in their farming areas for lack of funds since a coro of millet seed costs 2,000 CFA Fr; others quite simply did not plant at all. Granted, there was plenty of water from the lake, but this rising water flooded thousands of hectares of corn.

The destruction is continuing as the water advances, because the dams which have gone a long time without repair are no longer holding up before the pressure of the water, resulting in the devastation of the corn fields which for the most part are in the ear-forming and milky maturation stage. Thus, faced with the withering of the early growth on the one hand, and the flooding of the corn fields on the other, the people are wondering what will become of them. Trusting in the government of the Third Republic which is resolutely engaging in the struggle against famine and drought, the farmers are hoping that an effort will be made to come to their assistance. The sending of foodstuffs and sufficient materiel is necessary, and a welcome policy would

also consist in assisting food growers not only to increase their own stock of consumer products, but also to produce surpluses which would enable them to meet basic needs to tide them over. (ATP) [CHAD PRESS AGENCY].

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CHAD

BRIEFS

THREAT OF FAMINE--The Guera prefecture is threatened by famine despite the abundant rains at the beginning of the rainy season which heralded good crops. The Guera prefect, Comrade Daoud Kinefour, with the ONDR [Chadian National Office for Rural Development] section head, the WFP representative Melle Therese and Dr. Emmanuel from the Red Cross League of Societies [LSCR] based in Mongo made a trip to Melfi on a special plane to verify on location the alarming news concerning the food situation in the area. This catastrophic situation, according to our correspondent in Mongo, is due to the sudden cessation of the rains. In Central Melfi and within a radius of 10 km, the plants have withered in their ear-forming stage. At the present time, more than 10,000 people are threatened by famine. To deal with this alarming situation, 200 tons of emergency food aid are being sent with the assistance of the WFP to this city. The areas most threatened by famine are the following villages: Central Melfi, Dabakaye, Zargar, Dabakaye Sifera, Ndjamena, Danga, Tchafa, Mari, Mosso, Atya Backa, Mouraye Hiltalhimod, Mabono, Ablo, Hore, Wa, Amassi, Goumi, Mcbra, Backa Arabe, Backa Baraine, Madmoro, and Balarai. (ATP) [CHAD PRESS AGENCY]. [Text] [Ndjamenya INFO TCHAD in French 17 Oct 85 pp 4-5] 9824

CSO: 3419/62

DJIBOUTI

IMPROVEMENTS TO AIRPORT REPORTED

Djibouti LA NATION in French 24 Oct 85 p 3

[Text] Last Thursday, in the conference room at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, an important document was signed by Minister of Commerce, Transportation and Tourism, Moussa Bouraleh Roblel, and the several providers of funding, including the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the state of Kuwait, and the emirate of Abu-Dhabi.

What they were signing was an agreement for \$21 million in financing for expanding and upgrading the Djibouti International Airport. The project, which emerged from the Donors' Conference in November 1983, calls for expanding and creating the most efficient and best adapted facilities in this service sector which is one of the pillars of our economy.

It calls on the one hand for resurfacing and strengthening the runway so as to allow for smooth and expeditious flow of exponentially increasing traffic in the most effective manner, as well as updating, remodeling, and improving the air terminal facilities.

The present terminal, build in 1976, was designed as a transfer point, with capacity for processing 60 passengers per day. As of now, though, it seems that daily passenger traffic runs anywhere from 200 to 300. The situation will be markedly improved by separating local from international traffic, as well as dividing the arrival and departure areas for international traffic and doubling or tripling the baggage claim systems, whose present equipment is worn out and obsolete.

Most Up-to-date in the Region

The project also provides for a modern air-ground communications system. All of this will bring our facilities fully into compliance with ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] standards, improve flight navigation, enhance security and timely flight departures, and allow for expanded reception of several kinds of information, including meteorological data.

Furthermore, the doubling in size of the air-freight zone will greatly increase the reception capabilities for good storage.

It is also worth underscoring, in the context of this project, there there will be upgraded managerial capacity for handling various groups of employees. Training is, of course, the vital component in any development of technical capabilities.

At the time of that meeting, the minister reminded his audience that, "Our Arab brethren have responded very generously to our hopes, witness this airport expansion project," financing for which has been shared as follows by the three donor countries: Kuwait 42.7 percent, Saudi Arabia 33.5 percent, and Abu-Dhabi 23.8 percent.

At the close of the meeting, Moussah Bourleh thanked our sister Arab nations for the help they have given our country, rated among the least advanced countries. "We have every confidence," he concluded, "in Afro-Arabian and inter-Arab international cooperation."

Similarly, the influx of money will mean that the airport area (container terminal) will be supplemented by completion of this project which will, beyond any doubt, make our airport not only the biggest, but unquestionably the most modern in the region.

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CSO: 3419/66

DJIBOUTI

FLOUR-MILLING INDUSTRY DEVELOPED, INDUSTRIALIZED

Djibouti LA NATION in French 24 Oct 85 p 3

[Text] After the Government of the Republic of Djibouti gave the green light to plans to move the country into the industrial era--lo and behold--the Khat Importing Corporation (SOGIC) is pitching in to help in the country's economic takeoff drive. This makes three times! What can we say of the imminent materialization of the Djibouti flourmill?

It is true: a new plant will be going up very soon now. Following in the wake of the Tadjoura mineral-water plant and the Djibouti dairy-products plant, a third one, this time mainly privately owned, will be moving into the national flour market.

What with water and milk taken care of, that left only bread. Three raw materials vital to the survival of the human species. A splendid trilogy: water, milk, and bread to sustain the burgeoning development of a young nation. A nation that was by no means spoilt by the riches of its national resources, its soil, or even what might lie beneath it. A nation, though, which, by dint of labor and determination, thanks to a policy long in gestation and carefully ripened, is now on its way to facing up to and dealing, one by one, with all its problems. While the first two plants were the work of Djibouti's government, with the help of friendly countries, this third one is the product of a Djibouti corporation.

Despite the endless negotiations stemming from the hazards of the road, which required a feasibility study for the flourmill, the project at last got the green light. Of course, creating such an enterprise would be impossible without the state's having a hand in it. The present flour-marketing system requires that all aspects and dimensions of flour-milling and production be fully mastered so as to avoid untoward disruption to supplies for makers and the price of bread.

Around the Clock

Total investment cost is around 350 million Djibouti francs. Major equipment for the Djibouti flourmill consists of a mill that can grind 2.5 tons of wheat per hour, and a storage silo with a capacity of 1,400 tons. Unloading the bulk-cargo grain-ships will be handled by 100-ton/hour pneumatic suction-pumps

which will transfer the grain into waiting dump-trucks averaging about 10-ton capacity. The plant will be capable of handling 60 tons of wheat every 24 hours, or, at a processing rate of 75 percent, a production capacity of 45 tons of flour per day. In addition, the mill will be working around the clock at constant load.

The total yield, allowing for possible spillage in handling and transport, is estimated at 96 percent. The mill's maximum production capacity means processing 18,000 tons of wheat to produce 18,000 tons of flour. However, during the first 2 years, pending completion of another unit to produce pasta and biscuits, the mill will be operating at two-thirds of its top potential, which is 9,000 tons of flour and about 2,500 tons of bran. Under these conditions, the silo's storage capacity of stock for more than a month of operation will prove quite adequate. As for supplies to the mill, that will be taken care of by monthly shipments of about 1,200 tons each. Two yearly shutdowns for about 3 weeks a piece are planned for regular maintenance (regrooving the chutes).

What Is the Outlook for the Mill?

SOGIK's management did not jump into this project just for the fun of building a plant. Far from it. Calculating that that may not go on selling forever, they decided that it might be prudent to switch to a far more useful, not to mention indispensable product. The startup of the flourmill project will not be confined solely to producing flour. Since there is no market in Djibouti for by-products, SOGIK has other plans in mind.

The first one deals with bran. A plan to manufacture cattle-feed is in the works, and it calls for forming its bran into cattle-cake. Once this plant is brought up to speed, it will turn out 10,000 tons of cattle-cake and can use about 2,000 tons of bran the mill turns out. Furthermore, there are poultry-raising projects under way and more are contemplated: there may well be a market for 500 additional tons of bran and straw as well, as is a project for producing pasta and biscuits.

For the time being, however, the Djibouti mill will not begin operations until the end of this year, and all we can hope for as of now is a drop in the price of flour, and consequently welcome dip in the price of a loaf of bread.

6182/13045

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GABON

RELATIONS WITH FRANCE, ECONOMIC SITUATION ANALYZED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 30 Oct 85 pp 6-8

[Text]

On the morning of 11 August a young Gabonese airforce captain, **Alexandre Mandja Ngokouta**, was shot by firing squad on a Libreville beach. His public televised execution, three months after the discovery of a coup plot, was the first time a Gabonese officer had been put to death for conspiring against the state since President **Omar Bongo** came to power in 1967.

A few weeks earlier, in June, a petitioner trying to hand a letter to the president at Libreville's Léon Mba Airport was shot in cold blood after being tackled and subdued by Bongo's personal bodyguards. The president got a cool reception when he visited the victim's home town, Mouila, in the northern province of Ngounié, a few days later. His trip there was part of a two month tour of the provinces which saw one other ugly mishap - a helicopter crash killing 10 people, including the country's most popular television presenter. To the Gabonese, most of whom are still deeply influenced by traditional animist beliefs, it looked suspiciously as if Bongo's luck was turning.

Although Mandja's conspiracy¹ was the work of an isolated individual, his antipathy to the Bongo regime was not unique in the armed forces. Many of the younger middle-ranking officers who have been abroad for training in France or the United States are frustrated by the lack of professionalism and the corruption among the politically-appointed senior ranks. Some, like Mandja, would appear to have broader aspirations to moralise Gabonese society.

However, the chances of a successful coup by the regular armed forces are highly unlikely. Not only are they extremely small in size (a little over 2,000 men), fragmented, poorly equipped and closely monitored by Bongo's intelligence services, but they

are outnumbered and outgunned by an elite *Garde Présidentielle* (GP) officered entirely by foreigners - mainly Frenchmen and **Moroccans** - of unwavering loyalty. A privileged, highly-paid force, the GP has been commanded for the past 15 years by a veteran of Dien Bien Phu, Gen. **Martin**.

In addition, France acts as a guarantor. Besides the freelance French officers in the GP, who are recruited under individual contracts, 125 French officers are seconded to the Gabonese army, navy and airforce under a Franco-Gabonese military agreement dated from 1960. French officers pilot most of the nine *Mirage V* jets delivered to the Gabonese airforce over the past two years.

In return for this security assistance, France is allowed to station about 600 troops in Libreville, at the *Camp De Gaulle* near Léon Mba Airport, where three or four *Jaguar* fighter-bombers can usually be spotted on the tarmac. The French presence is as much in evidence now as it was when Gabon became independent in 1960. Indeed, the number of French expatriates in the country has more than quadrupled since then, from 6,000 to 25,000. *Elf Aquitaine*, the French state company, pumps most of Gabon's oil and France still provides over 60% of imports.

There have been occasional flurries of tension between Paris and Libreville - most notably in the aftermath of the publication in France in 1983 of **Pierre Péan**'s book *Affaires Africaines*, which detailed Bongo's association with mercenaries, the Biafran secession, **Bob Denard**'s raid on Cotonou in 1977 and Rhodesian sanctions-busting. The seal was set on this embarrassing affair by Bongo's state visit to Paris in October 1984.

Nonetheless, it was Mitterrand's election victory which encouraged opponents of Bongo to risk challenging him openly in 1981. A clandestine *Mouve-*

ment de Redressement National (Morena) started circulating anti-government propaganda calling for a multi-party system. Bongo cracked down hard. Dozens of *Morena* activists were arrested and 29 of the 37 of them brought before the State Security Court in November 1982 were convicted. Having nipped the movement in the bud, Bongo felt he could afford to show clemency. The *Morena* detainees were gradually released – the last six being amnestied on 15 August this year. Among them was **Jean-Pierre Nzgue Nguema**, a former rector of Libreville's Omar Bongo University.

Today *Morena* has no organised presence within Gabon. But on 12 August *Morena* exiles in Paris announced the formation of a “provisional government”, headed by **Max Koumba-Mbabinga** as prime minister. Bongo had earlier sought and apparently received assurances that dissident activities by *Morena* would not be tolerated in France. Franco-Gabonese relations took another minor knock, but the damage was quickly repaired by the French foreign minister, **Roland Dumas**, who took a snap decision to fly to Libreville to attend the 17 August celebrations of the 25th anniversary of Gabon's independence.

Apart from the *Garde Présidentielle* and the French alliance, Bongo's strength is built on oil, which has given the country's extremely small population (estimated at 800,000) by far the highest per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa (\$4,500 in 1984). Although this wealth is very unequally distributed, the multiplier effects of the oil boom have benefited all urban Gabonese. Gabon has the highest minimum wages in the region and until recently the government has had sufficient resources to guarantee public sector jobs to all lycée and university graduates.

Oil revenues – and the patronage they have made possible – have enabled Bongo, an astute tactician, to play three seemingly contradictory roles at the same time. At one level he has been a tribal leader, favouring his own Batéké, a very small group numbering no more than 40,000 in Gabon, **Congo** and **Zaire** combined. Resources have been poured into the south-eastern city of Franceville, the capital of the Batéké area which is to be the terminus of his 800bn CFA franc Transgabonais railway, due for completion in December 1986. At another level, Bongo is leader of a coalition of Gabon's small tribal groups who fear the potential dominance of the Fang, a traditionally warrior people who invaded from **Cameroun** in the 19th century and now constitute 40% of the population. Though the Fang-populated north has not received its fair share of resources, Bongo has used his powers of patronage

to incorporate prominent Fang into his regime too. They are well represented in his cabinet, notably by the prime minister, **Léon Mebiame**.

The disappearing Gabonese

Bongo has cut across internal divisions by encouraging his countrymen's antagonism towards foreigners. Last January a presidential speech against foreign shopkeepers resulted in scores of **Lebanese** stores being pillaged. However, Gabonese xenophobia is mainly directed against the foreign Africans who have arrived over the past 15 years, attracted by the country's oil wealth. They numbered 112,000 in the 1980 census, and today account for about a quarter of the population. Most are thought to have entered illegally, crossing the border from **Equatorial Guinea** or **Cameroun** – or arriving by *pirogue* from along the West African coast. Some have come from as far afield as **Senegal** and **Mali**.

In May Bongo ordered a census of the entire foreign population. All foreigners had to register with the authorities in June and, whether they entered the country legally or illegally, their registration certificates now allow them to stay, at least temporarily. That might change as falling oil revenues depress the economy. But the government has so far promised that there will be no **Nigerian**-style mass expulsions.

Though Gabon will not have to cope with economic problems of Nigerian magnitude – the feared *après-pétrole* is still at least a decade away – the decline in oil revenues has forced the government to plan a 15% cut in its investment spending next year. All new investment projects are to be deferred, and the government projects a 1.5% nominal decline in GDP, implying a fall in real terms of well over 10% in 1986.

Competition for jobs will intensify. Under an official Gabonisation policy the ministry of human resources is increasing pressure on foreign companies to recruit Gabonese staff in place of expatriates, and in the public sector the number of French *coopérants* is gradually being reduced.

But private sector employers are often reluctant to take on Gabonese, either on the grounds that they are inadequately qualified or, at lower levels, because their minimum wage is 25% higher than that for foreign Africans. Economic contraction will also diminish the resources available for the patronage that currently oils Bongo's political system, and intensify regional and ethnic competition, notably between Fang and non-Fang.

Bongo has no intention of bowing to the dissidents' call for a multi-party system, though he has recently allowed an element of competition for politi-

cal office within the framework of the ruling *Parti Démocratique Gabonais* (PDG). For the first time rival candidates were allowed to stand for parliament in the first round of the last general elections, held on 17 February. 268 candidates competed for 111 seats, and 49 sitting deputies lost to newcomers. The inflated salaries paid to parliamentarians (1.2m CFA francs or a little over \$3,000 a month) were inducement enough to ensure heated electoral contests. However, all the candidates had to be approved beforehand by the PDG's politburo, and the electorate was restricted to party militants in local PDG committees. The successful candidates were then ratified by universal suffrage in the second round, on 3 March. No first round competition can be anticipated for the next presidential election, due at the end of 1986. Bongo, it can be safely assumed, will be chosen as sole candidate at next year's PDG congress.

Footnote

'A graduate of US and French military academies, Capt Mandja, who was based at Libreville's air base, belonged to a quasi-secret evangelical sect, *Christianisme Céleste*, that originated in Togo, Benin and Nigeria. He believed he had received instructions from God to overthrow Bongo and kill him, along with 30 or so of his closest collaborators whose names he was foolish enough to write down on a hit list that fell into his captors' hands.

Mandja had done no more than seek out recruits for his plot when his intentions were betrayed by some of his fellow officers – though three of his confidants were convicted by a special military court on 1 August for failing to turn him in. Two of them were sentenced to forced labour in perpetuity. *Christianisme Céleste* was not implicated in Mandja's plot and so has not been banned, but prominent Gabonese who were members of the sect have been ordered to terminate their involvement.

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CSO: 3400/457

GHANA

JAPAN SHIFTING TO GRANTS INSTEAD OF LOANS

Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 29 Oct 85 pp 1, 5

Article by James Mensah: "Japanese Grants for Ghana"

Text A high ratio of Japanese Government assistance to Ghana is to be in the form of grants instead of loans as from next year.

This is to help the country in her efforts at self-reliance, economic and social development.

The Japanese Government is also to increase her assistance to Ghana under the Official Development Assistance (ODA) as from the next fiscal year.

This is in line with Japan's decision to further fulfil her international obligation by increasing her assistance to developing countries by 10 percent each year so that by 1992, the amount granted under the ODA should be double that of 1985.

Mr Kazuaki Arichi, Japanese Ambassador in Ghana, disclosed this at the first anniversary celebrations of the Mfantsipim Secondary School Chapter of the Ghana-Japan Friendship Association in Cape Coast at the weekend.

On Ghana-Japan relations, Mr Arichi mentioned the bronze statue of Dr Noguchi at the Korle Bu Teaching Hospital and the Noguchi Memorial Institute at the University of Ghana, Legon, as symbols of the friendly relationship between the two countries.

The Noguchi Memorial Institute, he said, is a modern example of medical co-operation project of Japan in Ghana, combining grant and technical co-operation for which the government of Japan provided Ghana two billion yen (9 million US dollars) for its establishment between 1977 and 1978.

The Ambassador said in the field of technical co-operation, his government accepted 376 Ghanaian trainees in Japan and dispatched to Ghana 241 Japanese experts and 153 young Japanese volunteers.

It also provided equipment valued at more than one billion yen, while in the field of aid, Japan provided food, aid for the improvements of roads and highways, promotion of fisheries and assistance towards the rehabilitation of Ghanaian returnees from Nigeria, and the rehabilitation of the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation to the tune of more than 11 billion yen (about 52 million US dollars) all in 1983.

/12851

CSO: 3400/410

ROMANIA AND GERMANY

GHANA

OBENG ON INDIAN COOPERATION, POSSIBLE MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 2 Nov 85 p 1

Article by Faustina Ashirifie: "Ghana Has a Lot to Learn"

Text The Leader of the Revolution, Flt-Lt J.J. Rawlings, has stated that Ghana has a lot to learn from the creativity and determination with which India tackles her problems.

He was talking to the outgoing Indian High Commissioner to Ghana, Mr Gurcharan Singh, when the latter paid a farewell call on him at the Castle Osu, yesterday after a four-year duty tour in Ghana.

Chairman Rawlings who appreciated the friendship of India and her oneous assistance to Ghana, also praised India's role in the Non-Aligned Movement.

At the instance of the Chairman, Mr P.V. Obeng, PNDC member who was also present, commented on some of India's co-operation and assistance to Ghana which included the development of the socio-cultural and economic relations between the two countries.

Referring to a discussion he has earlier had with Mr Singh, Mr Obeng hinted that India has agreed in principle to send to Ghana experts to work alongside their local counterparts in some of the vital economic sectors.

Mr Obeng further disclosed that India was willing to extend military training to the Ghana Army to increase her level of co-operation in that field.

He praised the consistency and determination with which India tackles her development programmes in the areas of minihydro projects, food security system, rural development and drainage systems which he said, are worth emulating.

Our agricultural development, Mr Obeng noted that the country has completed the review of her agricultural sector, adding that the coming in of the experts would be of immense help to Ghana.

The PNDC member was of the view that since the cultural backgrounds and problems of the two countries are similar, the mentality of their peoples and their approach to solving problems are equally similar, thus necessitating the need for Ghana to learn from India's experiences.

The PNDC member who bade Mr Singh farewell, expressed the hope that his successor would show the same commitment and enthusiasm with which he carried out his duties.

Mr Singh stressed on the similarities between the two countries in tradition, culture, high illiteracy rate and various past problems of the Indian economy, which according to him, have been surmounted.

He expressed his country's willingness and readiness to share with Ghana her development in the field of agriculture which has been possible due to long-tested internal policies on education, technology, industry and science.

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CSO: 3400/410

GHANA

MEDIATORY DELEGATION DEPARTS FOR TUNIS

Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 4 Nov 85 pp 1, 5

Text A joint mediatory delegation of Ghana and Burkina Faso has left Accra for Tunis and Tripoli with a special message from Chairman Rawlings and Captain Thomas Sankara for the Heads of State of Tunisia and Libya.

The leader of the fourman Ghanaian team, Captain Kojo Tsikata, member of the PNDC, told newsmen in Accra at the weekend before their departure that the message is related to the present dispute between Libya and Tunisia.

Following the expulsion of Tunisian workers from Libya, tension has arisen between the two countries in recent times.

According to the PNDC member, the mediatory effort of the two countries is the result of the communique issued jointly in Ouagadougou by Chairman Rawlings and Captain Sankara about a month ago to find an amicable settlement to the conflict between Libya and Tunisia.

Captain Tsikata, who is also PNDC member responsible for Foreign Affairs and Security said the mission is being undertaken in the spirit of African unity.

Other members of the Ghanaian team are Mr Kofi Djin, Secretary for Trade, Colonel Jeff Asmah, Ghana's Ambassador to Libya and Tunisia and Mr Jack Wilmot, Director of Africa and OAU Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Burkinabe team is being led by Major Bukari Lingani, member of the National Revolutionary Council and Minister of Defence.

The delegation which would be away for three days was seen off by the Charge d'Affaires of the Libyan People's Bureau. Mr Omar Alghadi and officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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CSO: 3400/410

GHANA

UNIVERSITY PRODUCING PHARMACEUTICALS FROM LOCAL MATERIALS

Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 1 Nov 85 pp 1, 5

Article by Kwaku Nehemia: "UST Producing Drugs From Local Materials"

Text

THE Production Unit established recently by the Faculty of Pharmacology of the University of Science and Technology (UST), Kumasi, has started the production of first class quality drugs using mainly local resources and materials.

This is to help the country improve upon its drug situation and also reduce the amount of hard currency used in importing drugs from abroad.

The establishment of the Production Unit forms part of the university's programme to attach such units to all faculties to make them viable and also provide avenues for the students to translate their research findings into productive use.

This was disclosed by Dr R. Ansah Asamoah, Senior Lecturer and head of the faculty at a press conference held by the Ashanti Regional branch of the Pharmaceutical Society of Ghana in Kumasi yesterday as part of activities marking the Golden Jubilee celebration of the society.

Dr Asamoah said Ghana has a warehouse of medicinal plants and materials which if effectively put to use, can contribute massively towards effective health delivery.

Some of the drugs currently being produced by the faculty are mist sennaceo, analgesic and kaolin drugs.

According to Dr Asamoah, the Faculty of Pharmacology in conjunction with the Centre for Scientific Research into Plant Medicine and herba-

lists associations has started an intensive exercise to identify medicinal plants in the country for production of drugs and other medicaments.

He stated that the faculty has helped Nigeria to establish a similar faculty of international repute and disclosed that arrangements are far advanced to help Liberia to establish a similar one.

Mr Mike Adzua, Secretary of the Ashanti Regional branch of the Pharmaceutical Society of Ghana, spoke at length on the role of a pharmacist and stressed the need for the review of the Pharmacy Act of 1964 to make the check on drug abuse and misuse more effective.

He disclosed that the association will soon embark on a programme to educate the general public on drug abuse and misuse.

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CSO: 3400/413

GHANA

AGRO BASED FIRMS ASSURED OF PNDC SUPPORT

Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 26 Oct 85 p 5

Article by Abdul Aziz: "Agro-Based Firms Assured of Support"

Text

THE PNDC Government is shifting emphasis from import-oriented to locally-oriented raw material industries, Dr Francis Acquah, Secretary for Industries, Science and Technology, has said.

This is to guarantee the continuous operation of agro-based and other relevant industries using locally-available raw materials.

It will also lessen the demand on the foreign reserves of the country so that essential items that must be imported can be adequately catered for.

In an address delivered on his behalf on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Accra Machine Shop (AMS) in Accra yesterday, by Mr Dan Ayaviee, acting Chief Director

(Technical Division) of the Ministry, Dr Acquah said the government's policy on industrialisation considers the metal sector as a very high priority area to provide support base to the industrial sector.

Dr Acquah said it is in this direction that the government, despite the foreign exchange constraints is doing its best to help such industries to make their impact felt in the Economic Recovery Programme.

He urged local industries to explore alternative ways of promoting the growth of their industries so that lack of foreign exchange will not unduly hamper their operation.

Mr M. M. Mortoo, Managing Director of AMS, appealed to the government to implement the ministry's proposal that the machine shop goes into small spareparts manufacturing to help boost the transport industry.

Mr Mortoo said if this proposal is carried out, it would help to conserve the foreign exchange of the country.

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CSO: 3400/413

GHANA

GOVERNMENT ALLOCATES FUNDS FOR ROAD CONSTRUCTION, REPAIR

Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC in English 30 Oct 85 p 6

Article by Debrah Fynn: "Government Votes ₦700m for Road Repairs"

Text

THE government has earmarked ₦700 million under the 1985 budget for periodic maintenance of trunk roads in the country, Mr E. O. Donkor, Secretary for Roads and Highways has disclosed.

Mr Donkor who was receiving road maintenance equipment from the Government of Japan at a ceremony at Sege in the Greater Accra Region yesterday observed that Ghana has reached a stage in her socio-economic development where its road infrastructure needs to be vigorously tackled.

The equipment, which were presented by Mr Kazhaki Arichi, the Japanese Ambassador in Ghana include tipper trucks, water tankers, bitumen distributors, tractor heads, chain saws, motor graders and excavators.

Others include pick-ups, mobile laboratories, crawler dozers, wheel loaders, pneumatic rollers, level instruments and related spare parts all valued at ₦140 million.

This is the second time the Japanese Government has presented to Ghana equipment for road

rehabilitation. The first was in June, 1983.

Mr Donkor noted that to give a concrete meaning to the avowed aims and objectives of the government to improve the lot of the people, the PNDC has within the last four years attached great importance to the country's road infrastructure by releasing substantial funds for maintenance.

The Secretary on behalf of the government expressed his sincere gratitude to the Japanese Government for the generous offer which, he stressed, will go a long way to improve the already cordial relations existing between the two countries.

Making the presentation, Mr Arichi contended that the improvement of roads and highways is one of the most important needs of the economic development of Ghana.

He pointed out that the rehabilitation of the roads system which connects the productive areas to the consuming centres is an indispensable factor for economic development, particularly in the case of an agricultural country like Ghana.

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CSO: 3400/413

MALAWI

COUNTRY MAINTAINS FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENT STATUS

Blantyre DAILY TIMES in English 25 Oct 85 p 4

[Editorial: "A Feat That Malawians Can Maintain"]

[Text]

THE NATIONAL Assembly has opened on an optimistic note that Malawi has been able to maintain its feat as a food self-sufficient nation. Members started their deliberations on Wednesday after His Excellency the Life President had performed the State Opening of Parliament on Tuesday full of praise for these achievements.

The Motion which the members are debating has already summed up the people's gratitude to the many things that the Malawi leader has achieved for his people in this country.

Indeed, the colour, dignity and pomp that crowned the State Opening of Parliament at Parliament Building in Zomba that day, had put another seal on the unity of purpose for which Malawians are known, and which the Ngwazi notes with pride.

The Life President's State Address gave all the salient points on how Malawians have been transformed from a poverty stricken people in colonial days to a happy nation of well-fed, well dressed and

well-housed people.

Why are Malawians admired? Unity, loyalty, obedience and discipline — the four cornerstones upon which the Party and Government are founded — have produced great wonders. There is no tribalism, no sectionalism or regionalism as was the case in the pre-independent times, or as it is in other countries now.

We are sure Malawi's cause for pride is justified. Which other country in Africa can boast 'mountains and mountains' of maize such as the ones the Ngwazi saw at various places he visited during his pre-Convention tour of the districts in the North? Certainly, this is a great feat for Malawi at a time when many countries are starving and people in some countries literally dying from hunger.

We say once more, Malawi needs a pat on the back for having a leader who teaches his people to work hard in the fields.

Today no district is left behind.

We say to all Malawians, keep up the spirit and the nation will continue to be in the lead.

MAURITIUS

ILOIS PROTEST OF COMPENSATION ACCORD DELAY REPORTED

Port Louis LE MAURICIEN in French 12 Oct 85 p 2

[Article: "Ilois Deplore Failure to Observe Anglo-Mauritian Agreement"]

[Text] At a press conference yesterday, the Chagos Refugee Group, a movement which defends the interests of the Ilois, deplored the failure to observe the Anglo-Mauritian agreement concerning the payment of 250,000 pounds sterling, approximately 5.2 million rupees, in final compensation. The movement is demanding the immediate release of this amount and has threatened to take certain steps if the Ilois do not obtain satisfaction.

Claudette Lefade, the group's president, declared that the sum of 250,000 pounds sterling had been withheld of the 4 million pounds in compensation offered by the British government for the settlement of the Ilois on Mauritius. The agreement signed to this effect stipulated that the 250,000 pounds would be paid before 31 December 1985 if no proceedings had been instituted by the Ilois community against the British government by this date. The group therefore believes that the time has come for the money to be distributed to the Ilois.

According to Lefade, the Ilois Trust Fund which administers the 250,000 pounds does not seem inclined to pay the compensation to the Ilois, claiming that the Mauritian workers displaced from Diego have instituted proceedings against it. From the viewpoint of the Chagos Refugees Group, this question is irrelevant because the Anglo-Mauritian agreement clearly stipulates that the compensation is to be used for the resettlement of the Ilois. The group believes that if there is compensation to be paid to these workers (about 150 of them), they should address themselves to the company which hired them.

The Ilois community maintains that the ITF [Ilois Trust Fund] is no longer looking out for their interests. It is asking the Mauritian and British governments to ensure that the agreement

they signed is observed to the letter. The Chagos Refugees Group sent a telex to the British prime minister asking her to intervene promptly. A reply on the subject is expected at the British High Commission in Mauritius. Moreover, the group plans to meet with the prime minister, Sir Gaetan Duval, and the minister of social security and national solidarity, Dr D. Bundhun, to seek satisfaction.

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CSO: 3419/74

MAURITIUS

LUTCHMEENARAIDOO OUTLINES ECONOMIC POLICY

Port Louis LE MAURICIEN in French 12 Oct 85 p 2

[Text] Reduction in the economic importance of sugar, accelerated agricultural diversification, and industrial development. Three "Master Plans" to be elaborated: telecommunications, water, and energy.

Yesterday, the minister of finance, Vishnu Lutchmeenaraidoo, described the economic policy which the island of Mauritius must follow during the next few years, a policy focusing on the consolidation and diversification of the economic base. "Without economic diversification, there will be no sustained growth," declared the minister who warned Mauritians against any euphoria stemming from the results expected for this year (a growth rate of approximately 6 percent), because, he stated, "our economic position is still tenuous."

In a press conference a few hours after returning from a mission to the Maldives and Seoul where he led a delegation to the annual meetings of the finance ministers of the commonwealth, the World Bank and the IMF respectively, Lutchmeenaraidoo stressed the fact that a greater effort toward economic diversification was necessary, because at any time the national economy could be affected by external factors. The minister believes that several political economic scenarios should be envisaged. In his opinion, it is necessary to work for the maintenance and indeed the consolidation of the agreement on the sugar quota with the European Economic Community and the export of our sugar to the United States. But, the minister observed, it is also necessary to see to it that the "weight" of sugar in the country's gross domestic product is reduced in the medium and long term. "I am not saying that production should be reduced, but it should come from a smaller land area, so that the land thus made available can be developed for growing other crops." Agricultural diversification, which is off to a good start, must be encouraged, because there is a considerable risk that the demand for sugar will decrease over the years," declared

Lutchmeenaraaidoo, who is pleased that of the approximately 2,200 projects approved under the Small Entrepreneur Financing Scheme, more than 50 percent are for agricultural projects. As far as he is concerned, it is not by chance that financial incentives were granted to the agricultural sector.

Textiles: Yes, But...

Lutchmeenaraaidoo observed that economic diversification includes the development of the industrial sector, especially the free zone. However, he noted that it is not enough simply to promote vertical trustification in the textile industry and improvement in product quality, but other possibilities should be developed also. Lutchmeenaraaidoo also recommended sustained efforts for diversifying our export markets and hinted that Media would have stations in several countries. In the same context, he alluded to markets in the preferential trade area (PTA). Later, when answering a question from the MAURICIEN about the delay in the application of new customs duties for the PTA, the minister emphasized that the government wanted to be sure that the island of Mauritius got a "fair deal." "We must be satisfied that after reducing our duties, Mauritian products benefit from preferential duties in the PTA member countries," he added.

According to the minister, economic diversification must be accompanied by cutting back on unproductive sectors. He stated that there were "potholes" in the public and private sectors--somewhat more in the former. These cutbacks have begun, Lutchmeenaraaidoo continued, because the public sector must prepare to enter the year 2000. On this subject, he announced that three "Master Plans" would be worked out, specifically affecting the telecommunications, water, and energy sectors.

Answering another question from the MAURICIEN as to whether he had made sure that there would be an infusion of sufficient capital to finance this diversification, Lutchmeenaraaidoo declared that it would be necessary to find financial resources to spur on the national economy, promote an enterprising spirit, and to further training. In this regard, he spoke of the negotiations presently under way for obtaining a "sugar sector loan" and an "industrial development loan." As far as training is concerned, he stated that the National Youth Training Program had been worked out and would soon be begun. This program will provide the bridge between academic training and the needs of businesses. "I am satisfied that we are on the right track," he declared.

Contentious Issues

Speaking of contacts established in Maldives and Seoul, Lutchmeenaraaidoo noted his positive meeting with Edward Jaycot of the World Bank, enabling him to settle some contentious issues. He

declared to the journalists present that these contentious issues concerned the conditions imposed by the World Bank to accelerate the Mauritian economy's structural readjustment process. While accepting the idea of readjustment, the minister declared "that he was not about to sell the island of Mauritius for a few million dollars." In his opinion, any condition should be linked with a sound economic development program, not with a purely theoretical and dogmatic one. "We are currently negotiating two loans, one for the sugar sector and another for the industrial sector. We do not want conditions that are difficult to observe," he said.

As concerns his meeting with Bhatia of the IMF, he said that he took the opportunity of reviewing the evolution of the present "standby" agreement, and of discussing future relations. Lutchmeenaraidoo made a point of stressing that at the moment these relations are very good, and that he was able to talk with the general manager of the IMF, J. de Larosiere at a luncheon in Seoul. "But," he added, "I would like the island of Mauritius to become gradually less dependent on the IMF."

The minister also made reference to the discussions he had had with the general manager of the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation, Yves Roland-Billecart, the new president of the African Development Bank, M'diaye, the president of the European Investment Bank, the Maldives minister of finance, the sultan of Brunei, and the president of the Morgan Guarantee (with whom he spoke of the computerization project, the daily oversight of our foreign currency reserves, and the service on the debt). On the bilateral level, the discussions centered on the possibilities of cooperation (e.g., fishing, telecommunications, and the surveillance of maritime areas with the Maldives), and with the financial institutions, the discussions dealt with future investments.

Moreover, Lutchmeenaraidoo announced that Chitnis, the director of the Development Bank and a member of the delegation, dealt with the issue of a line of credit with South Korea, since an offer to this effect was made to the prime minister, Aneerood Jugnauth, during his official visit to Seoul. Nevertheless, no decision has been made concerning this line of credit intended to finance our imports from South Korea.

Maldives/Seoul: Observation and Consensus

Summing up the Maldives and Seoul conferences, Lutchmeenaraidoo said that the participants had made the observation that a new world recession was possible even before a real economic recovery took hold. In Seoul, for example, the representatives of some countries compared the current situation with the prelude to the 1929 crisis when world trade dropped 25 percent as a result of protectionist measures. The minister made reference to

the protectionism that is being fostered in the industrialized countries, including the United States, where no less than 300 bills are to be studied by congress and the senate. The minister mentioned the "Jenkins bill" which has already been approved by the senate. "Any protectionist measure deals a crushing blow to the chances of economic recovery in the Third World," he declared.

The delegates to Maldives and Seoul were also concerned about the debt crisis. Commenting on American state treasury secretary Baker's statement that banks should make more loans to developing countries, the minister said that it should not be imagined that the United States had suddenly been overcome with compassion for the Third World. The fact is that Brazil and Mexico have technically suspended payments, and any inability to repay loans would bring on a banking crisis. The American government, he continued, is aware of the danger that the debt problem poses for the large democracies.

From Lutchmeenaraidoo's point of view, there was a consensus on four points during these two meetings: (1) we cannot afford another 1929 type recession, and the only solution is to fight against protectionism; (2) the time has come to go on from austerity to growth, while at the same time intensifying the structural readjustment process; (3) it is necessary to inject cash into the most indebted countries; and (4) there must be a drop in the dollar.

Moreover, Lutchmeenaraidoo stated that Peru's position--the president of this country declared that he would devote 10 percent of export receipts to servicing the debt--is logical and is gaining ground. The island of Mauritius, he remarked, is one of the countries which does the best job of repaying its debts, but has the effect of slowing down economic growth. In response to a question, the minister reaffirmed that there was no thought of rescheduling the country's debts.

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CSO: 3419/74

MAURITIUS

PLAISANCE AIRPORT INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS DESCRIBED

Port Louis LE MAURICIEN in French 10 Oct 85 p 4

[Article: "The New Plaisance Airport Will Bring About a Change in Our Habits"]

[Text] Imagine yourself in December 1987. You go to the airport. Once you have arrived at the Chaland traffic circle, you have to take a new two-lane road. This road gives access to the air terminal, and will run alongside a raised parking lot capable of accomodating 1,000 cars.

Inside the air terminal, each company will have its own counter. Passengers traveling first class will use a special counter and a departure waiting room prepared especially for them.

For planes arriving in Plaisance, once they have come to the end of the runway, they will be able to use one of the two routes connecting the takeoff strip and the boarding area. These two routes will enable the planes to get clear of the runway. Arriving passengers will no longer need to crowd onto the tarmac, but will use telescoping boarding ramps.

As a matter of fact, the new Plaisance air terminal, which will be ready in December 1987, will be fitted out with the most sophisticated equipment. It is even said that the new airport will be able to accomodate the new Boeing 747 (wing stretched version).

To take stock of the progress of the work, the minister of labor visited the site yesterday. Accompanied by Chinese ambassador Chen Duan, the minister expressed his satisfaction with the pace of construction. He is convinced that work will be completed in October 1987.

The minister of labor's visit to the site provided the opportunity for the workers assigned to the project to voice their complaints concerning wages. They appealed to the minister to review the situation.

MOZAMBIQUE

FOREIGN MINISTER CHISSANO ON RELATIONS WITH USSR, U.S.

LD092239 Paris International Service in French 1245 GMT 9 Nov 85

[Article by correspondent Carmen Bader, report on Mozambican Foreign Minister Joachim Chissano's news conference; date and place not given]

[Text] [Announcer] Mozambique needs everybody and does not want privileged relations with either of the superpowers. This is a brief summary of Foreign Minister Joachim Chissano's political thinking expressed yesterday in Paris. While stopping-over in the French capital on his way back from Moscow, the Mozambican minister confirmed the serious economic and military difficulties with which his country is confronted and which he is trying to solve through relatively innovative policies. Marxist in principle, the Mozambican regime has nonetheless engaged in a rapprochement with its very western neighbor South Africa, and President Samora Machel has just gone to Washington for an official visit.

Here is an account of Chissano's news conference by Carmen Bader:

[Bader] To remain faithful to a policy of nonalignment is a difficult exercise for a country which is in the eye of the storm in southern Africa. This is the gamble which Samora Machel's team made. For 2 years, Maputo has been flirting with the West and for the first time it has been looking toward Washington. At the same time, Mozambique is trying to intensify its historical cooperation with the USSR. We are open to all countries, Joachim Chissano said yesterday in Paris among other things.

On his way back from Moscow, the Mozambican foreign minister wanted to nip in the bud all the journalists' questions which might cast doubt on the very good relations which exist between the Soviet Union and his country. Deliberately reserved on the number of experts sent by Moscow to Mozambique, Chissano contented himself with saying that cooperation with Moscow covered all economic sectors, including of course the military sphere. The two sides reportedly decided to intensify their exchanges. So, how is Washington reacting to this? Well, the United States understand very well; only one thing might worry it: the installation of Soviet bases in Mozambique, a small sentence which refers to the recent and first official visit by Samora Machel to the United States.

The Reagan administration has been interested in Mozambique for 3 years. Joachim Chissano has confirmed, among other things, the presence of two American oil companies in his country. There is common ground between the two superpowers in their concern at the nationals staying there and whose stay might be unsafe, because of the National Resistance Movement's actions are at the root of Mozambique's current problems and hence the failure of the Nkomati accord with Pretoria. How does the Maputo regime accept the non-respect and the violations of this agreement by the South African side. With a highly diplomatic answer by Chissano the mere fact that Nkomati is referred to as respect or non-respect for the accord makes it easy for international public opinion to understand his country. There is no more talk of civil war in Mozambique but of guerrilla actions supported by Pretoria. Now, we have a text of reference, a good document, the minister explains and he concludes it establishes the necessary conditions so that, one day, we might vanquish the bandits in arms, which implies that the war is not won yet.

[Announcer] The problems of domestic security in Mozambique were to be largely solved by the signing of the famous Nkomati accord between Mozambique and South Africa. Unfortunately, internal opposition remains very aggressive. Nevertheless, the Mozambican minister does not seem to be accusing Pretoria:

[Begin Chissano recording] Since we signed the agreement, there have been no direct aggressions from South Africa against Mozambique. This means that the first part of the agreement on nonaggression has been fulfilled. However, beyond this, there is a part which refers to the end of (?siding and abetting) groups which use violence against another country. Here, South Africa has obviously not respected its undertaking; however, I think that the agreement was politically useful to show those who still have doubts and illusions that South Africa is the destabilizing factor in Southern Africa. The accord is a point of reference in the struggle for peace in the region. [end recording]

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MOZAMBIQUE

MACHEL ON ROLE AS CHIEF OF STATE, CURRENT ISSUES

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 29 Sep 85 pp 30-32

[Interview with President Samora Moises Machel by Guilherme de Melo; in Mozambique, date not given]

[Text] [Machel] "They are not a movement. They do not have a plan of government; they do not have a structure. Savimbi has one. One may or may not agree with it and consequently support it or fight it, that is something else. But be that as it may, it is a movement. These people are not. Their objective has been only to destroy: to destroy systematically, dismantle structures, destroy networks, everything on which the very body of the nation rests. That is pure banditry. They is why we call them armed bandits. That is all they are!"

Samora Machel is seated in front of me in the presidential helicopter that has just taken off from the Chimoio Airport in the heart of Mozambique.

For three days, the capital in the south buzzed with reports of major offensives unleashed jointly by Mozambican and Zimbabwean forces against the central guerrilla bases in the middle of the country. General Sebastiao Mobote has been in the theater of operations for more than a week coordinating the offensive with a Zimbabwean brigadier and other officers of both countries. Now the report of the capture of the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) headquarters has been confirmed.

The day before, a Soviet "Antonov" had taken off from the air force base in Maputo with a score of reporters from the Mozambican and foreign press, radio, and television and from the news agencies accredited to the capital. The telephone call reached me at the hotel 4 hours before:

[Question] "Do you want to go, too? We got you a seat on the plane..."

[Answer] "Good, there are questions one should never ask a reporter. They are almost offensive."

Samora Machel arrived in Chimoio at the end of the afternoon, traveling aboard the slim, white presidential "Tupelov." Only the following morning would we go to the central base that had just been taken, a distance of about 100 miles

more into the interior. We would go in the helicopters; the three powerful and ultra-sophisticated Soviet "M-25s" that serve as an escort to the presidential helicopter, and the others for the retinue and the reporters.

And it was that morning, on arriving at the airport, that he noticed me. The president was in his usual good humor. There was even an uncontained euphoria that brightens his lively aspect, lends more spontaneity to his laughter and makes his gestures more exuberant.

He talks to the press people. He recalls an episode connected with my old days with the NOTICIAS of the then Lourenco Marques, when he went to see me at the paper with two other male nurse colleagues so that I would write an article against a decree issued by the Lisbon government that was extremely discriminatory to black hospital personnel. [Machel] "You wrote it and the decree was blocked in Mozambique. Do you remember? It was in 1953..."

He laughed good humoredly. Then in that informal way of his that disconcerts the security personnel that surround him everywhere and overjoys the people who applaud him, he takes my hand and takes me with him down the runway.

[Machel] "You are not going in the press helicopter; you are coming with me in my helicopter. We have a mountain of things to talk about."

We are now face to face, relaxed and informal, while the plane flies over the region in a wide turn.

[Machel] "When we, the FRELIMO, were only a fighting front and were battling Portugal, we attacked the barracks and set ambushes for the troops. We sought contact with the civilian population to recruit them to our cause, which after all, was also theirs. But we had one watchword: not to destroy any existing project that was part of the material structure of the colony itself: the bridges, the highways, the electric power plants, the power transmission networks, the docks. We never touched them. And why?"

He interrupted himself and fixed me with a sharp, incisive look. Then, he proceeded:

[Machel] "Because we really had an objective in our struggle: to liberate ourselves from colonialism and, however long the struggle might last, we knew that sooner or later all of that would end up in our hands when the colonizing power desisted and would finally withdraw. That is what has happened wherever independence has been gained. But these people? After all, what do they do?"

He never uses the word "resistance"; never uses the term RENAMO. Suddenly his look becomes hard, cold, implacable.

[Machel] "They destroy. And they destroy simply because they are not interested in anything else. They are not prepared eventually to be able to receive power in their hands and to inherit everything that we have inherited. Their actions are pure banditry. South Africa has not built a movement; it has set up a factory of murderers. They are murdering the very country

for which they say they are fighting. That is why I do not accept them as an opposition. What opposition?"

[De Melo] "President Samora, in Africa the leaders are hardly able to accept the opposition," I interject.

He looks at me with a merry little gleam in his eye. The smile returns.

[Machel] "That is a good comment of yours. But you were born here. You know well that independent Africa began only 25 years ago. It came after centuries in which the colonizing powers "reigned", taking advantage of tribalism, of the intellectual backwardness of the population, and their illiteracy. There was not a feeling of nationalism, of national unity, in the countries that gained their independence. It was necessary to build it. It is still being built. Portugal is eight centuries old and see what it has been since the renewal of partisanship."

He looks around him as if looking for something. On the table opened up between the two comfortable light-blue-fabric upholstered chairs in which we are sitting, there is a small metallic rod of the transistor radio antenna type. He takes it, extends its various sections until it forms a pointer, wider at the base and narrowing gradually toward the top.

[Machel] "You know, power is like a hammer. Its weight is concentrated on the width of the base. That is the people. But its strength comes from the hand that holds it and which must have the necessary precision to strike the hammer."

He wraps his hand around the base and asks me to support mine immediately after his on the end of the little rod.

[Machel] "Look. Now the two of us are holding the hammer. We are going to strike it at the same time, all right?"

The blow that we struck on the top of the table was uneven, the result of the obvious uncoordination of our joint movements.

Samora Machel burst out laughing.

[Machel] "Did you see? The more people who hold the hammer, the more uncontrolled is its movement and the weaker and less sure is its blow. And all the force that comes from its base ends up being lost."

Suddenly he turns to the subject of nationalism, of unity, a subject that is obviously dear to him.

[Machel] When we took power, we received a country molded by a colonialist regime and where the 10 million blacks that comprised it operated in terms of ethnic groups, of tribes, of different dialects, of traditional uses and customs; all of that held together by a false concept of "Portugueseness" that in reality did not exist. You know how it was: in school, they taught

the Mozambican children the railroads of Portugal, its rivers and mountain ranges, the climate of Covilha and Faro. And in the choral singing classes, they rehearsed "chulas" and the "malhao" [Portuguese popular music]. When independence came, there was a whole job of Mozambicanization to be done; and at the same time, one of literacy. In these 10 years, more people have been taught to read and write Portuguese in Mozambique than the Portuguese did in 500 years.

It is a fact; I have have to acknowledge it.

[Machel] I was greatly censured for having closed down the night clubs, the cabarets, the dance halls in Maputo and Beira. Yes, I closed them. I did that because the people had lost the sense of their own culture. Rock, shows, and boleros were the youths' way of life. Because the whites had imbued them with the idea that the "marrabentas", the "chiguibos", the "makwelas", the "mapico" were "heathen dances". They were "native dances", as they said. They were not. They are not. They are an integral part of our own culture as the African people that we are. So there was a need to return the country to its own culture, or our own culture to the country, if you will. But now the night clubs and the dancehalls have resumed operation everywhere. And you see kids breakdancing in Maputo.

[De Melo] "Why, Mr President? Do you believe that all of that can now go on freely?"

[Machel] "Yes, it can. Because today the people have already lost their shame of singing and dancing their traditional rhythms on the appropriate occasions. They have gained awareness that they are part of their national identity. The rest is naturally the diversion that characterizes the modern world. Mozambique is a modern country."

The helicopter descends. I look out the window that the president shares with me. Down below a compact crowd beckons; waving colored cloths, they eagerly surround the field.

[Machel] "You are going to see a farm cooperative that is a veritable model: Chinhamacungo. And you are going to meet an exceptional man. He is now famous throughout the country: Zeca Lampiao. He was practically an unknown farmer until the last party congress. He arrived there then and 'raised Cain'. He asked to speak and for 2 hours he engaged in a sharp criticism of the politicians, pointed out the blunders of the Development Plan, lambasted the foreign technicians and cooperation aides and explained how things will have to be done: by the farmers themselves, as they know how to do it, and with the knowledge acquired over generations and based on the aid and direct support that the state may really be able to give them. Everything had been thrashed. Some still wanted to argue. I told them to keep quiet and to let him speak at will. He is one of those men who wears his heart on his sleeve, whom I understand because they are like me, you know."

He casts a happy look, embracing the land that stretches in a greening landscape of slopes and ranges up to the Zimbabwean border, a few kilometers away.

[Machel] I am a man of the soil. Down deep, I am a peasant. I was born down in the south, in a predominantly agricultural region near what was then the colony of Limpopo, as you know. My father had 600 head of cattle and nine plows. My brothers and I would go to the fields with him to plow the land, do the sowing. I studied as much as I could but you know that I did not take any higher education courses, nor am I a learned man. I am a man of the people and I carry the farm in my blood. Perhaps for that reason, my administration has always been land to land. The language I use is the language of the people. It is in that language that I speak to everybody. I feel and know that the people understand me. The others, I do not know."

The helicopter is now landing on the dark brown ground of the landing field, which, after all, is not a landing field at all: it is the football field.

Zeca Lampiao is a short, fat African, his big, homely face gleaming with sweat and happiness as he embraces the president. Around us, the strident sound of the women, clacking their tongues against their palates while simultaneously emitting a guttural cry, is deafening. The drums made of stretched skin resound frenziedly and youths, with arms upraised, deliriously sing greetings to the recent arrival.

We remained about an hour during which time Samora toured the whole cooperative, familiarized himself with the living conditions of the peasants, visited some houses, the breeding enclosures for poultry, pigs, and sheep, and listened to all the information about production that they provided to him; always in an explosion of embraces and kisses, dances and shouts of greeting surrounding him. It is Africa in all of its exuberance which the European cannot really understand.

When we resumed our journey, a staff officer approached the president discreetly and handed him an alcohol-soaked piece of cotton which he swabs over his lips, his face and then squeezes between his hands.

He smiled at me on seeing me follow his actions.

[Machel] "I do this not because I have an aversion to the people. But I have responsibilities which I cannot evade. In these crowd baths, there are hundreds of hands that touch mine, of lips that kiss my face. Unfortunately, they can belong to individuals who are sick, even without knowing. But a president cannot become sick."

With a movement of the hand, he indicates the interior of the helicopter in which we are traveling. It reminds one of the first-class cabin of any commercial plane. There are two varnished wood tables, glass ashtrays; a sofa extends along the other side of the plane. The atmosphere is frugal but comfortable.

[Machel] "They say that I travel like a VIP. Yes, I do travel. This is my private helicopter. The presidential jet is also like this but only larger, of course. That is the way the president of the People's Republic of Mozambique travels, do you understand? I do not do it for myself; I do it for

what I am and what has to be respected: the office of president. I believe that we should always assume with dignity the position that we hold, whatever it might be; and to assume everything that is inherent in it. The presidential plane and helicopter are inherent in the office that I hold, not to citizen Samora Machel. When one day, when I am older and retire to the peace of my region, I will again occupy myself with the land, the oxen, the peace of the farm. Another, who will succeed me, will travel in these.

At the other window, Antonio Julio, the governor of Manica Province, calls his attention so he can look down at the hydraulic projects underway in the zone.

"Dams, many dams and hydro-agricultural projects, are what this country needs," says Samora Machel after having observed the projects.

He leans back against the chair again and offers me a cup of coffee. He drinks tea. He follows it with sips of water mixed with lemon juice. In the afternoon, he will have a rally awaiting him in Chimoio and he knows that he will not stop talking, laughing, and singing for at least 2 hours and his voice is his great resource in those huge contacts with the people.

"Cahora Bassa," he tells me suddenly, "was the most important project that Portugal actually built in all of its colonial empire. And what happens? It is tied to it by international commitments that it assumed to build it; it has every interest in seeing that the dam operates without any problems, so that it will not lose money in satisfying those commitments. And what happens? It does not even help to defend it and to ensure its output without scares or sabotage. That story to the effect that I was asking for Portuguese troops to come and help me fight against the armed bandits--of course, it is nothing of the sort. But would it be something out of this world if Portugal would also contribute with its resources to help me defend the dam and the transmission of energy? After all, it would be defending its own interests."

"That does not appear to be exactly the understanding that was had of the problem there in Portugal," I commented.

Samora shakes his head with a deep sigh which I cannot fully translate. Dejection? Scoffing? Resignation?

[Machel] "You know, many times things become complicated because of complexes. That is why, in a certain way, the right ends up always operating much more openly than the left in these matters. For example, the case of Rhodesia. The Laborites there kept stalemating: sanctions here, little half-measures there. Who finally resolved it? Margaret Thatcher, a conservative; radical in many situations, a 100-percent rightist. We ourselves, with the famous dispute that arose from decolonization. Who finally resolved the problem overnight and unblocked the relations between our two countries? Sa Carneiro."

"When Lucas Pires came here now," I observed, "he arrived in Lisbon and also said what he well pleased about the question of military aid, without mincing words. Do you know what he is known as after that trip? The African."

Samora laughed heartily.

"That is right. My friends, my allies, are of the left. For that very reason, when the time comes, they feel constrained: 'If I should say that he is right in that...If I help him openly in that, they will immediately begin to say that I am doing it because we are friends, because we are on the same side of the barricade, that there was no impartiality in my conduct...' Then, they cringe and become indecisive. It is a matter of complexes. For that very reason, those from the rightist area are immediately much more at ease. Experience has already taught me that that is so."

Shortly afterwards we descended at the facilities of the Manica Forest Industries (IFLOMA), a state company located in Messica a little more than 50 kilometers from the city of Chimoio.

In February 1977, the Third FRELIMO Congress defined the country's forest policy, which resolved that forest industries be established in Manica Province in the short and medium term. That same year, the governments of Mozambique and Sweden signed a cooperation agreement that made possible the availability of financial resources for implementation of the projects previously drawn up.

"You are going to see a noteworthy project that we are carrying out here in the heart of the country," said the president enthusiastically. "The project envisions the immediate exploitation of the existing plantations in Manica Province, on the order of 15,200 hectares, providing the existing sawmill in Penhalonga with an annual projection capacity of 9,000 cubic meters of lumber. At the same time, it provides for the establishment of a sawmill with a production capacity of 26,000 cubic meters and the establishment of a particle-board [aglomerados] panel factory with an annual production capacity on the order of 20,000 cubic meters. An integrated paper-pulp factory with an annual production of 100,000 metric tons, especially newsprint, writing paper and cardboard, will also be put into operation."

"Is the industrial complex already in full operation?" I asked.

[Machel] "Not yet completely; it is going by phases, but the operation of the economic infrastructures of what already exists is entirely assured by Mozambican workers and technicians who specialized abroad. Some Czechoslovak and Canadian cooperation technicians are also working here."

Later, after the visit to the whole operating complex, which he made with interest, and when we were reentering the helicopter, he slapped me on the shoulder with a happy expression.

[Machel] "Well, did you like it? We need a partner for other projects, for other investments. When you get to Lisbon, write that in the DIARIO DE NOTICIAS."

"As a message to Dr Mario Soares, to Dr Almeida Santos? They are your friends..." I say, entering into the game.

[Machel] "Yes, they are. Has anyone said otherwise?"

He said it with conviction but at the same time, he winked at me with a sly smile in that way of his.

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MOZAMBIQUE

GOVERNMENT'S MISTAKEN POLICIES TOWARD PEASANTS PROVE COSTLY

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French Oct 85 pp 14-15

[Article by Claude Meillassoux, research director at the National Center for Scientific Research and author of a book on South Africa, "Les Derniers Blancs" [The Last White Men] (Maspero, Paris, 1979), and Christine Verschuur, cooperation agent in Mozambique: "Between the State and the 'Bandits' Armed by South Africa, the Ignored Peasants of Mozambique"]

[Text] Mozambique is in a state of crisis. With the exception of part of the Cabo-Delgado province, travel in rural areas has become next to impossible. The towns are in a state of siege and the peasant population is subject to alternate occupation by regular troops and "armed bandits." To check the progress of the latter--organized in a movement called "National Resistance" Movement (MNR), which is armed, trained and financed by Pretoria--Mr Samora Machel, president of the republic and of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) signed the N'Komati agreements of March 1984 with Mr Pieter Botha, president of South Africa; under these agreements, the two governments agreed to respect each other's independence and not to encourage on their territory any subversive movement directed against the other government.¹

How did the situation in Mozambique deteriorate to the point of compelling its government to come to terms with those who, in their eyes, represented one of the "three vipers" to be crushed? Is it the result of foreign aggression alone, or also of the policy carried out toward the peasant population which represents 87 percent of the country's living strength?

Under the Portuguese regime, Mozambique was a "service colony" offering large infrastructure facilities to its neighbors. At the time of independence, its railroads and ports were widely used, in particular by South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), to ship their raw materials by sea. It also represented a labor reserve for these two countries, as over 100,000 workers would migrate every year to South African mines. Revenues from these sectors accounted for the bulk of Mozambique's foreign currency resources: 60 percent of the gross

domestic product (GDP) in 1975! The Cabora-Bassa dam, built before independence, supplies electricity to South Africa which, in turn, supplies the electricity required by the Mozambican capital.

Now, since independence, it has been South Africa's policy to reduce its purchases of services from Mozambique. Thus, taking a reference of 100 in 1973 (on the eve of independence and the coup in Portugal), the activity of the port of Maputo on behalf of South Africa, which had already dropped by half in 1980, fell to 16 in 1983.

The number of Mozambican miners in South Africa, which was 118,000 in 1975, has stabilized around 44,000 since 1977. This reduction represents a cumulative loss of earnings of \$568 million for the period 1975-1983.

Starting in 1980, Mozambique was caught in the drought. They say it is the worst drought experienced by South Africa in the past 50 years, and the main cause of famine in the country's central and southern areas. In addition, large human and material losses were caused by floods in 1978 and by a hurricane early in 1984.

It was also in 1980 that "armed bandits," which are said to number about 20,000, started operating. Initially, the National Resistance Movement (MNR) consisted of FRELIMO renegades, mercenaries supported by Portuguese owners of large estates and by the special services of South Africa and the former Rhodesia. This initial core infiltrated the Mozambican territory in several points and recruited among peasants suffering the social consequences of the agricultural policy and economic stagnation: among conservative notables as well as among the young who are hostile to them; among deserters from the regular army as well as among delinquents. Armed, fed, trained and coordinated by the MNR, they swarmed over the whole territory in less than 4 years. Their operations played a decisive part in the economic and social ruin of the country.

Toward them, the peasant population is holding back. At any rate, no large population exodus has been reported from regions controlled by the "armed bandits" to those controlled by the FRELIMO.

Thus cut off from its back-country and deprived of the support of the rural population, the government must increasingly have recourse to international aid. Food-aid figures for 1985, for the three principal cereals consumed, give an idea of the scope of this aid.² The country's needs, in towns (rural needs are unknown), were estimated at 678,100 tons (60 percent corn, 20 percent wheat, 20 percent rice) for the period of 1 March to 31 December 1985. Inventories on 31 March 1985 represented 7 percent of this total. The production marketed is expected to be 103,800 tons (15 percent of the needs). Expected or already promised gifts will cover 20.5 percent of these needs. In 1984, the debt amounted to \$1.5-2 billion, which the country cannot pay back.

When it gained independence in 1978, Mozambique was unwilling, or unable, to "negotiate" the conditions of an economic disengagement with its main opponent and de facto colonizer, South Africa. Therefore, the FRELIMO turned to the country's inland to strengthen its independence by transforming the economy

and social relations of production. It was the experiment of the "liberated areas" that widely inspired the socialist orientations of the new State.

The Failed Experiment of "Community Villages"

The FRELIMO's economic program relied on the mobilization of peasant forces throughout the country and on an agricultural revolution that would make it possible to feed the development effort. The strategy of "community villages" was to serve both the liberation of man in rural areas and a technical revolution capable of unblocking an obsolete agriculture.

Already in 1976, at a time when the FRELIMO had not yet constituted itself as a party, the principles of organization of "community villages" claimed to be inspired by the experience of liberated areas, although "community villages" did not exist in these areas in the form of grouped settlements which, in a war situation, would have been easily spotted by the enemy.

The project reformulated after independence consisted in mobilizing the population of a given region by convincing it of the advantages of community organization and of the benefits it would derive from it, in creating progressively a core of collective production, then in regrouping a settlement around this base, in a location selected by common agreement by the future villagers, technicians and local FRELIMO officials.

Village activities were to develop according to a plan negotiated by the villagers themselves and focussing on production. Subsistence was to be assured mainly by family farms, complemented by collective production that would take up part of the time devoted to agricultural work. Collective production was to provide a fraction of the food needs, the stores required for the following campaigns and the financing of the village social services. An accumulation fund was to provide for the maintenance and renewal of production tools (with the understanding that human energy would be used to the largest possible extent before having recourse to machinery), for the constitution of reserves in prevision of possible natural disasters, and for cultural and exchange activities (training, visits, etc.). Finally, the surplus was to be distributed in proportion to each villager's work.

Independently of its main activity, the "community village" was also to engage in farming and livestock raising. In addition, it was advised to diversify production, for instance through the introduction of fish farming, bee keeping, cereal mills, canning, dairy production, crafts and small workshops, etc. All these recommendations were supplemented by information on how to build the residential area, and a town-planning model was outlined.

The "community village," therefore, appeared to be a social, political and administrative production unit integrating a whole range of activities. Its development--local accumulation, planning, labor organization, distribution of the results, etc.--was to be controlled by its members. A place of transformation of social relations, rejecting autarchy as well as dependence, it was more than just a relocation of rural housing: it was an assertive and planned transformation of the Mozambican social landscape.

In 1977, 215 villages were created; in 1979, there were 1,059, and 1,352 in 1982, regrouping close to 20 percent of the rural population, i.e. 1.8 million peasants. The new villagers had been promised schools for their children and, for themselves, the possibility of becoming literate, clinics, supply stores, etc. However, although their regrouping in villages could actually make it easier for the State to provide social services, the State had only limited resources to operate them: few teachers or notebooks, few nurses or medicines, etc. In addition, having a store built by the villagers did not mean that it would be provisioned.

The experiment seems to have had a positive impact at first. The creation of community villages made it possible to extend health care and education to rural areas. The drilling of wells near the villages meant less work for the women. A greater opening on the outside world became possible, as well as a revaluation of popular knowledge. Exchanges of techniques among areas were organized. In a few pilot villages, housing comfort was improved through elementary techniques. Efforts were made to clean up the environment; simple agricultural technical innovations were introduced (for instance, small dams, new crops, ploughs, etc.). Social services of a new type were implemented (day nurseries, meeting rooms, etc.).

Participation in national and local governing bodies was institutionalized. A little over one half of the 110,000 party members are peasants. Women take part in meetings at provincial or national level. Party cells had been formed in over 500 villages; in as many others, there were "impetus groups" consisting of party members responsible for peasant organization, work in collective fields, cleaning up of a village district, etc.

Close to 500 people's assemblies had been created, where elected officials were invited to discuss local problems and programs.

In some 150 villages,³ "people's courts" tried cases falling within their competence (divorces, thefts, etc.). A study of the way they operated would have shown that judgments tended to be more equitable to categories who, in former times, were always considered at fault--women, for instance.

In some areas, it became possible to discuss problems, mention difficulties, express one's point of view on the various facets of group-life organization. Democratic forums were set up, even if they were not always well run; even if, sometimes, they were hemmed in by eminent personalities of the "traditional" political hierarchy; even if their power was actually very limited. Participation in these forums was, in principle, extended to include groups that had been deprived of any form of expression. When they understood it, and as soon as they could, FRELIMO militant delegated to community villages tried to protect the interests of underprivileged peasants (young people, single women, dominated lineages, etc.) by encouraging them to assume positions of political or economic responsibility in the village, or again by encouraging them to take part in training courses.

However, the role of "community villages" in production seems to be a lot less positive. In this case, we note considerable discrepancies between intentions

and results. At the time of maximum extension of the movement, in 1982, 80 percent of the peasants still remained outside "community villages." As for the villages that had been set up, their economy never received any real and organized support from the authorities, the latter's support being exclusively reserved to State agricultural enterprises.

According to 1979 statistics, of the nearly 1,000 villages then in existence, over half "were the result of circumstances and not of the peasants' political and economic organization: 107 had been created after natural disasters (1978 floods in the south), 13 by refugees returning to the country, and 458 were former "aldeamentos."⁴ Some, which had been hastily created after the 1978 floods, gathered up to 18,000 people... In areas threatened at the time of Zimbabwe's struggle for independence, and later on wherever "bandits" operated, the Mozambican army forced peasants to regroup themselves in "new protected villages" which are sometimes counted as "community villages."

In the south and the center of the country, where the drought prevailed since the 1980's, villages that were also called "community villages" were set up around health-care and food-distribution stations, and their population was sometimes too numerous for the land or water available. On the other hand, it is estimated that the war that is raging now has destroyed about 400 villages.

The agricultural economy of "community villages" is geared in principle to four forms of production: the State sector, cooperatives, the family sector and the private sector.

Abandoned farms were at the origin of the first State farms which collected scattered lands into a single farm. Later on, plantations were nationalized and also converted into State farms. Finally, cooperation agreements with socialist countries were signed, providing for the farming of new tracts of land in the form of "large State-owned projects." This is the case, for instance, of the "400,000-hectare" project, jointly with Rumania, which initially focussed on cotton production and is located in the Cabo-Delgado and Nyassa provinces, in the north of the country; or of other agreements signed with western countries (copra project in Zambeze, with the French Central Economic Cooperation Fund, for instance, to rehabilitate the largest coconut plantation in the world).

State farms are controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture which develops production programs, assigns technicians and distributes production resources. Foreign equipment purchases are centralized, as farms do not have foreign currency but pay in local currency. According to the third congress, which took place in 1977, the State sector was to become the government's main source of revenues, to supply towns and agribusinesses, and to provide export products.

As for cooperatives, they still have no legal status. The peasants work there a number of hours per day or per week while still working in their family fields. The State-owned service company Mecanagro or a neighboring State farm associated to the "community village" are expected to contribute to ploughing. The product of cooperatives is destined to cover social needs and finance

investments, the remainder being distributed to cooperators after the harvest has been sold, in proportion to the number of hours they have worked.

As for the "family sector," it consists of peasant farming organized according to domestic-type production relations. A semi-itinerant agriculture operating according to a well settled social logic, with an average of 2 hectares under cultivation per family, it is the main agricultural production sector.

The Failure of Cooperatives

At the time of independence, the land having been nationalized, private farms employing salaried workers had to pay a rent to the State. These are mainly plantations (sugar, sisal, etc.), or small or medium-size farms belonging to Portuguese settlers who have not left the country, or the farms of rich Mozambican peasants. The fact that this form of production is doomed in long-term plans and the centralization of foreign purchases by the government hindered the development of these farms. These private farms, however, compete with State-owned agricultural enterprises by paying better wages here and there, often in food products not available on the market. The government's attitude toward them is about to change, due to the dual failure of cooperatives and of the State sector.

Whereas cooperative exists outside "community villages," conversely many "community villages" do not have any collective production, and the number of villages linked to a State-owned agricultural enterprise is insignificant. Of the 1,352 "community villages" found to exist in 1982, only 229 had an "agricultural cooperative," 224 a "collective field," and 155 had other types of cooperatives (mining, fisheries, charcoal, bricks, etc.).

That same year, the country counted a total of 375 agricultural cooperatives which, even according to official figures, contributed very little to peasant subsistence.

Many problems of internal organization, labor productivity and dependence on the State are at the origin of the poor economic results achieved. Cooperatives cannot operate either like large family farms, which would be only a sum of efforts that would not significantly increase labor productivity or farm yields; nor like settlers' farms prior to independence, as this would require production resources that the country does not have.

The benefits of collective work have sometimes made it possible to accumulate a small capital which, lacking production means (ploughs, carts, pumps, tractors, etc.), could not be deployed on the domestic market, as the purchase of such means is reserved to State farms, a few pilot cooperatives and, more recently "private" farms. The gains accumulated by cooperatives in their bank accounts have been more often used as loans to the State sector than for their own modernization.

According to the report of the fourth FRELIMO congress, "of all investments made in the agricultural sector from 1977 to 1981, only 2 percent were directed to the cooperative sector," the rest went to the State sector.

Since 1973, a year of all-time record agricultural yields, the production and marketing crisis of agriculture has kept getting worse. At the time of independence, the exodus of rural merchants and the destruction of transportation means by their former owners had seriously disorganized the marketing networks. The sale of cash crops being compromised, peasants then tended to fall back on food crops. Production resources started being scarce: essential consumer goods were in short supply and the currency, having no purchasing power, was devalued. All incentives to commercial production disappeared.

Faced with this situation, the State decided (in 1982) that consumer goods distributed in rural areas could be "purchased" only with agricultural products and that only the members of agricultural production cooperatives could be members of the consumer cooperatives.

Until 1984, the only organization steadily and generally "in touch" with the peasant sector was Agricom, a state-owned enterprise created a few years after independence and responsible for agricultural marketing. Since its mission was mainly to replenish the State's coffers by orienting the peasants toward a market economy, it was not very much concerned with the conditions of this integration. Although the Agricom policy made it possible to revive somewhat the commercialization of export products, by paying them with staple products (fabrics, soap, etc.) and production tools (hoes, seeds, etc.), the increased devaluation of the currency, on the other hand, increased the trend to fall back on subsistence food crops and to turn away from official markets.

The transformation of the peasant agrarian system by the "community village" programs had raised serious social problems. The very existence of the villages was compromised by ignorance of land distribution rules, causing internal conflict; by the lack of any planning of the needs for land and fallow land; by the fact that fields were too far away, a source of extra work for the peasants. In addition, the peasants complained that too much time was spent on political and cultural activities or on some collective work. According to a survey of 100 "community villages" in the north of the country,⁵ half of the villages in existence for at least 5 years showed a decline in yields.

State farms constitute a privileged sector for investments, the distribution of production means and, above all, the assignment of technical cadres. In spite of that, their results have been consistently mediocre as far as work productivity, yield per hectare, production volume or value are concerned. In local or foreign currency, many results are negative. Rice, for instance, costs from \$.50 to \$10 per kilo, but it is sold to the public for the equivalent of \$.25.

Not only are state farms not productive enough to pay wages high enough to ensure the survival of their workers and their families but, lacking purchasing power, cash payments are no longer an incentive and no longer attract seasonal workers.

Claiming that there is a labor shortage, East Bloc experts have encouraged agricultural mechanization. Based on long-term (20 to 50 years) trading of raw materials for machines and experts, cooperation contracts with these countries represent a heavy mortgage on the State agricultural production.

Already in 1978, the Ministry of Agriculture had been blamed for neglecting peasant farming and cooperatives in favor of excessively mechanized State enterprises. The minister had to resign. But this repeated blame did not hinder the development of State farms, until the fourth Congress, in 1983. This congress, again blaming overexpansion, made a severe analysis of mechanization and demanded a reorganization. It also deplored the lack of workers' participation in the planning and management of enterprises.

In the wake of this criticism, the large agro-industrial complexes were dismantled and divided into farms of more modest size. Certain lands, long claimed by cooperatives, were allocated to them, others were parcelled out and distributed to the families of farm workers or to private farmers. Provisions were made to diversify crops (food crops for farm workers, fodder) and productive activities (small industries, etc.). A number of cadres who used to have desk assignments were sent "in the field."

From Being Ignored to Being Disapproved Of and Despised

The FRELIMO's agricultural policy, therefore, seemed to hesitate between two orientations: one, idealistic, desirous to achieve the socialist organization of the peasants; the other, realistic, trying to derive resources and foreign currency from agriculture and advocating the implementation of large enterprises supposed to be more profitable. Neither succeeded. Certainly, agricultural reorganization is an awesome task and the transition from domestic to market economy is at the heart of all the third-world crises. If this transformation is so hard to complete in most cases, it is because, once it is abandoned to the laws of the market, the peasantry has to bear their impact unprotected. Could a government claiming to be inspired by scientific socialism and a militant party claiming to be attentive to the people's needs be capable of planning this transition, of accompanying it with the long-term prospects and precautions that could have saved the peasantry from disorder and poverty? To achieve this, they would have had to inquire about the peasants' living conditions and social customs in order to assess how much more the revolution was likely to bring them.

Now, the major orientations defined are based neither on knowledge nor on recognition of the peasantry as a social class. Confronted with the peasantry, Mozambican officials behave like all bureaucrats, whether socialist or colonial; they use the same methods and achieve the same results: regrouping the population along communication routes; compulsory collective fields destined to provide resources for the State; coercion to correct the disastrous effect of their ignorance. For the ones as for the others, peasants have no social existence. In Maputo, official circles keep saying that "the traditional peasantry was destroyed by colonization" and that, under these conditions, anthropology would be useless. They consider implicitly that, no matter what form of organization he is boxed into or on what site he is settled, the peasant must be able to produce his food and a marketable surplus. If it is not so, it has to be the result of customary unwieldiness, backwardness, ill will or even intent to sabotage. Now, "traditional" or not, there exist in Mozambique peasant societies which have reacted to the successive impacts to which they have been subjected. It is known that, for at least two centuries, under the effect of the slave trade, of the forced growing of cotton and cashew nuts,

these societies have continued their evolution to solve the problems of their existence and their perpetuation in the context of social structures that were constantly reconstructed.⁶

The experiment of "community villages" shows how blind officials were where the peasantry was concerned. In this sparsely settled country, regrouping the population forced many small communities to move. Far away from their fields, they had either to abandon them or transplant tons of manioc. They had to ask the families that used to live on the regrouping site for new land, and in most cases all they got was exhausted fallow land or arable plots far from the village. A new hierarchy was formed between the families who owned the land and newcomers, a hierarchy that was reflected in the management of cooperatives and the allocation of related prerogatives. Only the initial settlers have access to merchandise, when there is some, or to paid work. Sharp conflicts and resentments were born from these new inequalities which the administration tends to ignore. Some displaced families, bitter and disappointed by the conditions they were given, ran into the bush and lived of plundering.

Disorganized and divided by the agricultural policy implemented, the peasantry naturally offers a favorable ground to MNR recruiting.

Another example of the ignorance, or even of the cruel contempt in which some bureaucrats hold the population was the "production operation" of August 1983. Independence, that is true, had been the signal of a large exodus of rural populations toward towns. Forced to reside in their rural areas under the colonial regime, many peasants took advantage of their new liberty to discover big cities and settle there. Then, economic stagnation and the closing down of businesses made the presence of these "immigrants" less bearable, although, as in all third-world towns, this population is engaged in all sorts of marginal tasks whose usefulness is not immediately obvious to municipal officials.

In the climate of shortages which prevails in Mozambican towns, some of these activities verge on black market, delinquency or prostitution. Accused of living at the expense of salaried workers, it was however all of the unemployed population, not just this marginal fringe, that was the target of the "production operation." After two weeks' notice, raids were made on the streets and even in private homes to round up all those who could not give proof of employment. Several tens of thousands of families were sent to rural areas, in trucks and in trains, and even through an airlift to Nyassa, 2,000 km from Maputo, in spite of the gasoline shortage.

Thus cast on foreign land, without any ties to the local populations (many of the displaced persons had spent all their lives in towns), abandoned in the field under precarious conditions, responsible for building their own huts before the impending rainy season, provided at best with meagre rations inadequate to hold out until the next agricultural campaign, these men, these women and these children were expected to start producing and solve the problem of feeding the towns. To prevent displaced populations from returning to the towns, it became necessary to reinstate the colonial pass system, so that Mozambique and its neighbor's apartheid system have again something in

common. You can imagine how these displaced people receive the MNR people when the latter reach them.

Declared responsible, the minister of interior had to resign (but he was nevertheless decorated on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of independence). Such an operation reveals the profound distrust of the government as a whole toward the people. Unwilling to take into consideration the factors that would give them an in-depth understanding of the peasants' problems, officials react with hostility to the latter's defense reflexes and soon suspect them of belonging to the opposite camp: treated like enemies, they are thrown into the enemy's arms.

Can the socialist or realistic options be ascribed to trends existing within the government or the party? Among leading personalities, it is customary to distinguish, on the one hand, "revolutionary intellectuals" and, on the other hand, the "great families. The former asserted themselves after the 1962 merger of the three major groups of resistance to colonization, when they created the FRELIMO. Within the new movement, it is these "revolutionary intellectuals" who triggered the armed struggle. They are said to have "transformed the struggle into a revolution" in 1968, during a crisis that broke out within the front between "revolutionaries" and those that were then called the "new exploiters." To the revolutionary orientation, we owe the formulation of mobilizing themes, the definition of global strategies to control under-development and, something exceptional, an integrity recognized by all, which ruled out corruption at the highest government and party level.

On the other hand, we also owe it some mistakes: lack of adaptation of plans to resources, lack of reference to the specificity of the environment and to the experience of other African countries, inability to recognize itself in the Mozambican culture. We already mentioned this ignorance of the peasant's civilization (but not of the folklore which, on the contrary, enjoys high standing); it nurtures an attitude of disapproval toward certain institutions, like initiation rites or women's dowry, and contempt for popular knowledge, like that of midwives or healers. It is an attitude of principle that merely proposes to eradicate these signs of backwardness without trying to understand the role they play. Going one step further, certain types of behavior, seen as backward, are condemned. President Machel even went so far as to criticize publicly town women who breastfeed their children in the street, wear a head-scarf or squat on a mat.

This distance from the people seems to have gotten worse after 1977, after the Front's transformation into a Marxist-Leninist party and after the transposition of models and dogmatic analysis that it implied. When the "grupos dinamizadores" [impetus groups] were converted into party "cells," the original momentum was replaced by formalism and a formal agitation encouraging maneuvers to conquer positions. Hierarchized, bureaucratized, and also heir to the militarist guerrilla organization, the new party consolidated the power of leaders who were covered with more and more medals and decorations and whose heroic nostalgia kept diverging from the population's concerns.

The second trend would be that of the "great families" who are said to have asserted their influence with the signature of the N'Komati agreements. Coming

from a class of small landowners of the South whose development had been hindered in favor of Portuguese settlers, educated by the religious missions, these officials, accompanied by several relatives, hold many leading positions in the party or the State apparatus.

This political sociology may be valid or not, but nevertheless no organized and durable trends appear to be expressed in the party or the government. On each problem, the individual opinions of officials may regroup themselves differently. This vagueness may be a strength, but it is also a weakness because, as no constructive opposition is likely to organize itself, there is no alternative for the present line. Identifying with the State, and maybe also with the Mozambican people, this political body, all orientations taken together, believes it is preserving both the former and the latter by preserving itself.

This complete transformation of the Mozambican rural society was certainly an ambitious, maybe an excessive task. We could reel off an endless list of mistakes that were made. It is true that, in a world dominated by the laws of the market, the country must indirectly submit to these laws, as it can find the resources it needs for its decolonization only if it markets its production. The South African aggression is also a real threat, although it is mentioned too readily.

To preserve the socialist option as well as to resist outside forces, they needed the support of the peasants, the majority of the people. Neither foreign aid nor the medals that the leaders of a country that is now weak and drained are giving to one another can remedy this fatal deficiency.

FOOTNOTES

1. See LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE July 1984.
2. Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique, March 1985, duplicated document.
3. All data refer to villages existing in 1982.
4. "Protected villages" around the military barracks and commercial and administrative stations of the Portuguese, created to prevent any relations between the population and the FRELIMO.
5. National Committee for Communal Villages, Ministry of Health: General Information on Communal Villages, Maputo, 1985
6. Geffray Pedersen: "Social Differentiations and Socialization of Rural Areas," duplicated document, 1985. This report, very well documented in this respect, did cause some trouble in the Mozambican administration.

9294
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MOZAMBIQUE

RADIO QUESTIONS MOTIVE FOR RSA MEDIA CRACKDOWN

MB080845 Maputo in English to Southern Africa 1100 GMT 7 Nov 85

[Station commentary]

[Text] The South African Government has (?announced) dramatic measures against both the local and foreign media. The audio-visual media has been banned from covering the political violence which is raging throughout the country and all newsmen and women have been banned from entering Soweto, the biggest population center in South Africa.

An attempt has been made to justify these measures with the argument that the presence of television crews in the areas of tension tend to encourage violence. This argument merits some scrutiny.

First of all, this does not explain why all newsmen and women, including newspaper reporters, were banned from Soweto. Secondly, it cannot be argued that today's riot or attack was stimulated by the violence black people saw on television last month. State controlled television in South Africa simply does not show pictures like that. It is true that television pictures have been shown worldwide, and it is conceivable that the actions of black and colored people might be affected by the knowledge that the eyes of the world are upon them. But the fact (?remains) [words indistinct].

The South African authorities [word indistinct] may argue that people have provoked disturbances in order to attract world attention. Television, according to this line of reasoning was actually a factor in the violence [words indistinct] both sides in the conflict [words indistinct] with moral responsibility will avoid the threat of violence [words indistinct] estimated (?to have been) seen by millions of people around the world.

To put it bluntly, if a black man in Soweto feels so angry toward the whites that he decides to throw a petrol bomb, [words indistinct] neighborhood, is he more likely (?or less likely) to go ahead with this plan in the knowledge that it could damage the anti-apartheid cause, because of international television coverage? Surely, under the circumstances, any rational man would refrain from such [words indistinct] attacks. Black South Africans want the world to be on their side, not against them.

However, arguing about that particular scenario is to be the devil's advocate. It assumes that blacks are the source of violence in South Africa, which of course is not true.

For the government there seems to be no reason for the news censorship in South Africa.

It has nothing to do with government's concern over the causes of the mounting violence. The causes lie in unique (?circumstances) of the apartheid system. And if the government were really concerned, it would tackle that issue.

The real reason for the crackdown on the press, radio, and television, is that the government does not want to know of the things that its army and police are doing to the people of South Africa. Brutality and repression are too horrific. And what will the (?tough chiefs) of apartheid do now, now that nobody is allowed to watch? It is a frightening thought.

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CSO: 3400/426

MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

EEC FINANCES COOPERATION PROJECTS--The European Economic Community (EEC) will contribute 145 million ECUs (20.3 million contos) in cooperation programs for Mozambique in the next 5 years. The EEC representative in Maputo, Antonio Marongiu, revealed at a press conference that the contribution will assume the form of aid without the repayment of capital or interest. Nevertheless, semi-official Mozambican government circles are apprehensive about the amount assigned by the EEC to the economic plans of Mozambique, which should ratify the Lome III Convention this year. The EEC delegate, accompanied by the Mozambican domestic trade minister, Aranda da Silva, analyzed the joint work carried out in the framework of the EEC's support from 1978 to 1984. According to Antonio Marongiu, the task of scheduling the food aid for 1986 and the following years is underway now. With Mozambique's adherence to the Lome Convention, "the food aid programs will gradually become integrated with the most vast cooperation program between Mozambique and the EEC, which specifies as priority objectives the increase of farm production and achievement of security of the food supply." The European diplomat added also that this priority is part of the support given by the EEC to the food security programs developed in the context of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) of which Mozambique is a member-state. Reviewing the programs of food aid to Mozambique, Marongiu said that the total value of aid between 1978 and 1984 was 66 million ECUs. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 11 Oct 85 p 12] 8711/9871

CSO: 3442/20

NIGER

RELATIONS WITH PRC EXAMINED BY NIGER ENVOY

Niamey LE SAHEL in French 13 Oct 85 p 10

[Interview with the ambassador from the Republic of Niger, his excellency Pierre Ausseil, by Youssouf Kailou, in Peking, date and place not given]

[Text] This year there has been an increase in Niger Chinese cooperation activities, shown by the visit of the president of the National Development Council in September.

At the time of this visit, a group of journalists from Niger also traveled to the Peoples Republic of China, at the invitation of the Chinese Peoples Foreign Friendships Association. In Peking, Youssouf Kailou met with the ambassador from the Republic of Niger, his excellency Pierre Ausseil, who discussed bilateral relations and China's new policy of opening up to other countries, which has become such a fashionable topic in the western media.

Question: The Republic of China and the Republic of Niger have maintained diplomatic relations for many years. What is the current status of cooperation between the two countries?

Answer: Our two countries have maintained diplomatic relations for over 11 years. The establishment of diplomatic relations between the Peoples Republic of China and the Republic of Niger was one of the first international policy actions undertaken by the Supreme Military Council and by the government after Niger's armed forces came into power. And ever since that time, all sorts of ties have been created between our respective governments and leaders, producing a quite valuable cooperation right now. In fact, in addition to the two official visits made by the president of the Supreme Military Council, the chief of state, this year there has also been the visit by the president of the National Development Council, which was preceded by several visits on a ministerial level. Your delegation's visit to the Peoples Republic of China obviously shows that this cooperation is quite healthy.

Question: In what areas does China intervene in Niger?

Answer: China's areas of intervention are quite varied. I will only mention a few of the projects our Chinese friends have worked on,

- First of all, rural development, with projects conducted at Saga, Kolo, Seberi, the lower Tiaguirire, and the Tera reservoir.
- China has also undertaken a program drilling 50 wells in the Air region.
- It is involved in health care: China sends medical teams to Niger, whose staff are rotated every 2 years.
- The last project, and without any doubt the largest in terms of the amount of funding required, is now right in the middle of construction.

This is the sports stadium with a seating capacity for 30,000. This facility will soon bring our capital city up to the level of other metropolitan cities in Africa, in terms of being able to hold games and sports events of all types.

The list of projects that I have just cited, though not exhaustive, gives an idea of the importance that our two governments attach to the determination of areas of intervention in the current stage of our development. These areas are: agriculture, health care, and water projects. These are the areas that were selected by mutual agreement. They receive the constant attention of the president of the Supreme Military Council, the chief of state, Brig Gen Seyni Kountche.

Question: China, a country with a population of over 1 billion people, grows enough food to feed itself. It also has had some very successful experience with water projects and programs against desertification. Your Excellency, what are some future areas for the expansion of cooperation between Niger and China? Are there any agreements now being negotiated or about to be signed?

Answer: China has indeed reached a level of self-sufficiency in its food production. An annual grain production of over 400 million tons has freed this country from the problems we are facing today. And it is also a fact that the desert is shrinking in China; water control projects are visible everywhere in this country. In my opinion, this is a highly successful experiment, considering the situation prevailing some years ago.

You have just visited some regions of the Peoples Republic of China; you certainly noticed this country's state of development, with its appropriate level of infrastructure. In mentioning the possibility of signing agreements between our two countries, you were undoubtedly thinking of the visit by the president of the National Development Council to the Peoples Republic

of China. In reality, there is a two-fold agreement which is about to be signed, which will open up the way toward another form of cooperation. The two projects covered in this agreement concern one development project and one biogas project. A joint team will soon travel to Niger to determine how these two projects will be carried out.

Question: After 36 years of independence, the Peoples Republic of China has finally decided to open the country up to the outside world. As a result, hotels and tourist sites are being invaded by Japanese, European, and American tourists. How do you feel about this move?

Answer: China's new openness, as it has been planned and practiced, didn't just start this year. It is in reality a concept that has a dual aspect in China.

Internally, it has led to the improved management of state companies and enterprises, accompanied by a noticeable amount of decontrol. And externally, a new approach has been chosen for the development of some coastal cities.

As this experiment was a success, the Chinese authorities then opened up more cities and regions to foreign investors. This is another phase of this new openness, and not its start, which you can now observe. Nor has tourism been neglected. As you can see, tourists of all nationalities are coming in thousands, to learn about the reality of China today. And in my opinion, China's openness to foreign countries, supported by a bold economic reform, has produced highly positive results.

Question: What benefits can our country derive from the new reforms made in a China undergoing a complete modernization?

Answer: Before answering your last question, I would like to share with you what I have observed about the reforms carried out in this country ever since I have been representing our country in China.

First of all, the so-called system of responsibility applied to the Chinese economy has produced excellent results. It has allowed the peasants to sell their surplus production in the free market, and so improve their standard of living.

Then there is the reform of enterprises, to which another role has now been assigned. They no longer have to simply fulfill the social role assigned to them, which amounted to a sort of forced egalitarianism which interfered with their operations and their profits. Starting in 1984, the managers of these enterprises have had to prepare for their successors, in other words, to give up their jobs to younger cadres, who are more likely to make them profitable concerns.

The reforms are not limited to the rural world and to enterprises. They also affect many other areas which I don't need to list here. I mentioned these two cases to illustrate the steps in the process, that is, the application to rural areas before urban areas.

The preceding remarks should also show that these attempts at modernization are applied in a specific context. The results are highly encouraging and may serve as an example for countries with the same characteristics, such as the Sahel nations which are trying to reach self-sufficiency in their food production.

Now, in answer to your question, I will say that there are many benefits we can gain from the Chinese experience. But in answering your question, let me conclude by telling you my personal conviction: an economically stronger China will increase its aid to other Third World countries. The Chinese leaders are constantly saying this. They want to give more help to the Third World countries, particularly to the African nations.

7679
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NIGER

FINANCE MINISTER DISCUSSES 1986 BUDGET

Niamey LE SAHEL in French 23 Sep 85 pp 5, 8

[Interview with Finance Minister Boukary Adji; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] After commenting on the main features of the 1986 budget appropriations law, Finance Minister Boukary Adji answered reporters' questions during a roundtable discussion. Thus he provided clarification of the new measures contained in the law, in particular the introduction of the value-added tax (VAT) and taxation of married women. Mr Boukary Adji also assured the press that fiscal pressure will not increase.

Question: Mr Minister, what are the major macroeconomic data on which this budget is based, in particular the estimated growth and inflation rates for next year?

Answer: The only point of reference we have is the series of estimates made by the Ministry of Planning at the time of our recent negotiations with the IMF. It has been estimated that the gross domestic product (PIB) will increase by approximately 11 percent. It will rise from approximately 700 to 788 billion, in particular because of agricultural production, which this year is fortunately much higher than 1985.

As for inflation, predictions estimate that the inflation rate will be about 7 percent. We will therefore have real growth (abstraction derived from the increase in prices) of approximately 4 percent for 1986.

Question: It is rather surprising, Mr Minister, for a budget to increase during a period of austerity. To what should we attribute this increase?

Answer: The austerity aspect must actually be viewed according to how government expenditures, particularly operating expenses, are managed. But you are absolutely right in pointing out a context that is certainly not one of growth. But as I said, fiscal pressure will definitely not increase in 1986. The increases that we expect in tax revenues are instead related to a better taxation yield, that is, the collection of a larger percentage of what is normally due from taxpayers.

On the other hand, there is one source of revenue, comprised of all sorts of proceeds, that will unfortunately be lower. But at the same time there are special revenues, in particular those expected from the drawings that we anticipated in connection with the IMF, but also the drawings that we expect from the structural adjustment program currently being negotiated with the World Bank. Thus on one hand there are expected foreign contributions from our agreements with foreign countries or institutions, which will make it possible to cover the increase in expenses, in particular those for investments and equipment for better operation of our agencies.

Question: The public debt has also increased, Mr Minister. This category represents 30.92 percent of all estimated expenses for 1986 and is 11.19 percent higher in comparison to 1985, or nearly 3 billion in absolute value. Does the listed figure take into account the expected results of negotiations for debt rescheduling?

Answer: It is true that the public debt has increased. This is due in particular to the rise of interest rates and also to the unfavorable rise of exchange rates. The announced results for reimbursement are figures derived from the expected debt reschedulings of the Paris and London clubs. We will continually initiate negotiations with both, all of which is also tied to our program with the IMF. Thus we expect to have a rescheduling of approximately 20 billion, to reduce the service on our debt. Without reduction and without rescheduling, service on the debt would perhaps be twice the amount listed.

Question: The anticipated reforms concerning our own resources are related, in the case of direct taxes in particular, to the incentive of taxpayers to declare their incomes on time. How will that take place?

Answer: When we talk about improvement of tax yields, about improvement of revenue yields, that is obviously related to the tax returns that taxpayers are in principle obliged to file. It is on the basis of such returns that the various taxes are calculated and collected in their various forms by the Treasury. For example, this cannot be estimated from direct payment by persons subject to taxation. There is no doubt that the more reluctant taxpayers are to declare their incomes, the more problems we will have in recovering the taxes due. This is why plans have been made to penalize bad taxpayers by eliminating their opportunity to deduct certain expenses which they may have from their taxable base. For example, interest expenses that a taxpayer might pay on loans, premiums which he might be paying if he has a life insurance policy, etc. In fact, there is a whole series of professional expense that normally reduce the taxpayer's amount of tax. Now, if a taxpayer does not declare his income on time, he will be unable to deduct such expenses. We think that this will provide some incentive for everyone to declare their incomes on time.

Question: In the case of personnel expenses, the budget is 26.9 billion as opposed to 26.3 billion for the previous year. This difference seems insignificant in view of the expenses the government must meet, in particular the hiring of already trained Civil Service personnel and the promotion of other

civil servants. In view of this difference, we might wonder about the government's ability to meet its obligations!

Answer: First of all, the listed increase must be corrected, because we are comparing estimates with estimate. The 1985 figure is an estimated figure. In the case of actual figures, because of the tendency of some agencies to increase real needs, it is likely that the actual figures will be slightly less than the budget figures. As a result, this leaves us with a much larger increase than that listed.

However, the problems related to personnel expense are, it is true, ones that must be considered and for which a solution must be found before it is too late. It is actually likely that in time the government will run into problems in providing jobs for all trained Civil Service personnel. But we have planned to hire all trained Civil Service personnel in 1986. Thus all personnel trained for the various agencies will find employment in the Civil Service. Personnel promotions, which are many, will also be carried out, as there are many instances where this minimum is not always attained.

Question: What about the tax measures that apply to married women?

Answer: The married woman with an income is also naturally subject to taxation just like any other citizen. But a distinction must be drawn between a married woman living with her husband and a married woman separated from her husband. When a married woman lives with her husband, the concept of a taxable household is taken into consideration. The taxable household concept provides for taxation of the total household income. Tax is then levied on the basis of the number of household members, which varies with the size of the family. A single amount, of course, is paid for such tax. As for distribution [of income] within the household, that is an internal affair.

In the case of a married woman whose husband has no taxable income: the woman is allowed to declare her income directly and to be taxed on the basis of the total number of family members. There is also the case of women whose husbands have nontaxable incomes. In this instance as well, the woman is allowed to declare her income and pay her taxes, but only on the basis of two household members: herself, on one hand, and her husband on the other. There is also the case of a married woman who may have income from noncommercial earnings, from real estate revenue or any other kind of revenue that could be greater than her husband's income. The woman is allowed to declare her income also on the basis of the number of family members.

Finally, there is the case of a married woman who is separated from her husband: in this instance, the woman is allowed to declare her income as an individual while taking into account only those children for which she is responsible.

Question: We are also aware that the government will not be responsible for certain expenses during the next school year. Considering the effects that this will have on the incomes of parents of students, has the government planned any measures that would reduce the expenses of parents?

Answer: Actually, the government has decided that parents should bear certain expenses related to school supplies. The aim of this concern is to provide an education to the largest possible number of students but within the limits of the government's available resources. This has obviously led to a search for measures which could reduce expenditures per child while providing an education for a larger number of children, which is substantial.

There is no doubt that for the first year this government measure will result in additional expenses for parents. But to reduce such expenses, the decision has been made, within the framework of the next budget appropriations law, to exempt all school supplies from taxation. We are also aware that all supplies do not always get into the schools; some may be used by people other than students. But in the end, the basic measure will definitely benefit children and we think that, as a result of tax exemption, the prices of supplies will be a little more within the reach of parents. This is more or less the purpose of this budgetary measure.

Question: One major new feature of the 1986 budget is the introduction of the value-added tax (VAT). What does this innovation consist of?

Answer: Added value is a concept borrowed from economists. It means the difference between revenue and what is called intermediate consumption, that is, what you purchase from middlemen. If you are a baker, the added value roughly consists of the difference between the price at which you sell bread and the price of all the ingredients you purchase from middlemen, such as the flour used to produce the bread.

The VAT introduced in 1985 consists, at each stage of economic activity, of taxing only the fraction corresponding to your added value, that is, the fraction related to your activity and thus including the wages that you pay out, amortization of the equipment you use, the financial expenses you pay and the profit margin you set for your activity.

The principle of VAT collection consists of taxing your total production while giving you the opportunity to recover the tax you paid on the previous purchase. Take the example of the flour you purchased: it was subject to the VAT at its level. In the case of your tax return, you bear the amount of tax on the price of the bread as a whole and you deduct the tax already paid to your flour supplier. This avoids cascading taxation because in the past you paid tax on the entire price of the bread without any possibility of deduction. We think that this kind of tax, the VAT, is likely to encourage the country's industrialization since expenses for businesses are reduced, which will make our products competitive with foreign goods. When you export your production, you will be exempt from the VAT. Thus your production, in foreign markets, will be more competitive and easier to sell.

The VAT will provide the government with a little more revenue because it will cover a larger mass of economic activities. But above all it reduces the risks of fraud, for if the flour supplier were to think of defrauding someone, he will find that the baker, when he purchases the flour, will demand that the supplier tell him the tax he had to pay. An opportunity has

thus been provided for cross-checks between the baker's tax return and the flour supplier's return.

We are nevertheless aware that this is a rather complex tax, which is why it will take effect only beginning 1 January 1986. The remaining time period will make it possible to bring taxpayers up to date and to provide all business operators affected by this tax with as much information as possible.

Question: Specifically and with regard to businesses that don't have a reliable and monitored accounting system, what action will you take?

Answer: It is true that there will be a problem in the case of domestic small and medium-size businesses, since they don't have accounting systems enabling them to report on their production, what they purchased from middlemen, and thus their intermediate consumption, etc. In that instance, we will have to use an all-inclusive-amount system. Therefore, we will not base our calculations on accounting figures. In agreement with those affected, we will make estimates of revenue and taxes on the basis of all-inclusive amounts which can be adjusted from year to year. The ideal situation would be that as the operations of those businesses expand, they could organize themselves to permit better monitoring of their various organized units among themselves.

Question: Mr Minister, there is also the rental value tax (TVL). Principal residences are exempt from this tax. What does this tax consist of and why has the government levied the TVL?

Answer: Two new measures have actually been planned for the TVL. They will ultimately help to relieve the taxpayer's burden.

There is the tax that must be paid in principle by an owner of a residential building and the person who occupies that dwelling. In this regard, the law stipulates that when the estimated rental value exceeds a certain amount, you are required to pay the TVL, which is 12 percent. We found that this measure was difficult to bear and also does not encourage housing development. This is why the 1986 budget appropriations act provides for the elimination of this 12 percent tax. The second tax category has undergone a reduction. This is the TVL that must be paid by certain commercial and industrial businesses on premises owned by them. The tax was formerly 12 percent. In this case as well, the government has found this tax to be antieconomic, since it discourages investment and it is ultimately the consumer who again bears the tax burden. The tax has therefore now been reduced from 12 to 4 percent, or by nearly two-thirds of the amount formerly required.

11915

CSO: 3419/42

NIGER

PLANNING MINISTER DISCUSSES 1986 INVESTMENT BUDGET, PROGRAM

Niamey LE SAHEL in French 27-29 Sep 85 pp 1, 3-4

[Speech by Minister of Planning Almoustapha Soumaila; date and place not specified]

[Text] As you know, the Council of Ministers adopted the general budget and the investment budget for fiscal 1985-1986 during its meetings from 16 to 19 September 1985.

The investment budget, established by Order No 84-34 dated 27 September 1985, is therefore a 2-year budget. During its first year of existence--actually a year of experimentation--the necessary efforts were made to lay both the technical and the institutional foundations for better preparation.

That important work of improving the economic management of our country made it possible to submit to the government, in accordance with the provisions of Order No 84-34, an investment budget for 1986 and a 3-year investment program covering the years 1986, 1987, and 1988.

It is appropriate to recall that since September 1984 we have used a system of "sliding" overall planning whose basic feature is that it can be adapted to changes that have occurred or will occur in the national and international economic environment.

I therefore propose to organize my speech around three basic topics, as follows:

1. Recent and short-term developments in our country's economic situation as they relate to execution of the 1986 investment budget and the 1986-1988 program.
2. The 3-year investment program and the main features of the 1986 investment budget.
3. The factors necessary for continuing our efforts to achieve financial stabilization and economic recovery.

First the Economic Situation

In analyzing the basic data, we note the following:

1. The international environment has continued to be shaken by the serious worldwide economic crisis. The beginnings of an economic recovery as observed in 1984 and 1985 have not lived up to the expectations created in the big industrialized countries, most of which have had to maintain or even strengthen their financial austerity measures.

This has obviously worsened the difficulties of our countries, which depend on the world's economic poles not only for their exports and the financing of their investments but also for their imports and repayment of their foreign debt.

Throughout these 2 years, the dollar has continued to rise in value, and it even set absolute records in 1985.

Parallel with that, the monetary policies in the major financial centers have been unable to halt in time the breathtaking rise in interest rates.

2. Subregionally and regionally, several unforeseen and far-reaching events have gotten the better of our countries' efforts.

In Africa, the drought has added further to the already multiple and extremely thorny problems of our inhabitants--to the point of triggering the most spectacular awareness on the part of the international community.

In our immediate vicinity, intraregional trade has been seriously disrupted, and this has affected not only the movement of people and goods but also that of capital.

3. Lastly, on the domestic--that is, the national--level, the sudden return of the drought has seriously shaken the foundations of our basic production.

Moreover, the situation in important production units, both industrial and commercial, has continued to reflect the negative effects of the world crisis.

Although the sector of government-controlled enterprises has withstood this crisis in localized instances, it has also required our attention.

Those are the recent developments in the environment. As you know, they have constituted a definite handicap for our economy and our public finance.

The few figures that follow illustrate that handicap and reflect its extent in key sectors.

Agricultural production in 1984 was down nearly 40 percent from 1983. All of you know, both from the standpoint of your household and from the collective standpoint, what that has cost us in terms of worry, energy, mobilization, organization, and the distribution of food aid as well as in terms of funds.

As far as livestock losses are concerned, the final count is not complete, but they are estimated at 50 percent, including all animal species combined.

You are also aware of the upheaval in age-old traditions that this has caused for many Niger households and of the exemplary courage with which those households have faced up to the situation.

Our outstanding debt will probably rise by over 40 billion CFA francs solely because of the higher value of the dollar if the latter continues its trend.

Lastly, let us mention the fact that in real terms, the price of a kilogram of uranium dropped by 43 percent between 1978 and 1984, thus encumbering significantly the collection of our budget revenues and throwing our balance of payments out of equilibrium.

Fortunately, short-term developments in our economic situation should provide less cause for worry.

In the case of agriculture, expected production is appreciable, considering the amount of rainfall in 1985.

In the short term, the subregional environment seems more likely to stimulate the exchange of goods and capital.

The world economic crisis seems to be winding down in some leading countries, even though, on the international level and especially in the developing countries, the spread of the early signs will be late in coming. But the return of international confidence on the economic level might be beneficial.

In Niger, all these elements together should initiate a process allowing us to make up for recent previous situations.

The GDP, for example, which rose by 5 percent at current prices in 1983, then dropped by 16 percent in real terms in 1984 and rose again by 7 percent in 1985, should improve by 4 or 5 percent in real terms in 1986.

But that trend needs to be strengthened by appropriate economic and financial policies. That is the purpose of the economic and financial recovery program which was established with the IMF and which has enabled us so far to achieve the objectives of financial stabilization and those of the structural adjustment program for which preparations are now being made.

That trend also needs to be backed by effective public investments. These are reflected here in the 3-year investment program I am about to present to you. We have already discussed the context in which that program was worked out.

1986-1988 Investment Program

During the next 3 years--that is, from 1986 through 1988--the financial resources to be allocated to public investments will reach an overall total of 275.5 billion CFA francs.

The annual packages will rise from 80 billion CFA francs in 1986 to 92.5 billion in 1987 and 103 billion in 1988.

As a result, investments in 1987 will show an increase of 15.63 percent over 1986, while those in 1988 will be 11.35 percent higher than those in 1987, for a total increase of 28.75 percent over the entire period.

The successive annual budgets will represent 10.1 percent of GDP in 1986, 10.77 percent in 1987, and 11 percent in 1988.

This represents a considerable effort, and it demonstrates the desire of the Supreme Military Council and the government to devote maximum resources to development with a view to improving living conditions for our inhabitants.

The figures also reflect our firm intention to broaden the base of national production so that individual and collective initiative can develop on viable supporting foundations.

The objectives being pursued in this 3-year investment program fit into our national priorities, of course. Those priorities have been reasserted time and again by the chairman of the Supreme Military Council and chief of state, Gen Seyni Kountche.

Let us recall them briefly:

As our prime priority, we must safeguard, consolidate, and expand our national production potential, the long-term objective being to achieve self-sufficiency in food not only through intrasectoral actions but also as a result of the synergistic effect of upstream and downstream actions in support of agricultural production.

What the government is inviting Niger's people to participate in, within the framework of the Development Society, is a genuine structural adjustment--that is, thoroughgoing changes in our economy.

The 3-year investment program is therefore initiating those changes in the direction of:

1. A better contribution by all economic agents to the national economic effort.
2. A gradual smoothing-out of the recent difficulties through a better adaptation of human resources to the real needs of society and the economy.
3. Relative but gradually increasing human security in the face of climatic hazards.
4. And, lastly, a progressive but resolute reorientation of the public investment policy.

This means that the 3-year investment program is characterized by four basic features, as follows:

1. Sizable growth in volume, amounting to 28.75 percent between 1986 and 1988. I discussed this earlier.
2. A significant reorientation of the structure of investment, primarily toward directly productive sectors but also toward those social sectors which help improve living conditions for the inhabitants (health, education, and water resources).

Specifically as regards productive sectors, the investment effort will focus on the rural sector as a priority, the idea being to seek equilibrium in food supplies on two levels: that of increased food production and that of assured food supplies. In this framework, special attention will be paid to water resources, since it is a fact that complete mastery and optimum utilization of water resources will be the indispensable conditions for protecting ourselves from climatic hazards.

Other efforts in the productive sectors will focus on diversification in the fields of mining, energy, and industry.

Overall, this reorientation will result in the following average allocations during the period from 1986 through 1988:

- a) Productive sectors: 45 percent of the investment resources.
 - b) Social sectors: 29.9 percent (about 30 percent).
 - c) Economic infrastructure: 17.8 percent.
 - d) Other sectors: 6.6 percent.
3. Reorientation as regards investment financing itself, which will be marked by prudent recourse to loans and respect for the absolute necessity of keeping our foreign debt within the limits of the country's ability to repay.

Within this framework, the emphasis will be on mobilizing nonreimbursable aid that will be justified in the eyes of friendly countries by our will to help ourselves.

4. The final feature of this program is the firm intention to design good projects and also to execute them with the necessary rigor and seriousness.

This means that all the projects have been analyzed from the standpoint of past progress, that some of them have already been reoriented in the direction of greater productivity, and that others will be so reoriented as rapidly as possible.

Those are the basic features of this 3-year program. I will discuss the conditions for its proper execution shortly.

1986 Investment Budget

The 1986 investment budget has been set at 80 billion CFA francs, compared to 69.6 billion in 1985. That is an increase of 14.94--or about 15--percent.

Let us look briefly at how this budget will be financed under the overall budgeting system--that is, with all the state's investment efforts included.

The general budget will provide 5.5 billion CFA francs for the investment budget. That is 6.88 percent of the total investment funds, compared to 6 billion CFA francs (8.63 percent) in 1985.

We see here a relative drop in the amount provided from the general budget. This is explained chiefly by the concern to bring about a recovery in public finance, which the minister of finance has talked to you about, but also by a better evaluation of the real needs of the projects in terms of counterparts.

Borrowing will account for 32,873 million CFA francs, or 41.09 percent of the funds, compared to 33,179 million CFA francs (47.70 percent) in 1985.

Those figures reflect the concern, which I mentioned above, to curb the country's foreign indebtedness.

Nonreimbursable aid (that is, external grants) totals 41,626 million CFA francs, or 52.03 percent of the total, compared to 30,380 million CFA francs, or 43.68 percent, in 1985.

It also reflects the shift in investment financing toward nonreimbursable aid.

Now let us look at how these funds will be used.

Projects underway in 1985 will receive 62.4 billion CFA francs (78.2 percent) of the funds, compared to 17.55 billion (22 percent) for new projects.

Productive sectors will receive 36 billion CFA francs (45 percent) of the total funds. In 1985 those sectors accounted for 37.90 percent of the budget, meaning that their relative share is up by over 7 percent.

As I said above, the emphasis is therefore being placed on an expansion of the country's productive base.

We should note that in the productive sectors, miniprojects will receive over 1 billion CFA francs, thus confirming the option favoring miniprojects.

The social sectors will receive 22.8 billion CFA francs (28.5 percent) of the funds, compared to 18.64 billion (26.80 percent) in 1985.

Here, too, the concern expressed above is being respected.

Infrastructure will receive 12 billion CFA francs (17.11 percent), compared to 23 billion (33.16 percent) in 1985. That decline simply reflects the delays

encountered in starting up certain infrastructure projects and has no impact on the current work on those projects.

The difference--9.2 billion CFA francs, or 9.39 percent of the total--will go to other sectors for the support of development, which are thus experiencing considerable growth, since they received 1.5 billion (2.14 percent) in 1985.

The funds in question are being devoted essentially to administrative activity and the development of technical capability.

Before closing this chapter on the allocation of funds, it seems important to me to emphasize that new projects are accounting for 63 percent of the funds available to directly productive sectors.

In addition, and for the purpose of strengthening economic recovery, 4 billion CFA francs will be used for sectoral studies and project work, compared to 2.5 billion in 1985.

The objective in view is the establishment and support of a bank of viable projects, particularly in productive sectors.

Lastly, I would like to point out that this budget does not include all the investments that will be made in Niger in 1986. The following must be added:

1. Efforts by the ONG's--estimated at 2.5 billion CFA francs to date.
2. Efforts by the territorial communities, whose investments were already up to 2 billion CFA francs for 1985. Those efforts should be expanded gradually until they are in line with the policy adopted at state level, which calls for maximizing investment funds relative to operating costs.

3. Efforts by government-controlled enterprises, for which the recovery program now being worked out is to generate in particular a jump in renewed investment.

Taking one with the other, it would be reasonable to estimate that public and comparable investments will total about 85 billion CFA francs in 1986.

So there, in succinct form, you have the public investment budget and program.

To conclude, let us discuss the conditions necessary for their successful execution.

The first determining factor will be the improvement of our ability to prepare for and plan projects. To the extent possible, we must avoid haphazard management and see that our daily actions fall within the framework of specific guidelines and have reference to predetermined objectives.

To achieve that, 1986 must be used to capitalize on the experience accumulated as a result of the tremendous amount of work done in connection with the investment budget and program being considered here.

It should also be said that the government appreciates the almost general mobilization and personal investment of cadres and officials in the various departments on behalf of this work.

That pool of interest will be improved thanks to several seminars to be held at intervals throughout 1985 and 1986. The first of them, intended for cadres in the Ministry of Planning, was held in Namoro from 13 to 15 September 1985.

To optimize these possibilities, it will certainly be important to set up in each ministry a structure responsible for project preparation, planning, and followup.

It seems important to us to stress the necessity of improving the management of those activities. Procedures and the proper tools for followup will therefore have to be provided for the management of those projects. This can be done by instituting operational plans and planning estimates for each project.

That approach, supplemented by periodic progress reports and management reports for each project, will have the advantage of constituting a management aid for those in charge of projects and will facilitate control of project execution, both physical and financial.

The training and information efforts already underway in that direction will be continued and intensified during 1986.

The cornerstone will certainly continue to be the daily use made by each sector and each administrative unit of the available human resources and capabilities.

Openmindedness, the decentralization of tasks, and willingness to learn will guarantee optimal utilization.

Overall, we can see the amount of ground that remains to be covered despite a few legitimate satisfactions.

We also know that we will have to cover that labor-laden ground. We know that we must do what must be done to bring about and succeed with the economic recovery.

We will do it with the commitment necessary for our country's development--for our development.

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CSO: 3419/41

NIGERIA

LABOR ON WAGE CUTS

Labor Reiterates Opposition

AB080850 Lagos Domestic Service in English 0600 GMT 8 Nov 85

[Text] The Nigerian Labor Congress has reiterated its opposition to the wage cuts announced recently by the Federal Government. In a reaction to a news analysis on the pay cuts broadcast by Radio Nigeria, the Congress said its position was that by focusing on salaries and wages to reduce expenditures, the government was, according to it, chasing shadows. It claimed that the real wasteful expenditure was in the areas of government contracts and defense.

Minister Urges Ultimatum Withdrawal

AB090814 Lagos Domestic Service in English 0600 GMT 9 Nov 85

[Text] The Nigerian Labor Congress [NLC] has been asked to withdraw its 21-day ultimatum to the Federal Government on the recent pay cuts announced for public service employees. The Minister of Employment, Labor, and Productivity, Rear Admiral Patrick Koshoni, told a news conference in Lagos yesterday that the government's decision on the pay cuts was dictated by the general consensus to revive the economy. He drew the attention of the NLC to the procedure for resolving disputes as provided in the trade dispute decree and said it was important for the Congress to show understanding in the matter. The minister stated that it was not true that government did not consult the relevant trade unions prior to the announcement of the pay cuts. He said representatives of the union were duly informed about government's intention in line with the current industrial relations practice.

On allegations by the NLC bordering on a number of issues affecting workers, Rear Admiral Koshoni explained that these developments were caused by past mismanagement of the economy and the situation in the international oil market. These problems, he added, could not be blamed on the present administration. The minister gave an assurance that the sacrifice being demanded as a result of the national economic emergency would involve every individual and group in the country, adding that workers' sacrifice alone was not capable of revamping the economy. It will therefore be necessary for aggrieved unions to channel their grievances through the appropriate quarters in the interest of industrial peace.

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CSO: 3400/408

NIGERIA

BRIEFS

FREEZE ON PROFIT REPATRIATION ADVOCATED--The Nigeria Labor Congress [NLC] has recommended a temporary embargo on profits repatriation by multinational companies to conserve foreign exchange. It also advised the government to reschedule the repayment of foreign debts to a level not more than 20 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings. These are part of the practical proposals for revamping the economy which the NLC said it has submitted to the Federal Government. The congress restated its opposition to the IMF loan and suggested that rent on houses be frozen for 1 year. It demanded that the government should make it an offense for public establishments to rent a place for any employees above 20 percent on the employee's basic salary. President Ibrahim Babangida recently asked the congress to propose measures to revive the national economy. [Text] [Lagos Domestic Service in English 1500 GMT 9 Nov 85 AB] /12712

CSO: 3400/409

SEYCHELLES

DETAILS ON SIXTH SPPF CONGRESS GIVEN

President's Report

Victoria NATION in English 28 Sep 85 pp 2, 16

[Text]

ANY feelings of complacency that any Seychellois might have over the undeniably phenomenal progress Seychelles has made in just eight years of socialist construction were dispelled by SPPF leader Albert René yesterday.

Presenting his Secretary-General's Report to the Front's Sixth National Congress at the Maison du Peuple yesterday afternoon, Mr René repeatedly stressed that in spite of the many successes, there were also still many problems to solve, many challenges to overcome and many more things to do.

HOUSING

Looking first at the housing situation, Mr René said that so many houses had been built since 1977 that thousands of formerly homeless families now had a home of their own. But where did these people live before 1977? And "in spite of all (the) new homes, there are still many families living in deplorable accommodation".

The party leader reminded the Congress that it was not always easy for the government to borrow the amount of

money needed to build houses for the people.

He also said those who received housing loans had to repay these regularly every month. Those who had repayment problems — if they were unemployed at the moment, for example — had to inform the Seychelles Housing Development Corporation (SHDC). The Corporation would make arrangements for lower instalments or even defer repayments for one or two months. "Those who fail to take these steps must not complain later if SHDC takes steps to repossess the house," Mr René warned.

He also pointed out that with its plan to build 500 houses a year starting 1985, the government had to find the necessary land and thus had to buy properties suitable for housing. "It is only when an owner refused to sell that the government, in the interest of the people, is forced to take steps to acquire the property," Mr René explained.

"In implementing the policies of the Front, the government works for the benefit of the people," Mr René said.

"The rights of the majority of the people come before the rights of the individual. If we want to provide every Seychellois family with its own home, we need money and land."

Everyone, particularly members of Congress, had to understand this and also had to help and educate the people to understand that if at times the government had to acquire properties to redistribute, it did so with the aim of giving a better life to the majority of the Seychellois people. "We do it to implement the will of Congress which has laid down that every Seychellois family must possess its own home," Mr René said.

Proposing changes to the housing policy as laid out in the party's policy statement "Onward to Socialism", Mr René said that there was not enough land available for the government to continue building whole new villages as demanded in the document. Instead, it was proposed that the government build on vacant lots in existing villages where there was already easy access to roads, water, electricity and other facilities.

In Victoria too there were some houses that were degrading for the people to live in and Mr René felt that the Front should ask the government to carry out a serious study on the reconstruction of parts of the capital.

Ending his report on housing, Mr René said that some people had abused SHDC's services; others had resorted to irregular dealings and had not worked conscientiously. In the branches too there were some who had not always allocated construction material to those who should have received them.

"All these drawbacks have affected us and have caused suffering to our own brothers and sisters," Mr René said.

INCOME

Turning to the subject of the income of the working Seychellois, Mr René reminded the Congress, "In a society that belongs to all of us, and where all of us must have a share of the national cake, we cannot have some people earning very high salaries while others are getting very little." In 1977 some people were earning over R8,000 per month while a great many others were earning less than R400 a month, a ratio of 20 to 1.

The first problem the government encountered was that it was not easy to reduce salaries, Mr René reported. As a developing country, Seychelles needed doctors, professors, engineers and other professionals, but the colonial education system had not produced enough qualified Seychellois. In addition, most of the professionals went to work in other countries for higher salaries.

"Our people in general had not yet attained that degree of patriotism — that necessary level of love for the motherland — which would make them carry on working in their own country even if their salaries were less than what they could get elsewhere," Mr René said.

The second problem encountered — and it is still a problem today — was that in general Seychellois workers were not producing as much as they could. "There was — and there still is — a mentality of doing as little work as possible for as much money as possible. There existed — and still exists — a mentality of waste at work. There was — and there still is — an attitude of dependence on others."

But in one way, the workers could not be blamed too much, Mr René said, because in the past, the benefits of their labour went into the pockets of a small handful of people.

"Most workers did not realise — and even today some have still not understand — that a great change occurred in this country in 1977," Mr René said in reference to the Liberation. "From that day on, all their labour contributed to give them a better salary. The time had gone when big employers could pay any salary they felt like.

"From that day on, all their labour contributed to give them better health care. The time had gone when only those who could pay received good treatment.

"From that day on, all their labour contributed to give them a better education system. The time had gone when good education was available only to children whose parents could pay for it.

"From that day on, all their labour contributed to the better welfare of their old parents. The time had gone when our elderly had to beg."

But in spite of the problem, the government managed to increase the salaries of the lower paid year after year. In 1977, the average monthly salary of the Seychellois in general was less than R1,000 per head. In 1984, this had reached almost R2,000 per head. At the same time, salaries above R5,000 a month were frozen and the rupee was revalued to counteract the effect of the high rise in the cost of goods.

BETTER FOOD

On the subject of providing better food for the population, Mr René said: "In order to

make our people more energetic and productive, so that they can contribute by themselves to make their lives better, the Front has declared that every child in Seychelles must have not only enough to eat, but enough good nourishing food to help him grow up healthy and to develop his physical and mental capabilities to the full."

Since 1977, the government had "declared war" on this problem, and today it could be stated that there were no more malnourished children in the country.

It was also interesting to note that the people were consuming much more fish, meat, eggs, milk and all other foods that the body needed, due not only to better salaries, but also to continued education by the ministries concerned.

EDUCATION

"Education is the key to the development of a people," the party leader said, so the government speedily constructed many schools and today every child from the age of four to 20 could be accommodated. Comparing today's situation to 1976 when the country gained independence, there were 33 per cent more children in primary school, that is 14,500 in all or almost a quarter of the population, 11 times more children completing their secondary education, six times more studying for their A Levels, and nine times more going for further studies abroad.

"Every Seychellois child now has the opportunity to study for 16 years in his country and all of it free," Mr René said.

But infrastructure alone was not enough there were several

other problems to tackle. "The Front had charged government not only with providing equal opportunity, but also a good education for our children," Mr René reminded the Congress. A study carried out to find out what had to be done identified three great problems.

To begin with there were not enough qualified teachers and as a short term solution the government decided to recruit foreigners. There also it encountered — and was still encountering — certain difficulties, because it was not easy to get foreign teachers who were prepared to adapt themselves to the Seychellois people. In addition, it was a costly operation.

As a long term solution, the government adopted two approaches: give more training to existing Seychellois teachers, and encourage more Seychellois to take up teaching as a profession.

"A teacher must have a vocation, meaning that he must have a love for children, a love to share and a love of sacrifice for the good of his country," Mr René said. Sadly, many young people finishing their studies were not interested in teaching the country's children. And yet, a teaching career also had its rewards.

"What can be more encouraging for a human being than to know that he helped to train a doctor, dentist, engineer, mechanic, mason or another teacher? What greater joy can a person feel than to know he has contributed to lay the foundation of the New Society we are trying to create," Mr René asked. The Front and government hoped that more young people would show a will to help bring about a better fu-

ture faster by becoming teachers, he said.

The second problem was more fundamental — that of language. While children in every country used the language which he had learnt at his mother's knee when he first went to school, in Seychelles a child was expected to learn a new language before he even knew how to read and write his own. It was to remedy this that the Front decided to use Creole in school.

"It was one of the best decisions ever taken and today the result is clear," Mr René said. Children today could not only read and write in Creole, but they also learned English, and later French, more easily.

"It is already evident that all the children who began their schooling in Creole will attain a higher level when they reach P9," Mr René said.

The third big problem was the quality of the school programmes and textbooks being used. "It was evident that if we wanted our children to progress, then we had to write our own books and develop our own programme," Mr René said. This was a tremendous understanding and the Ministry of Education was working on it year after year.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The Front, Mr René noted, has asked for a social development based on Seychelles' customs, traditions and culture "to give pride, discipline and dignity to our people".

"In general, a great effort has been made over the past few years to instill pride and discipline in the Seychellois people, but we have not always succeeded," Mr René admitted. "A colonised mentality de-

layed us a lot in this field and we have not yet been able to develop the community spirit necessary to live as brothers and work hand in hand."

Nevertheless, a lot had been done for the welfare of the elderly who today had the right to a pension which allowed them to buy what they needed without having to beg as in the past.

There has also been great progress in developing the Seychellois culture, and in democratising sports to give all those who want to, the opportunity to participate. But Seychelles still lacked a lot of facilities and the 1985-89 National Development Plan had made provision to improve the situation.

INCREASING FOOD PRODUCTION

Mr René said it was evident that there were a lot of abandoned properties around, some suitable for agriculture, and during the past few years the government had negotiated with the owners to buy their land to turn into state farms or cooperatives, or to be resold to private individuals interested in making them productive.

One of the most important projects which government had undertaken was to produce the food and vegetables that in the past were imported. Today Seychelles was self-sufficient in pork, chicken and eggs and had begun potato and onion production.

But the most important task that remained to be done was to properly plan production. It was difficult for a small country like Seychelles to export vegetables, therefore it had to produce just enough for its own consumption. "If we do not do this, it will be difficult to guarantee reasonable prices for

the farmers' produce," Mr René explained.

Concerning the sea, the government was putting a lot of efforts into reorganising traditional fishing.

Government was building new types of boats to provide more comfort to fishermen at sea at the same time, the Marketing Board was being organised to guarantee a good revenue to fishermen and reasonable prices to consumers. Many young people were being trained to take up a career in fishing.

The development of traditional fishing was going hand in hand with efforts to set up industrial fishing. Negotiations were presently under way to buy Seychelles' first seine fishing vessel and for the country to also begin to process tuna for export. A fishing port was being built with all the necessary infrastructure to turn Victoria into the most important fishing centre in the Indian Ocean. This development project would provide employment for many people not only in fishing, but in associated services needed to support the fishing industry.

In addition to agricultural production, the Front also sought self-sufficiency in the country in general. This meant Seychelles had to produce as much of the goods that it consumed as possible. If the country was to develop, it had to make use of all its resources to produce what it needed.

The Seychelles Marketing Board was taking all the necessary steps to produce, right here in Seychelles, such things as fruit juices, jams, sauces, animal feed, flour, milk, sausages, bacon, ham, etc. Most of the projects would be completed this year and the rest

next year, would provide work for hundreds of people and would make Seychelles less dependent on imports.

Apart from food, there were also projects being undertaken to produce soap, paint, etc.

ACHIEVING FULL EMPLOYMENT

It was in employment that government had the most difficulty in implementing the Front policy, Mr René said, mainly for three reasons.

The first was that in 1977, the country inherited a labour system based on the exploitation of workers and class division in society. Workers in production were not considered as important as office workers who were paid more.

The second reason sprang from the mentality of the people, which might have been the result of the discrimination existing during the colonial era. "In general, all workers believed that others, and not they, were benefitting from the fruit of their work and this mentality still persists in spite of great efforts to change it," Mr René said. Many parents still believed that their children should work in an office and not in production.

The third reason was that Seychelles' economic situation did not allow the government to change this state of affairs fast enough.

But in spite of all this, the salaries of the lowest paid workers had been gradually increased to give them a better living standard, and a detailed study had been undertaken to find out the type of training the youth needed for future development.

At the same time the government had, in its five-year Development Plan, worked out

what had to be done to provide employment for all Seychellois who could and wanted to work. The country's education programme was also making a serious effort to make the youth understand that "if we want our country to progress, we must engage in productive work. If we all work in offices, the country will quickly come to a halt. We need people to work in offices, but we specially need people who produce fish, vegetables, houses and goods that we import, etc."

There was another mentality which had to be eliminated; an inherited mentality based on the belief that government could simply mint money. "The money that we have comes from our work in producing goods that we can sell here in Seychelles and abroad," Mr Rene said.

Money was therefore generated through the people's own work. "It is for this reason that if we want our country to progress, we all must work hard and well and struggle to stop anyone who delays our progress," Mr Rene said.

HEALTH SERVICE

"All have the right to health care without any discrimination," Mr Rene said. It was also the polity of the Front not only to treat all those who were sick, but also to do everything possible to prevent people from getting sick.

Clinics had been set up in most districts and the health of the population in general had greatly improved. Infant mortality had decreased and was less than in any country in Africa and even lower than in some European ones.

"But it is also necessary to say that we should not abuse our health service," Mr Rene said.

Another problem was the lack of Seychellois doctors.

Good health also depended on a clean environment. Thus, although animals had to be reared for food, this had to be done in a way that did not spread diseases.

"There are times when, in the interest of the health of the people, we must take certain decisions which others may not like," Mr Rene said. For example, the government had decided that before rearing pigs in future, a person would have to have a clean and hygienic sty.

So, before buying a pig, a person would need to have a certificate from the Veterinary Division testifying that he had a good sty.

"This decision is going to affect a number of people and some will insult the government," Mr Rene noted. "But insults or not, it is the duty of government to watch over the health of the population and to ensure that we live in a clean and hygienic environment."

Youth Promises

Victoria NATION in English 28 Sep 85 pp 1, 16

Article: "We Will Continue the Struggle, the Youth Promises"

Text

THE principles of the International Youth Year (IYY) came to the SPPF National Congress yesterday when a youth representative pledged the support of the young Seychellois for Secretary-General Albert Rene and the socialist ideals he has struggled to uphold over the past 21 years.

Addressing the Congress before the Secretary-General presented his report, 20-year-old Reginald Lawrence of the Seychelles Polytechnic said that the youth of Seychelles were convinced that after the meeting, the party leaders and militants would step up the struggle for a just and fraternal society with much energy and determination.

"As the vanguard of the Revolution, the party had struggled for the freedom and independence of the people, Reginald said, and for many years had fought against injustice and to bring "remarkable" progress to the country.

"We, young Seychellois, assure the participants of the Congress, and especially you, Mr Secretary-General, that we will always be sincere to, and defend the principles for which you have struggled since 1964," the youth said.

"We take this occasion to sincerely thank all those who, in one way or another, have struggled for freedom and justice in our country, and we guarantee you that we, young Seychellois, will continue that struggle till the end," he added.

After the speech, another youth representative, this time from the Pioneer movement of the SPPF Youth League, presented Mr Rene with a bouquet of flowers.

The Youth League, along with other SPPF-affiliated organisations, has three delegates at the Congress. The 141 delegates are made up of 14 Central Committee members, five delegates from

each of the party's 23 district branches, and three delegates each from the National Workers Union (NWU), the Seychelles Women's Association (SWA), the Youth League and the Seychelles People's Defence Forces (SPDF).

THE need to mobilise Seychellois youth and the rest of the population more actively at the community level was stressed at the opening of the sixth National Congress of the Seychelles People's Progressive Front yesterday, when Secretary-General Albert René called on party branches to establish closer and more effective ties with the people.

In his report on the implementation of the country's policies since the Seychellois socialist revolution was launched eight years ago (see accompanying article), Mr René told the 140 delegates from the party grass roots, Central Committee and SPPF-affiliated organisations, "Branch officials do not have enough contact with the population, particularly the youth. We have an active and energetic youth, but too often there are not enough activities for them in the branches."

Mr René asked why the branches did not hold more dances and cultural evenings in the community centres. "A community needs much more contact between its members - cultural, sports, political, social, etc. if it wants to live happily," he said. "As we say in Creole, 'there must be life' in the districts. If we do not have this 'life', our youth will find other ways to enjoy themselves and no one can blame them."

This was where the SPF Youth League had a great role to play, Mr René pointed out. The League had to animate the community and make the lives of the other youth of the districts happy and interesting.

"It is through social contacts that we will succeed in bringing a sense of discipline and happiness in the spirit of our youth," Mr René said.

"I appeal today to the branches and other party organisations to make a serious effort to get our whole population moving and to develop their community spirit in full."

Earlier, the party leader had reminded the delegates from all around the country: "Neither the best policies nor the best efforts by government will ensure quick progress if we do not work together to bring about the progress."

First of all, party officials, particularly branch officials, had to understand what the party and the government were trying to achieve and why. Too often party officials themselves did not understand what was going on and did not seek to know why certain actions were being taken.

"And if this is the case, how can they guide the rest of the population?" Mr René asked. "Many people then do not get to know the reasons behind the decisions that have been made," he added.

Making his first report to the country's supreme body since the post of party president was abolished and replaced by that of the Secretary-General last year, Mr René explained: "The . . . Congress . . . provides us with the opportunity to review the progress we have made so

far and decide if any changes are necessary in our policies and administrative programmes, to accomplish the task we have set ourselves to create a new socialist society."

Reminding the Congress delegates of the role of the SPPF, the party leader said: "We are a Front of the people dedicated to the progress of all the people, and which works for all the people. Our Front expresses the interests of the people as a whole; it seeks the interests of all the people . . ."

The SPPF was dedicated to the principles of: equal opportunity for all, self reliance, work by all for the benefit of all, planned development, increased productivity, greater participation by all the people, and a war against all forms of exploitation.

A helping hand

"Daily, weekly, monthly we are incessantly searching for ways to implement these prin-

ciples," Mr René said. "At times we make mistakes and when this happens we correct our course or start again. We never, however, change these great principles that . . . guide us."

"These principles concern all of us and because they do, each of us must therefore give a helping hand to find ways and means to apply them."

Finally, the party leader reminded Congress that the Front existed to ensure that everyone was treated equally. "We struggled, and are still struggling to destroy a society where not all were equal," Mr René said. "We did not struggle, and we are not continuing the struggle, to replace a bad society by another bad one."

The Congress, which is meeting in the Maison du Peuple conference room, then adjourned until today when there will be an open debate on the Secretary-General's Report and other matters, and the passing of resolutions.

Socialist Principles

Victoria NATION in English 30 Sep 85 p 2

Excerpt

THE sixth National Congress of the Seychelles People's Progressive Front reaffirmed the party's commitment to the country's socialist principles and programmes on Saturday afternoon as it passed six resolutions on national affairs.

In a 'Resolution of Support for the Socialist Principles of the Country', the Congress pledged to increase its efforts to mobilise and unite all the people to work for the setting up of a just Seychellois society, and to further increase people's participation and mobilisation

in all district branches. It renewed its full support for the socialist principles of the Front, and pledged "to crush all attempts against these principles and action for social justice in the country".

The resolution then called on all the people of Seychelles, especially party militants, "to place the interest of the country and the nation first in all their undertakings, so as to achieve ever greater progress and a better life for all".

Education

A resolution on education directed the government to continue seeking all possible ways to further increase the quality of education and to undertake all possible steps to encourage qualified young Seychellois to take up teaching as a career.

NYS

Considering that the main objective of the National Youth Service (NYS) was to train young Seychellois to be more disciplined, motivated and fully committed to national development, the Congress also directed the government to take the

necessary precautions to ensure that this fundamental objective of the NYS was maintained.

Reconstruction of Victoria

A resolution on the reconstruction of the country's capital noted the deplorable state of certain houses in Victoria and the need to modernise the town. It therefore charged the government to undertake a study of the present housing and environmental conditions in Victoria and to prepare plans for the reconstruction of the parts of the capital that needed rebuilding.

Rene Closes Reunion

Victoria NATION in English 30 Sep 85 p 1

[Article: "Calls for Continual Dialogue"]

[Text]

SEYCHELLES People's Progressive Front (SPPF) leader Albert René closed the party's sixth National Congress at the Maison du Peuple on Saturday with a call for continual dialogue at all levels of the Front and of society so as to breathe more vigour into the revolution.

Closing two days of discussions on party and national matters between 141 delegates from the Front's grass roots, leadership and affiliated organisations, the SPPF Secretary-General urged everyone to ensure that the party remained "lively".

"There must always be, between the branches and the central office, between the branch committees and their members, and between branch leaders and the public, a dialogue going on," Mr René said.

"In spite of all the structures we set up, if that dialogue does

not exist, if we do not give our time to listen to what people are saying, to explain to people what we are doing, I don't think we will succeed. We will be like two peoples at war on different sides of a wall."

Echoing one of the main points of his Secretary-General's Report presented to Congress on Friday, Mr René said that SPPF members had to make a big effort to make their party, their country and their people more "lively" and stressed again that "the only way we can do this is by having a continual dialogue between everyone".

"We must not wait for the people to come to us," he said, "but we, in the branches and other organisations, must be ready to make the effort to go and meet people where they live, where they work and everywhere."

Perhaps the time was approaching, the party leader said, when yet more structures would have to be created to allow people to express themselves more. "But it is not worthwhile doing this if we do not yet have a close contact with people to be able to guide them," Mr René added.

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SEYCHELLES

NEW MANPOWER, SOCIAL SERVICES MINISTRY LAUNCHED

Victoria NATION in English 2 Oct 85 p 1

Text

A NEW Ministry of Manpower and Social Services came into operation yesterday following the merger and reorganisation of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the Directorate of Manpower Development.

The new ministry is headed by Mr Joseph Belmont, the former Minister of Labour and Social Security. Ms Yvette Lafourte, who was both Mr Belmont's Principal Secretary and Director of the Directorate of Manpower Development, an independent organisation which serves the National Manpower Development Board, is Principal Secretary.

The ministry is essentially made up of two departments—the Manpower Department and the Social Services Department—with a supporting Administration Division.

Concern

Explaining the merger, a press release from the President's Office said yesterday that the Directorate of Manpower Development and the Labour Division of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security were both concerned with manpower issues, but with each organisation focusing on different aspects. The Directo-

rate was primarily concerned with national manpower planning, careers guidance, training activities and localisation, whereas the Labour Division dealt mainly with employment and access to it, conditions of employment and good industrial relations.

The roles of the two organisations were very closely related and their functions highly complementary, the press statement said. "Merging the two organisations will make it easier to adopt a more global and more consolidated approach to manpower issues, facilitate the necessary flow of information and avoid the risk of duplication of work," it added.

The Manpower Department is organised into three divisions—the Research and Planning Division, the Utilization Division and the Industrial Relations Division. There is also a section to deal with Praslin and La Digue. The Manpower Department is essentially responsible for all activities which were undertaken either by the Labour Division or the Directorate of Manpower Development.

The department also provides the secretariat to the National Manpower Development Board.

With the new organisation, a new manpower cadre is also being introduced. This cadre provides better career prospects for staff than were foreseen in the past, and also lays down fairly comprehensive training requirements. This, the press release points out, is in line with the overall policy of upgrading the quality of staff who have responsibility for manpower matters.

"Human resources being our most important resource, it is essential that we place responsibility for these resources in able hands," the President's Office said.

With regard to the Social Services Department, this has, for the time being, taken over the responsibilities of the So-

cial Security Division. However, in a separate exercise to be undertaken next year, the President's Office will look at how to consolidate existing social services and what new responsibilities this Department should assume. In particular, it is intended to streamline the responsibilities of various social agencies involved in assessing a person's need for financial assistance by the State, to enable cases to be dealt with more promptly.

The offices of the Manpower Department are at Unity House and at the Employment Centre on Palm Street, whereas the offices of the Social Services Department are at Oceangate House.

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SEYCHELLES

EXTERNAL TRADE DEFICIT DROPS

Victoria NATION in English 11 Oct 85 p 1

/Text/

SEYCHELLES' mid-year external trade deficit fell to the lowest figure since 1979 last June, as the value of re-exports, boosted by increased activity at the international airport and especially Port Victoria, shot up to a record R110 million.

The latest external trade figures released by the Statistics Division show that the January-June value of imports into Seychelles rose by R25 million or eight per cent on the same period last year to R324.6 million.

Mineral fuels comprised 30.7 per cent of the total imports at R100 million, up 14 per cent on January-June 1984, while machinery and transport equipment, and manufactured goods accounted for 22.7 per cent and 19.5 per cent respectively. A substantial amount of the fuel was resold to ships and aircraft as re-exports.

Food imports contributed 15.7 per cent of total imports (R51 million), two per cent more than in the first half of last year.

The value of imports of vehicles increased four times from R6.3 million in January-June 1984 to R25.7 million this year, due to the arrival of new buses for the SPTC and trucks for the SPU.

Domestic exports continued to do poorly, the mid-year value of R9.3 million falling nine per cent on last year. The value of fish exports rose by a quarter and that of cinnamon bark went up by 20 per cent, but copra fell 49 per cent.

Fortunately, the value of re-exports went up by R39 million or 55 per cent to a record R110 million. Ninety-five per cent of this came from petroleum imports resold to ships and aircraft.

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SEYCHELLES

REORGANIZATION OF POLICE REPORTED

Victoria NATION in English 3 Oct 85 p 1

Article: "Police Reorganise: Improvements Aim to Boost Morale and Efficiency"

Text

YOUTH and Defence Minister Ogilvy Berlouis has announced a sweeping reorganisation of the police, including a revision of its training and better career prospects, in a major effort to boost the force's morale, efficiency and public image.

The announcement, made on Tuesday at a meeting between the Minister and the country's top law enforcement officers at the Central Police Station in Victoria, came but three days after the Seychelles People's Progressive Front National Congress expressed concern at this year's rise in such crimes as thefts, burglaries, drug trafficking and banditry in general.

The Congress charged the government "to continue taking more effective measures to protect the personal property and ensure the security of citizens and visitors" and "to take stronger measures to eradicate thefts, drug trafficking and banditry in general".

After two months of preparations and almost daily top level discussions on the reorganisation, Colonel Berlouis announced several promotions and repostings of senior police officers to ensure a better administration of the force. He confirmed the appointment

of Mr Max Fontaine as Commissioner of Police and announced that for the first time, the Seychelles Police would have two Deputy Commissioners — Mr Tite Morrin and Mr Raymond Louise.

This was necessary as the introduction of the Seychelles Security Guards as part of the police last February had brought in 500 men and women to double the size of the force. In fact, one of the Deputy Commissioners had been given specific responsibility for the security guards.

Reintroduction

In the lower ranks, where only the posts of sergeant and inspector existed, the force has reintroduced the ranks of lance-corporal, corporal and sub-inspector abolished several years ago. These are aimed at serving as an incentive to constables and young people who until now have not joined the force because of what they see as a lack of prospects. As the reorganisation is implemented,

yet more posts above the existing inspector, assistant superintendent and superintendent may be introduced.

Stressing the importance of creating more incentives and prospects within the police, Minister Berlous said, "In any disciplinary force, if the morale falls then you have failed." So, apart from offering better prospects to encourage the lower ranks to make a bigger effort and to entice more young men and women to join the police, the force's training programme would also be revised.

A special committee would be appointed to prepare a new draft training programme adapted to local needs and circumstances and aimed at correcting present failings.

On the subject of public complaints against the police in general, Col Berlous claimed that some people criticised the force deliberately to cause division within its ranks and public mistrust to their own advantage. Others criticised the whole force because of dissatisfaction with certain policemen or because of some faults or weakness that did not necessarily affect the police as a whole.

"But it is nevertheless true that there are cases where the public have perfectly good reason to complain and some very constructive and valid criticisms have been made," the Minister said.

"There are some policemen who have lost interest in their work and are lowering the effectiveness and image of the force," he said. "I have told the police that the force has place only for those who are ready to carry out their duties efficiently, who are ready to im-

prove themselves, who are ready to accept their responsibilities, and who are loyal to the state. Anyone else should get out and find another job."

Acknowledging that there would have to be more public respect for, and confidence in, the police before people would agree to cooperate in fighting crime and maintaining law and order. Col Berlous said: "It works two ways. The public cannot expect the police to respect them if they do not respect the police and vice versa. In future, policemen who do not respect the public will find themselves without a job and people who do not respect the police will be dealt with according to the law."

The Minister explained that very often people criticised the police or lost confidence in the force because they expected immediate action each time they passed on information. Sometimes they even expected to be kept informed. They thus harassed the police instead of letting them get on with their work and this hampered investigations.

Lose confidence

On the other hand, there were some policemen with little or no notion at all of public relations. When someone came for help or to give information, the way some policemen treated such a person discouraged him from cooperating with the police. Worse still, this caused people to lose confidence in the force.

Turning to the old complaint that some policemen leak confidential information thus discouraging public cooperation, the Minister explained once again that there was nothing he could do if people did not come forward with such cases.

"This is a serious allegation and people with any evidence or complaint against any policemen passing confidential information obtained from members of the public to unauthorised people outside the force should take these to senior police officers or senior officials of my ministry," Col Berlouis said. "We must know who these people are before we can take action," he stressed.

Looking at relations between the police, the militia and the army, Col Berlouis said that each had a specific role to play and the creation of the military forces had not affected the powers, duties or responsibilities of the police.

"The army and the militia were created to defend the

sovereignty of the country against its enemies while the police keep internal law and order," Col Berlouis said.

Recalling that a few years ago there was some friction between the army and police, the Minister said this was caused by certain people who tried to turn the two forces against each other and against the public good. In fact certain former police officers had been responsible for demoralising members of the force and causing friction with the military but this problem had been solved.

The emphasis now, Mr Berlouis said, was to do everything possible to make the police a force respected by the people and feared by offenders.

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SEYCHELLES

FISHING PORT CONSTRUCTION UNDERWAY

Victoria NATION in English 27 Sep 85 pp 1, 2

Article: "The Civil Contractors Move in Next Week"

Text

WORK to prepare the reclaimed land north of the fishing port for the construction of modern industrial facilities starts next week when the East Coast civil contractors, John Howard and Co. move their men into the area.

Meanwhile the Belgian dredging contractors, Jan de Nul, continue reclaiming an even larger piece of land south of the New Port well ahead of schedule. Later on, after the dredger *Marco Polo* has finished its work, John Howard will move in there also to extend the commercial port.

John Howard, a British firm, have had extensive experience in building much larger ports and harbours in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and coast defences, river works, roads, bridges and industrial and utility projects around the world.

Speaking to the information services yesterday as preparations for actual construction picked up pace, the firm's contract manager Malcolm Soutar explained that next week bulldozers would start pushing the huge piles of crushed coral now

on the reclaimed land into the sea, so as to form the edges of the future quays and piers.

Once the edges are trimmed and shaped into slopes of the correct gradient within the next one to two weeks, small rock fill now being delivered to the area by the Special Projects Unit (SPU) will be laid on them to protect them from erosion by the sea..

In November/December steel tubular piles which will later be filled with concrete will be driven through the slopes into the earth below to form the foundations of the future jetties. Larger rock armouring will then be laid on the slopes and around the piles.

Finally, reinforced concrete decks will be laid on top of the steel piles to form the actual piers and quays.

Once the work on the seafront has been completed, John Howard will turn to the rest of the reclaimed land paving areas, laying roads, putting in drainage and building other infrastructure for future development.

The civil contractors will employ some 90 Seychellois, but

more employment will be created by giving some of the work to sub-contractors.

When finished, the fishing port will have industrial tuna facilities on the northern edge facing Union Vale and demersal operations on the southern edge in the yacht basin. In all, some 25 hectares of new land are being added to the fishing and commercial ports.

John Howard will extend the present tuna quay, and build new bunkering piers, lay-by berths and demersal and inter-

island quays at the fishing port.

At the New Port it will extend the commercial quay and pave new storage areas.

The seafront work will be followed — not all will be done by John Howard — by new roads and other service facilities office buildings, cargo sheds, repair and maintenance facilities, workshops, ice, freezing and fish processing facilities and outdoor storage areas, among other additions.

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SEYCHELLES

BRIEFS

WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION DISSOLVED--The Seychelles Women's Association was dissolved by Congress and replaced by a Seychelles Women's Council on Saturday while the party's entry age was raised from 16 to 18 with the establishment of the SPPF Youth League. In his Secretary-General's Report on the first day of the Congress last Friday, Mr Albert Rene said that with Seychellois women now recognised and treated as equal to men, there was no longer a need for a special association to seek women's rights. "Seychellois women and men are equal," and did equal work for equal pay, Mr Rene said. "Government is ensuring that all discrimination between men and women disappear," he said, adding later, "There is no need for any struggle between men and women." Amending Article 12 of the SPPF Constitution, the Congress therefore dissolved the SWA and replaced it with a Seychelles Women's Council of seven members. /Excerpt/
/Victoria NATION in English 30 Sep 85 p 17 /12851

SUPPORT FOR RENE--Party, workers', youth, women's and soldiers' delegates from around Seychelles on Saturday expressed their complete support for Mr Rene as both party leader and head of state, in taking any action he thinks necessary to counter the enemies of the Seychellois socialist revolution. In a motion of support read out in the closing stages of the SPPF's sixth National Congress on Saturday afternoon and followed by a standing ovation, a representative of the delegates stated that the Front, in reaffirming its full confidence in Mr Rene as head of state, "Extends full support for any action he deems necessary and appropriate to deal with the enemies of the Seychellois revolution in Seychelles and abroad..." The motion of support also renewed the Congress's full support for, and loyalty to, Mr Rene "and the party and government he leads so ably", and congratulated him, on behalf of the people of Seychelles, on his coming 50th birthday on November 16.
/Text/ /Victoria NATION in English 30 Sep 85 pp 1, 27 /12851

CSO: 3400/355

SOUTH AFRICA

THREE TOP COMMENTATORS LOOK AT BOTHA'S POST-ELECTION OPTIONS

'Way Out of the Vicious Circle'

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 3 Nov 85 p 16

[Article by Allister Sparks]

[Text]

THE Government has fallen between stools. Its reform programme has proved too limited to capture black imaginations but enough to forfeit the confidence of hardline white voters.

The result is a devastating combination of black unrest and a white backlash which revealed itself in Wednesday's by-elections.

The danger now is that the Government will make things even worse by responding more to the backlash than to the unrest.

With the failure of insight characteristic of ruling elites through the ages, it appears to have persuaded itself that the continuing unrest in the townships is not the result of black anger, but rather the work of a few agitators exploiting conditions of economic recession. Its solution, therefore, is to use tougher security measures rather than change its political approach.

The white backlash, on the other hand, is likely to produce an instinctive political response.

Viewed statistically, the by-election results should be no cause for alarm. The Government has a massive two-thirds majority over all other parties combined in the 178-member House of Assembly, and computer predictions are that the 17.2 percent swing to the far-rightist parties in the by-elections would enable them to win only six

more seats than the 18 the break-away Conservative Party now holds.

It would require a massive, and probably unattainable, swing for the far-rightists to oust the National Party from power — especially as it would be assured of support from the liberal Progressive Federal Party, which now has 27 seats — if such a threat became real.

In any event, the Government does not have to face a General Election for another four years, by which time constitutional changes giving the vote to non-whites could reduce the far-rightists to an inconsequential minority.

Unfortunately, electoral statistics are not the sole criterion in South African politics. In common with black Africa, tribal considerations are often more important. The Botha Government has a deep-rooted fear of its Afrikaner power base being eroded. The thought that the far-rightist parties may be in the process of becoming the new custodians of Afrikaner nationalism's holy grail is a nightmare that the prospect of compensatory English votes cannot dispel.

So a response to the swing seems probable. In his initial reaction to the results, President Botha said he would "take cognisance of why people voted the way they did". That probably means he will

move even more cautiously with his reforms and crack down harder than ever on the perceived agitators.

If so, this will worsen the situation. Slower reforms and harsher action in the townships can only increase black anger, leading to more unrest which, in turn, will result in a stepping-up of the international sanctions campaign and a further loss of business confidence, causing more economic hardship, and more of a white backlash against the Government.

Is there a way out of this vicious cycle?

The only way is for Mr Botha to recognise that once a commitment to reform is made, half measures are bad politics.

A leader in Mr Botha's position will lose the support of conservative members as soon as he declares himself in favour of reform. If he moves forward half-heartedly and ambiguously after that, he will fail to win any new support from the unimpressed recipients of his reforms, but his tentativeness will not bring back any of the conservatives whose faith is destroyed.

So the Government starts losing support on both its left and its right.

If there can be no going back, the only way is to move forward decisively. Bold action also creates an image of confidence that attracts its own following. As it is, Mr Botha's ambiguity has caused a serious crisis of confidence in his leadership.

What is required is a quantum leap that can capture the imagination and convince black South Africans once and for all that the Government really intends to dismantle apartheid.

There are many possible ways of doing this, but one could be to issue a declaration of intent, cast in the following form:

1. The Government declares its intentions to rescind all apartheid

legislation within one year, during which it will begin negotiations with representative leaders from all sectors of the community to devise a new non-racial, non-discriminatory constitutional system.

2. These negotiations will be open-ended. The Government makes only one advance stipulation, that it will insist on permanently entrenched safeguards for minority groups so apartheid is not replaced by another system of racial oppression. The form of these safeguards will be for the negotiators to agree upon.

3. As a gesture of good faith, the Government announces the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and other members of the African National Congress leadership group serving terms of life imprisonment. It also announces the lifting of all restrictions applying to Mrs Winnie Mandela.

4. As a further gesture of good faith, the Government invites the president of the ANC, Mr Oliver Tambo, to return to South Africa under indemnity from arrest to join with his colleagues and other community and political leaders in preliminary talks about the form which the constitutional negotiations should take.

Further announcements will be made at a later stage about the phased release of other political prisoners, the return of political exiles and the lifting of restrictions on political movements.

5. While the release of the ANC leadership group and the invitation to Mr Tambo to return are unconditional, the Government does this in the hope that the ANC will make a reciprocal gesture of good faith by suspending its campaign of violence.

The Government notes that the ANC has always claimed that it turned to violence only because it was deprived of the right to campaign for change by constitutional means, and points out that in the light of this declaration of intent that situation no longer applies.

6. To defuse internal racial tensions, the Government announces the release of all people detained under emergency regulations and the Internal Security Act since the current unrest began, and the withdrawal of all charges against such people.

7. While the release of detainees and the withdrawal of charges are also unconditional, the Government again hopes that the people concerned will make a reciprocal gesture of good faith by using their influence as community leaders to bring an end to the widespread unrest in the country, so that the process of negotiating our future together can take place in an atmosphere of peace and orderliness.

8. The Government appeals to the international community, and especially its neighbourhood States in southern Africa, to cease all hostile acts against South Africa and to use their influence and support to help stabilise the country through the difficult transitional period that now lies ahead.

Such a declaration would have a galvanising effect on the country, and all concerned about its future. Doubtless, there would be a further loss of voter support on the right, but many other whites anxious to see genuine reform would rally behind the Government.

Black leaders would be certain to respond positively. The level of unrest would diminish and, with support replacing threats from abroad, business confidence would recover. An improved economic climate would help limit the growth of both white reaction and black extremism.

This is not to say that a transition from apartheid to a new non-racial society would be easy. Obviously it would not. Constitutional negotiations would be long and difficult, perhaps with breakdowns but at least South Africa would be on a course with a fair chance of success.

The present vicious cycle of black unrest and white backlash has none.

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 3 Nov 85 p 16

[Article by Nicholas Fairbairn, Conservative MP and a former Solicitor-General for Scotland]

[Text]

I CAME here as a guest of the Government and as a lifelong friend of South Africa.

It may not be good manners to tell your host how to run his domestic affairs, but surely your best friend is no friend if he does not give you his sincere advice.

Not as a matter of criticism but as a matter of friendship and also because from within it may not be so easy to see why your marriage is falling apart as it may be from without.

As in marriage so in South Africa. The both extremes spell catastrophe born of selfishness and self-righteousness, frequently comprehensible but always fatal.

In the end both extremes of left and right will achieve the same result, ruin.

Tyranny by the majority of a minority is just as objectionable as the reverse, as in both cases it is ruled by junta.

Throughout South Africa I have met people of all colours and races in and out of government and at all levels who wish to preserve and enlarge that unique prosperity which the European created and which some Indians and coloureds have developed, too, and to which the African aspires.

All but the extremists in South Africa agree that the rejection and destruction of apartheid is not only too slow and too feeble but it is something which cannot be done gradually.

Dipsomaniacs cannot give up drink one drink at a time. A drunk who says he will cut down from eight vodkas to seven before breakfast does not do much to convince his family that he is anxious to give up booze. So it is with the Government.

All their reforms appear to have been surrendered with reluctance and not granted with grace.

They must kick the habit and rejoice in doing so, for let them be under no illusion there is a spiral of catastrophe into which they are presently locked.

And apartheid is the fuel of that spiral. It breeds grievance and grievance imagined, real or exploit-

ed is the fuel of revolutionary Marxism.

Grievance breeds violence, violence breeds oppression. Oppression in turn justifies the grievance and alienates the Western world to a point where Draconian economic pressure becomes inevitable.

And that in its turn multiplies the grievance by causing falling living standards for the whites and rising unemployment for the blacks.

Now is the last chance and the best chance because the prize of success is immeasurable and the penalty of failure is unthinkable.

The extreme whites must stop justifying their fears by false comparisons with the former colonial states to the north and the extreme blacks must stop fuelling their ambitions by imagining that they can create an equivalent one-party banana republic in South Africa.

Equally the extreme white must stop imagining that they can attain their supremacy by oppression and the extreme blacks must stop imagining they can impose their supremacy by revolution.

The lesson of the by-elections is not that the Government must move slowly to keep its support. It is that it hasn't much time left to abolish apartheid and to set up a multiracial constitution because if the Conservatives and their allies were to gain power, war and destruction would be the inevitable fate of South Africa.

If the Government with one act of great courage and statesmanship will reject apartheid now and all its wicked ways and is seen to do so with enthusiasm, the way is open to create a constitution uniquely tailored for a multiracial nation, where none can dominate and all can share.

Then South Africa can return to the brotherhood of the Western world where she belongs and in saving herself by her exertions will save Southern Africa by her example and make the subcontinent rich and more powerful even than Europe itself.

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 3 Nov 85 p 16

[Article by Professor Lawrence Schlemmer]

[Text]

IT HAS has rapidly become part of the conventional wisdom in and about South Africa that stability, and hence faith in the economy, can be restored only by negotiation between the South African Government and legitimate black leaders.

A substantial portion of South Africa and the concerned West has pinned its hopes and expectations on this process. This assessment is manifestly correct and it is necessary that a process of negotiation be encouraged. It is exceedingly naive, however, to anticipate that thorough negotiation could begin soon, or that its benefits would not be mixed.

Many issues and problems make negotiation involving a range of credible leaders unlikely at this stage.

The impediments are present on both sides:

The Government

1. For quite a while now, the State President and Minister Heunis have been clearly unwilling to declare their negotiating position. Recently, at the Cape congress of the National Party, however, the State President publicly endorsed the concept of "power sharing" on matters of common concern between groups, and spelt out a constitutional framework amounting to a form of race federation.

All reactions from African leaders and spokesmen to this framework were negative.

2. The problem of establishing a framework for negotiation is the tip of an iceberg of a larger problem. The National Party does not intend handing over power. At best, it intends sharing power. This means that the present Government

will always act to protect the position of its power base — the white electorate which, as the Government sees it, cannot be allowed to become a political minority. Therefore, all else being equal, any constitution to which the Government will agree must ensure that the white voting constituency as a constitutional unit has at least equal status with other constitutional units.

This framework will be perceived by the black political elite as a cosmetic variation of apartheid.

3. The State may be facing an internal crisis at the moment and may be under extreme pressure from the international banking community, Western governments, black popular protest and demonstrations, but it is far from capitulation.

The coercive sanctions on demonstrations could be hugely increased without the deployment of more personnel.

4. The Government has been insistent that black leaders coming to the negotiating table declare themselves to be opposed to violence. One consideration in this matter is that the release of imprisoned ANC leaders will undoubtedly lead to a welling of near unbridled aspirations and hope for majority rule among Africans.

As the cold, hard realities of a long drawn-out negotiating process dawn, the country could be plunged into the most violent conflict of its entire history.

5. Political negotiation is more often than not accompanied by rhetoric aimed at softening the opposition, and it is seldom conciliatory.

It could be touch and go whether the negotiating process will survive the surrounding rhetoric.

The black leaders

Problems arising within the context of prospective African participation in negotiations are no less discouraging. In the past two years, a dramatic process of radicalisation has taken place in the black communities, in part as a consequence of the emergence of strong competition for popular support between the UDF, the National Forum grouping (Azapo, Azasm) and Inkatha. Socialist rhetoric has never been more fashionable.

The current unrest, the consequent prominence of the ANC and the rhetorical position of no compromise taken by the UDF in reaction to the tricameral parliament have all combined to produce a mood of well-nigh boundless expectation.

The current fervour is to replace the system, not negotiate with it.

8. Negotiation implies compromise. To compromise, a political leader has to feel secure about his or her political base, or has to be able to take proposed negotiating positions back into an organisation to test their acceptability.

Neither of these conditions exist, with the exception of Inkatha. The ANC has obviously not had the freedom to establish community-based organisations of a normal kind. The UDF is a coalition of 600 organisations united largely by opposition to the Government and by sentiment and, hence, it has a very diffuse internal structure.

Some leaders (spokesmen) like Bishop Tutu and the Reverend Boesak are charismatic leaders apparently without access to lines of communication with an organised constituency at mass level.

The result of this could easily be that among the more obvious participants in a negotiating process, only the Inkatha leadership, or the emergent trade union leadership (if it participates) could engage in political "horse-trading".

9. The black intelligentsia appears to have an extreme aversion to ethnic, group-based politics, among other reasons because it implies for them a rejection of their dignity and worth as human beings. The overwhelming aspiration is to gain the fullest possible social acceptance as fellow citizens and any group-based politics, no matter how much power is shared, contradicts this desire.

The chances of creative compromises across this di-

vide of political needs are slim indeed.

Solutions

If the arguments presented above hold, then the two major contending parties — white government and current black leadership — are really too far apart to negotiate fruitfully. Yet the politics of negotiation, including the ANC, are absolutely vital to ensure development towards organic stability.

Historical precedent suggests that when the Government has tried everything and failed to contain unrest, and when the economy is crippled and African communities have become exhausted by constant turmoil, real negotiation will commence.

This is an unacceptable prospect. Not only will it take years for the economy to be rebuilt, but possibly tens or hundreds of thousands of lives will have been lost.

This future is to be avoided at all costs.

A. Catalysts are required to add new dimensions to the Convention Alliance initiated by the PFP, Inkatha and other interests. At least this initiative can provide an alternative forum in which some African and white leadership can begin to face the realities of negotiation politics jointly.

B. What is also required, however, is a framework which is, itself, at least a compromise between "group-based" and "open" politics.

One option, which has been argued before in Indicator SA, is that certain regions be allowed the opportunity to establish negotiations on a more open basis, with a view to the eventual representation at the centre simply as constituencies, without references to race.

/9317

CSO: 3400/421

SOUTH AFRICA

FIRST 100 DAYS OF EMERGENCY EXAMINED

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 1-7 Nov 85 pp 14, 15

[Article by Anton Harber]

[Text]

NEWSPAPERS reported four unrest deaths. Later the same day, another five people died.

Sporadic violence broke out once again in central Johannesburg. Seven people were arrested. In Cape Town, three young children "peppered" with birdshot were admitted to a clinic.

The financial rand dropped below 30 US cents and the ordinary rand closed at 38,45/55 US cents. The currency's performance was, in the incongruous language of the forex markets, "dull and listless".

Six magisterial districts in the Transvaal enjoyed their first weekday free from a State of Emergency. However, eight districts in the Western Cape laboured under their first weekday in a State of Emergency.

The number of people detained under Emergency regulations topped the 5 200 mark, with 1 209 people currently held. A total ban on the meetings of 94 organisations in the Western Cape — ranging from the "Social Issues Group" to the "National Forum Committee" — took effect.

President PW Botha appealed for national unity as his party prepared to take on the ultrarightwing in five by-elections. He quoted Winston Churchill: "I must warn that in times of difficulty, danger and crisis, all responsible people must stand together".

THAT was Monday, October 28, the 100th day of the State of Emergency.

Exactly 100 days had passed since the morning of Saturday, July 20 when Botha called a press conference in Pretoria and flanked, symbolically, by his military and police generals, declared an Emergency in a bid to "normalise" the situation.

On such an anniversary, and in the light of the events that followed, it is pertinent to recall what Botha promised to achieve through the Emergency.

He said:

"In view of the prevailing conditions it is essential that the situation be normalised in such a way that the climate for continued dialogue in the interests of all the people in the constitutional, economical and social fields is ensured".

He assured law-abiding people (read whites) that their lives would carry on as normal.

"I wish to give the assurance that law-abiding people have nothing to fear. At the same time, I wish to issue a warning that strict action will be taken against these persons and institutions that cause or propagate disruption".


He ended on a note of hope:

"In closing, I wish to say that South Africans have the ability to rise above pettiness and violence. I call upon all well-meaning and reasonable South Africans to join hands in these times and to stand together to restore order and peace in order that we can work in the interests of peace and prosperity for all in the country."

Events since then have mocked his words.

Not even his own view of "normality" has been achieved. Although certain parts of the country have grown quieter and endemic unrest in these places has been reduced to sporadic outbursts, the violence on a national level has multiplied — and spread to new areas.

It broke out in Durban after the murder of



Emergency by numbers: While the rand plummets, detentions soar. The rand reached its peak (just under 54 cents) shortly after the State of Emergency was declared. It reached its lowest point (just under 36 cents) in mid-October. The number of detentions more than doubled between week 6 (2 414) and week 11 (4 960)

activist lawyer Victoria Mxenge, and in Cape Town after the detention of Dr Allan Boesak.

It has moved out of the isolation of black townships and into city centres, producing television images reminiscent of Lebanon.

Whereas for whites, there had been no real emergency until the government told them there was an official one, now the unrest has moved — albeit sporadically — to city centres, where it is directly affecting their lives.

Despite heavy-handed attempts to make black scholars go to school and stay there, black matric exams began in both the Transvaal and Cape Town schools this week with few children in attendance.

The official figure for attendance in the Transvaal was 40 percent. In the Cape only about 20 percent of high school students were expected to write.

The "official" death toll for 1984/85 has passed the 850 mark. Of these, some 650 deaths occurred in 1985.

Well over 300 of the deaths occurred in the 100 days since July 20.

For two months prior to the Emergency, an average of 1,65 people were dying daily in political violence.

Since the Emergency was declared, the average has increased to about 3,7 people daily.

The Emergency, therefore, has failed in its most basic stated aim: to "normalise the situation".

On the contrary, it appears to have increased militancy among many people and upped the level of street violence aimed at the authorities.

The image of the police and military — never shiny — has been further tarnished by repeated allegations of severe abuses in the townships and torture in the prisons.

Opinion polls indicate a major increase in antagonism towards the presence of Security Forces in the townships.

For example, a Women for Peace survey in townships in the Rand showed that 90 percent of residents were opposed to the army presence and 76 percent were opposed to the police presence in their areas.

Almost 90 percent felt threatened by the army and 77 percent threatened by the police.

Before the Emergency was declared, the End Conscription Campaign was a fairly small group, a minor irritation to the government. After June 20, the ECC launched a highly successful campaign that latched onto a widespread distrust of the role of the military in the townships. To everyone's surprise, over 4 000 people, most of them white, attended an ECC meeting in Cape Town.

One of the most crucial acts taken by the Security Forces was the detention of hundreds of schoolchildren. Even the most moderate and apolitical parents were inevitably moved to anger and found themselves having to side with their children.

Thus after 100 days of intensive Security Force activity, the prospects for an end to the political violence and a return to "normality" seem more distant than ever.

But events since July 20 have also mocked the second half of Botha's intentions: "... to normalise the situation in such a way that the climate for continued dialogue in the interests of all people ... is answered".

When the Emergency was declared, hundreds of people were detained and others went into hiding. Many are either still in detention or still lying low.

Combined with raids on organisations, the breaking up of gatherings and the increased military and police presence in all areas, this situation has thrown many opposition organisations into disarray. Much of the violence has become spontaneous and wild — opening the way for much more thuggery to thrive on political unrest.

There has been a second, more serious effect: with the destruction of non-parliamentary opposition activity went any likelihood of dialogue with substantial leaders outside of present government circles.

Botha told black leaders he wanted to talk. But none of them has shown much interest in talking under present conditions.

After the Emergency was declared, everyone — from Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, of Inkatha, to Nelson Mandela, of the ANC — suddenly showed less interest than ever before about talking to the Nationalist government. Many introduced the withdrawal of the Emergency as a new precondition to talks.

These decreasing prospects of dialogue, combined with the catastrophic economic effects of the Emergency, also led to a rethink among many businessmen.

Many of those who had actively promoted the new constitution and a "yes" vote in the 1982 referendum now deserted the slow-rolling reform bandwagon.

They spoke out strongly for a complete end to apartheid and a group of them decided to meet with the banned ANC in Lusaka.

The result was to give businessmen the dialogue initiative, while Botha and his government appeared to be frozen into inactivity.

Since Botha had promised to use the Emergency to build dialogue, he managed to raise expectations of a major policy announcement. Then he failed to deliver it.

The result was to compound world anger about the Emergency with fresh disappointment.

South Africa has long been a world pariah. Now the pariah had developed Aids.

Within the first week of the Emergency, 12 countries withdrew their ambassadors in Pretoria for consultations.

Many of those have still not returned, leaving the Pretoria diplomatic circle looking like a Nusas meeting in Potchefstroom.

At the end of the day, even South Africa's closest allies in the Western world — Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher — imposed limited sanctions.

The economic repercussions of the Emergency were probably its most significant results. As the value of the rand plummeted, and showed no signs of diverting from this downward path, the pressure for the government to take drastic steps became stronger than ever.

The withdrawal of international credit, forcing South Africa to take the extraordinary and unprecedented step of withholding its debt repayments, brought financial panic.

It became clear the international debt crisis

**"South Africans
have the ability to
rise above pettiness
and violence..."**

President PW Botha,
July 20, 1985.

would not ease until the outside world saw definite and real signs of a move away from apartheid.

The process proved exactly what the government had been trying to disprove for years: that outside economic pressure would force the government to move faster on political change.

It also reduced to smithereens the image South Africa had of being a major economy that could withstand political pressures and would not suffer from some of the crises — like the debt crisis — that bedevil other Third World countries.

One hundred days after it was declared, the Emergency has achieved nothing intended by the government.

It certainly has not allowed a return to "normal" life, in which dialogue can take place.

It certainly has not allowed law-abiding people to continue their lives as usual. One of the most devastating effects of the Emergency has been the pressure it has put on ordinary people, and the way it has disrupted their lives.

It is ordinary people who are affected most by roadblocks, the huge military presence in townships and house-to-house searches.

Not surprisingly, the Emergency has also failed to show that South Africans can — in Botha's words — rise above pettiness and violence. Certainly people have failed to join hands to restore law and order.

But what has happened is not simply a failure of Botha's achievements. Not only has he failed in these goals, but he has made dialogue more unlikely, increased militancy among many of the youth and made it much more difficult to imagine reconciliation taking place.

The Emergency has created a new sjambokracy — where the rule of law has been replaced by the rule of the whip.

He has not just failed in his intentions. He may well have started something the consequences of which are now beyond his control.

That may be why there is so much speculation about the resignation of PW Botha, or of a move against him from within his own ranks.

In the end, that may become the most significant outcome of the Emergency.

SOUTH AFRICA

DAILY GRIND OF CAPE TOWN VIOLENCE VIEWED

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 1-7 Nov 85 p 15

[Article by Vivienne Walt]

[Text]

A FEW days before the State of Emergency was declared in Cape Town, a group of journalists stood on the corner of Belgrave and Klipfontein Roads in Athlone, watching teenagers set a delivery van alight. It was a routine sight, all in a day's work.

About 20 young activists were milling around the corner. "We're going to set Cape Town alight," said one of them, pulling a black and white headscarf over his mouth.

A van rounded the corner past the garage. The youths, in a flourish of excitement, surrounded it, forcing it to stop. The driver grabbed his clipboard, jumped out and fled to the other side of the petrol pumps, where he watched his vehicle pushed on to its side and its windscreen jumped upon in a glorious war dance.

"Juice, juice!" shouted one of the group, and grabbed a pump. Seconds later, the van was ablaze, and the 20 boys had fled, disappearing behind walls and doors. A Casspir made its way up the road, cordoned off the area and told the press to clear out.

Next day, the newspapers mentioned it in half a sentence, as part of its daily catalogue of many such incidents.

Cape Town bears the wounds of a two-month war in which nearly 70 young blacks have died. The tarred roads which run through the townships are dotted with the sticky

remains of burning-tyre barricades, and most traffic lights have been smashed.

Outside Guguletu, there is a graveyard of burnt-out cars, which have been towed to the spot to lie there in a kind of guilty nakedness: a criminal's burial. People stand on the other side of the road and point out the day's new arrivals.

This has become a city of nervousness and violence, where few people talk of possible peace. With one of the highest crime rates in the world, Cape Town is getting used to a new type of gang warfare.

It is the "comrades" against the police and army.

And this week, whites seemed to join in. A farmer allegedly drove past a group of stone-throwing youths in Hanover Park in a van loaded with vegetables and aimed his pistol at them, killing 16-year-old Mogamat Ebrahim. The newly-formed white Kraaifontein civil unit is planning armed patrols of the streets at night.

Nevertheless, mundane daily life has continued through the drama of the past weeks. As people fled up the side streets to escape the police water cannon and sjamboks during last Thursday's rioting in Adderley Street, a toothless man was walking leisurely in the opposite direction, balancing two cardboard trays on one forearm and shouting, "Fresh strawberries!"

The students swear that the new State of Emergency will not stop the stoning and burning, or the boycotts of schools and white businesses. Indeed, as one girl remarked at Mogamat Ebrahim's funeral on Tuesday, in referring to some of Cape Town's quieter schools, "The emergency's got them cooking again."

And although most UDF leaders have been jailed or have gone into hiding over the past week, dozens of the students at the funerals sported "UDF lives!" stickers on their jackets.

A doctor in a private practice in Athlone reports numbers of people coming for treatment for anxiety, depression and nervousness. A small girl tearfully told the doctor of repeated nightmares about vicious policemen.

One woman in Crossroads squatter camp, whose husband works as a divisional council foreman, says "I'm so frightened for him, because he's a government worker. His vans are being burned. My nerves are finished." Her children, she says, "feel like they are living in a jail, with all the army and police on the streets."

There is an almost constant presence of armed forces at the entrance to the squatter camp where 100 000 people live. But the Empilisweni Sacla Clinic at Crossroads is essentially a no-go area for them, and is regarded as one of the few places in the Cape

townships where people can be treated for pellet wounds without risking arrest.

One 18-year-old activist from Langa, who calls himself Siyayinyova ("We are advancing"), sits in the clinic's waiting room and runs his fingers over the week-old birdshot wound above his right eye. He has been shot twice during the past two weeks, once on his way home from a funeral in Guguletu. "So many people have died that we aren't afraid of anything anymore," he says.

The State of Emergency has imposed an even greater uneasiness on Capetonians, as they wait to see its effect during the first few days. The arrest of at least 85 activists last Friday was the prelude. And instead of the massive crackdown which was expected to happen the first day, the police seem to have kept people guessing day by day as to who will be arrested next.

"There's a calm at school. It's bizarre," says one Mitchell's Plain teacher.

This is a time of reorganisation, as people decide how best to act under the new regulations.

Slowly the word "unrest" is being substituted with "the situation" which does not imply anything out of the ordinary.

The city of burning cars and smashed robots is the new Cape Town, and could be around for a long time yet.

/9317

CSO: 3400/428

SOUTH AFRICA

LANGA, VAAL TOWNSHIPS POTENTIAL CENTERS OF REBELLION

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 8-14 Nov 85 p 5

[Article by Patrick Laurence]

[Text]

LANGA and the Vaal Triangle, two names already indelibly written into the chronology of township violence, could easily become centres of rebellion once again if the authorities do not handle local aspirations and grievances with great care.

Langa, near Uitenhage, was the scene of bloodshed on March 21, when 20 blacks were killed by police gunfire while on their way to the funerals of unrest victims at nearby Kwanobuhle.

The six Vaal Triangle townships were the scene of the start of the rebellion in September last year, in which more than 60 people were killed, including four town councillors.

Led by the Uitenhage Youth Congress (UYC), people of Langa are at present engaged in a peaceful quest for the fulfilment of two inter-related aims.

Their long-term objective is to dissuade the authorities from going ahead with plans to move the township's estimated 50 000 blacks to Kwanobuhle on the opposite side of Uitenhage. Their immediate aim is to forestall the forceful eviction of 426 families, who have been served with notices warning them to dismantle their shacks or face forced relocation.

Langa representatives have been engaged in discussions with the Kwanobuhle Town Council in a bid to save their township and prevent the eviction of the 426 families. The

Kwanobuhle Town Council is headed by Barry Erasmus, who was appointed city administrator by the government after the dissolution of the council *per se* in the face of popular opposition (which took a violent turn when the mayor was brutally murdered after refusing to resign).

So far negotiations have proved amicable and the town council has deferred its bid to evict the 426 families, pending discussions with the Langa residents. But Weza Made, of the UYC and the Langa negotiating team, has warned any attempt at forceful relocation of any of the Langa people will be "resisted to the death".

Langa representatives have gone further than merely opposing the relocation of Langa residents (which would involve wiping Langa off the face of the earth and replacing it by a renamed coloured township, although coloureds and blacks at present live peacefully side-by-side in Langa).

They have proposed that Langa should be upgraded and have consulted a town planner, Dr Michael Sutcliffe, of the University of Natal.

In a preliminary report, Sutcliffe has urged the government to consider seriously the upgrading of Langa, pointing out that it is consistent with its new commitment to self-help housing and site-and-service schemes and, of course, with its moratorium on the forced removal of blacks.

Sutcliffe made another observation: Langa has one element indispensable to successful upgrading of a township — "a strong, democratic and wide-ranging co-ordinating committee which clearly has community support". He remarked: "As international and local research has found, upgrading projects only works when strong and united community organisations exist."

Sutcliffe challenged the official reasons given for serving eviction notices on the 426 families: that their shacks were health hazards and that they had been erected illegally.

"Shacks selected for eviction are among the best ventilated, highest and driest in the whole area. Shack densities are much lower than in other areas and do not pose a fire problem."

Furthermore, Sutcliffe continued, many of the structures are substantial and the tenants have been paying site-and-service charges to the Kwanobuhle Town Council, an indication that they are there lawfully.

Langa residents believe the 426 families have been selected for eviction because their dwellings are closest to the white town of Uitenhage and that the Kwanobuhle Town Council is responding to pressure from white residents.

The Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Chris Heunis, has appointed a task group to consider the future of Langa and whether the government should persist with its plans to relocate the people of Langa.

It is headed by Dr C F Scheepers, deputy director general in Heunis'

department. The task group is still assessing the situation and has not yet made any recommendations to Heunis, Scheepers told Weekly Mail.

In the Vaal Triangle, the Lekoa Town Council, which has responsibility for six Vaal townships, has begun to serve summonses on rent defaulters "on a selective basis".

The current rebellion started in the Vaal Triangle in September 1984 as a protest against rent increases. Most residents have refused to pay rent and service charges ever since, demanding that rents be reduced to R30 a month and that the Lekoa Town Council resign.

Lekoa Town Council clerk, Nic Louw, stressed that summonses are being issued on people in employment with a steady income and not on unemployed household heads or pensioners. He blamed the non-payment of rent on "intimidators".

The 39-member Lekoa Town Council has 12 vacancies. Two by-elections have been held to fill them, on May 20 and October 21. On May 20 not a single person stood for office. On October 21 only one candidate stood. He was elected unopposed. A death since then has again put the number of vacant seats at 12.

Louw blamed the reluctance of people to stand for office on "intimidation".

The Lekoa Town Council, which was elected on a poll of less than 15 percent, is meanwhile bolstering its authority against "intimidators" by the recruitment of specially trained municipal police, who will be given extra powers under legislation to be introduced in parliament next year.

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CSO: 3400/428

SOUTH AFRICA

STUDENT PROBES PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITARISM

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 8-14 Nov 85 p 5

[Article by Moira Levy]

[Text]

OPPOSITION to military conscription is motivated by an "inner directedness" and a deep sense of moral outrage. It is conditioned by strong opposition to the presence of troops in the townships and a belief that the SADF is waging an "unjust war".

In sharp contrast, those in favour of military conscription display typically authoritarian personalities. They believe military service "instils discipline" and "makes a man" out of a youth.

These are some of the chief findings of a University of Cape Town study into student attitudes towards military conscription.

Psychology honours student Andrew Feinstein found in his research that all those in favour of military service identified their father as the single most important influence on their positive attitude.

Not one of those favouring military conscription saw the church as having any influence on their lives.

But almost all of them identified schools — in particular the cadet system — and the media, including radio, television and newspapers, as influencing their attitudes.

Not one member of this group expressed any objection to the presence of troops in the townships,

and the majority believed the SADF should be used to quell the present township unrest.

"This illustrates the extent to which they accept the government view of the situation, *i.e.* the necessity to restore 'law and order' to the townships.

"It is also felt that not only are the group's attitudes towards conscription not founded on a moral or spiritual base, but they are also characterised by support for the present status quo in South Africa, support for change only if it does not endanger the white minority, and a conviction that the racial, cultural and class differences in South Africa are natural and acceptable.

"In analysing the attitudes of this group, it is interesting to note that they seem very similar to the picture of the military that the SADF attempts to paint," Feinstein writes.

All members of the group described their politics as "moderate", and said the rest of the world should either be "more positive" towards South Africa or should "leave us alone".

In contrast, those adamantly opposed to conscription called themselves "non-racial democrats" and most aligned themselves with the United Democratic Front.

All members of this group described South Africa as an

"immoral" society that is divided unnaturally along racial, class and cultural lines and characterised by political, racial and economic discrimination.

"They feel that the cause of discrimination is white selfishness, and claim that the longer whites are in power, the more harmful the situation will become.

"Prominent among their hopes for the future are a system of one person, one vote, redistribution of wealth, and the removal of all discrimination and injustices.

"It can be concluded that those who hold attitudes strongly opposed to

military conscription in South Africa are socio-politically liberal, have favourable attitudes towards Africans, and are not ethnocentric."

A third group identified by Feinstein, all of whom described themselves as "liberal" and aligned themselves with the Progressive Federal Party, had no strong views either for or against conscription.

"All members of this group," writes Feinstein, "admit to having doubts and uncertainties as regard their attitudes towards military service."

This group called for the gradual introduction of one man-one vote.

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SOUTH AFRICA

CISKEI'S VIGILANTE SQUADS RE-EMERGE TO DEAL WITH DISSENT

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 8-14 Nov 85 p 3

[Text]

CISKEI President Lennox Sebe's vigilante squads have re-emerged to deal with dissent.

In a speech in early October, he called for the formation of vigilante groups in towns and villages.

Police would not be sent to unrest areas where such groups had not been established.

Men who refused to help in quelling unrest should be evicted from their homes, Sebe urged, and "evildoers" would be hunted "like animals".

In the same speech at a Zwelitsha rally, he lashed out at civil servants who are members of the United Democratic Front, calling them the offspring of serpents who should leave their jobs and "voetsek".

The speech came at a time of rising violence in Ciskei. The national school boycott had spread to even small villages in the homeland and there were reports of arson attacks on tribal offices, schools and the homes of headmen.

However, only in Zwelitsha, outside King Williams Town, is a vigilante group known to operate.

Ciskei Police Liaison Officer, Lieutenant Mavuso Ngwendu, said the group's existence had been brought to

the attention of the police. It operated independently of the police, he said, and had been set up to guard schools and other government buildings.

Residents speak of three white Ciskei government kombis patrolling the township at night. The vigilantes, armed with sticks and sjamboks and presumed to be supporters of Sebe's Ciskei National Independence Party, seem to have imposed their own curfew.

People on the street after dark risk a beating. A King Williams Town lawyer said his firm had received a number of reports from people who said they had been assaulted.

"This is becoming a major problem," he said. It was very difficult to take legal action, however, because complainants could rarely identify their assailants, who were sometimes masked.

In one incident, a party was reportedly broken up. The hostess, Mrs Misiwe Mahana, said vigilantes had knocked on the door while the party was in progress. When she opened the door, she was beaten with a sjambok.

She said the vigilantes broke light fittings and windows and beat up her guests, accusing them of holding an illegal meeting, then left with her TV set. Twenty people later underwent treatment at Mount Coke Hospital.

Sebe's vigilantes have built up a reputation for ruthlessness in dealing with opposition. In 1974, they became known as the Green Berets when they were brought in to crush a bus boycott in Mdantsane. They were again used when disturbances erupted in Ciskei after the death of Steve Biko in 1977.

Most recently they were used against Mdantsane commuters in a bus boycott that began in July 1983. There were widespread allegations of people being savagely tortured at the Sisa Dukashe Stadium where the vigilantes were quartered.

In a report titled "Ruling with the Whip", Johannesburg lawyer Nicholas Haysom detailed allegations of assaults, shootings, harassment and torture of commuters by the vigilantes, often acting in close cooperation with Ciskei police. Haysom said at the time that the vigilantes were mostly brought in from the rural areas, where they were recruited with the help of loyal chiefs and headmen.

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SOUTH AFRICA

FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT OF RAGING BATTLES IN CAPE TOWN

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 8-14 Nov 85 pp 6, 7

[Article by Tony Weaver]

[Text] I cannot speak of the war zones of the Transvaal, Natal or the Eastern Cape. I can only speak of the war zones of Namibia and Cape Town.

For two years, I covered the Namibian war and for two years I kidded myself I was a war correspondent.

Namibia was different, a clear case of an indigenous guerilla army fighting a foreign army of occupation. Even the wholesale conscription of Namibians has not succeeded in blurring the edges of what is essentially one of the last great wars against a colonial power.

In the Western Cape, civil war has broken out. There seems to be little justification in continuing to call it "unrest."

It is impossible to describe what is happening in the townships of Cape Town in the abbreviated shorthand which necessarily constitutes daily journalism. The awesome statistics in themselves take up too many column centimetres on each day's front or second page to allow for anything more than the summary cataloguing of events.

In Namibia, we mainly worked from sworn affidavits, eyewitness accounts, often piecing together rumours and hearsay, trying to firm them up into solid evidence, in our attempts to patch together a coherent account of the war.

In Cape Town, the war is unfolding before our eyes. There is no need of affidavits or hearsay evidence, the biggest problem has been finding enough reporters to be on the spot all the time when the battles rage.

The war has insinuated itself into the consciousness of white suburbia, no longer safe from black anger. Local newspapers get constant phone calls from people asking whether the N2 highway to the airport, scene of several petrol bombings and large-scale stonings, is safe to travel. We usually say, "At your own risk."

No major route which goes anywhere near a township is "safe" for whites and delivery vehicles.

Even the Eastern Boulevard, the highway which floats above the city on the slopes of Table Mountain, is no longer "safe" at night, with petrol bombs and rocks being thrown at motorists from the footbridges.

On the N2 and other toutes, motorists tell of bricks hanging at windshield height from bridges. The Bo-Kaap, the area above the city centre, and the city centre itself, have both been sites of violent confrontation in recent weeks.

It has taken two months, and Cape Town has been transformed from what was always regarded by leftwing activists in other centres as an area long on theory and short on practice, into the main centre of resistance in the country.

Take Athlone, the elite, middle-class suburb which has become a symbol of resistance.

When militant action first came to Athlone on September 4, both sides were pretty raw and ragged. The students started off by burning a barricade, the cops fired teargas, the students ran and reassembled, burnt a bigger barricade, then the cops moved in in force, chucking teargas everywhere and firing birdshot at anyone who ran.

Parents shouted at their children to get off the streets. That was day one.

On day two, the parents were hauling old tyres out of their backyards and passing petrol to the students, shouting warnings of "ghostbusters" when the Casspits came.

Athlone is now a seasoned war zone. It has come of age in the battle for Cape Town. When the police and army move in, there are wall-to-wall troops and police.

Every block, every school has its "action squad," coordinating action, providing direction, helping build petrol bombs and seeking materials for barricades.

As soon as the police and army arrive, the streets are suddenly filled with private cars going nowhere in particular, making progress down the main thoroughfares a slow process for the ponderous Buffels and Casspits.

The police no longer go in at night because now the people shoot back.

As soon as someone is wounded, a private car arrives, the wounded person is smuggled out and taken to sympathetic doctor.

Every now and then you hear stories that "a comrade" arrived on the scene and gave up his or her private car for use as a barricade when needed.

In Guguletu, every house has become a command centre. When the action starts, an ambulance immediately starts cruising the streets, picking up the wounded and ferrying them to safe clinics and doctors for treatment.

Elaborate smuggling networks have been developed to get people being sought by the police out of the area--a network which has been used to good effect to get journalists out of the area on occasion.

In Mitchell's Plain, kids sit on rooftops with binoculars slung around their necks, keeping a wary eye open for the Casspirs, yellow Land Rovers and Buffels hellbent on nailing as many barricade-erectors and stone-throwers as possible.

Mitchell's, as they say in the Cape, is 'n ander soort plek (a different kind of place). You can be standing on a street corner rapping to a bunch of kids who are briefing you on who has been short or detained or where the next rally is going to be, when the group suddenly says "Excuse us," turns and hurls rocks at a passing truck with a commercial logo on the door.

Then they return and say, "Sorry, where were we?"

In short, the townships of Cape Town have become the frontline in a war of attrition being waged by people who see themselves as guerillas in a struggle against the government.

The slogan one often hears now is, "The Western Cape will liberate South Africa."

Children who have not yet reached puberty tell you, "I wish I had a hand grenade," and many teenagers openly express a burning desire to get hold of an AK-47 and a couple of magazines of ammunition so they can "take out the boere."

Others tell you that they yearn for RPG-7s and bazookas so they can "boil the boere in a Casspir."

The level of political understanding may not be high, but it can do naught for the comfort of Messrs Botha, Malan and LeGrange that the slogans being shouted on the streets are those of the African National Congress, the SA Communist Party and the United Democratic Front.

Working on the streets of Cape Town as a journalist has become a high-risk occupation. It should not be said, but there are many journalists who breathed a secret sigh of relief when the state banned access to the war zones, because it meant they would now have a valid excuse not to risk their lives daily.

A strange relationship has developed between the press and the people. Anywhere, at any time in the streets of the townships a hang-gat skollie will come up to you and say, "Press card."

You produce it, and sometimes have to find arguments to counter accusations like "Cape Times--why did you quote the police saying they opened fire on us after we stoned them? They fired first, then we gooied back."

But it is not in threats from the people on the streets that journalists find the stuff of nightmares. It is the scenes of Casspirs and Buffels trundling down the streets, with soldiers firing from them, which evoke bad dreams and terror, even in daylight hours.

Perhaps because of the easy accessibility of Cape Town's townships, the war on the ground has largely been reported from the viewpoint of township residents. Reporters from respectable publications do not travel in Casspirs; they are too easily identifiable then as being on the side of the police, and vengeance Cape Flats-style can be swift and terrible.

The most neutral vantage point is from the streets looking up at the Casspirs, and even pro-government reporters who have experienced teargas, birdshot and rubber bullets being shot at them have come out shaken and believing the Security Forces have lost control over their men in the field.

We see the actions as a series of film clips. Journalists are essentially voyeurs and spectators, going in for brief periods to experience small episodes of the war. The people in the townships live with it every day.

And living with the violence of the system has produced its own counter-cycle of violence, hatred and bitterness which will take decades to break down.

Activists no longer sleep at home, children dare not go into the streets, journalists are scared to go beyond the boundaries of the white suburbs.

They are scared of the police and the army, the "Security Forces."

As a journalist reporting mainly on extra-parliamentary political opposition, I no longer have any contacts. They are all in hiding or in detention.

These are not all revolutionaries; most of them are liberals slightly to the Left of the Progressive Federal Party who have become involved in church organisation, civil rights movements and anti-conscription drives.

Every day brings another story of "Did you hear how so-and-so only just missed being picked up by the espee?"

On the streets, the Emergency powers are being used to systematically destroy the mass-based organisations which have made massive gains and won widespread support since the institution of the tricameral parliament.

Casspits and Buffels patrol township streets, picking up anybody who remotely looks as if they could be an activist. People are being pulled in wholesale simply, it seems, because they owe vague allegiance to the UDF or one of the civic associations or to one of the progressive teachers' bodies.

When I was held for 30 minutes for photographing police and army at a road-block recently, the policeman who searched us found an UDF pamphlet in my driver's bag.

"Next time you see something with UDF written on it, don't read it, throw it away," plainclothes Sergeant L. Gendenhuys said. His lieutenant calmly informed us: "Under a State of Emergency, everything which is critical of the government is automatically banned."

We did our best not to laugh, but the last laugh was on us: that night we heard that the government had effectively banned us from reporting anything from "unrest areas."

The police lieutenant knew that although the laws were not yet on the statute books, in practice the long reign of terror had begun.

--Tony Weaver is a reporter for the Cape Times.

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SOUTH AFRICA

HARD NEW STANCE OF CAPE MUSLIMS IN EMERGENCY DEMONSTRATED

Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 8-14 Nov 85 p 4

[Article by Jean Le May]

[Text] New Year's Eve in Cape Town will lose most of its sparkle this year. The Malay choirs will not be singing.

It was wholly inappropriate to go ahead with the traditional parade, said Malay Choir Board chairman Kashief Ernest because two singers, Moegamat Essa Ebrahim and Michael Miranda, had died in the unrest and "a number of our junior members were shot and injured as well."

This demonstrates more clearly than anything else, the hard new stance of Cape Muslims in the emergency. Traditionally, the Muslim community was the best-off (although not all are rich) and most stable of so-called coloured people at the Cape.

No longer. Muslim political thinking has hardened as the shots rang out over Schotche Kloof and the Cape Flats. Now, almost 95 percent of Cape Muslims--of whom there are just over 100 000--are said to back the political stance of the Muslim Judicial Council which is that although the Koran tells believers to submit to authority, they must not submit to an unjust authority. This is the message being passed to congregations in the great majority of 60-odd mosques in the peninsula, whose Imams back the MJC.

Representative for the MJC is Sheikh Nazeer Mohamed, who has tremendous standing in the Muslim community.

"We consider ourselves part and parcel of the oppressed people of this country," he told me.

"Islam stands for justice and we are consequently against any form of injustice. We cannot condone indignity done to human beings."

Feelings had hardened, he said, because "we are burying our brothers. People have been pushed to the extent that they freely show their opposition and tell the government that it is doing wrong."

The MJC was a judiciary body, he went on, and as such did not "affiliate" to other bodies, so it was not affiliated to the UDF.

"But we support them in their struggle for justice," he added.

Most radical of the Muslim organisations are the youth movements, naturally. There are three active in the Cape:

The Muslim Students Association, the Call of Islam and Qibla. Representatives could not be tracked down, understandably in the circumstances. All are barred from holding meetings under emergency regulations. I understand that Qibla is the most radical, although I was also told that the "mosque siege" of mid-October--when police action kept 2 000 people penned in a mosque until two o'clock in the morning--"turned everybody into a flaming radical."

Cape newspapers have reported that since then Muslim youths have given the Islamic warcry "Jihad" during riots: some have worn PLO-style headcloths. For some reason, this makes white flesh creep. But "Islam stands for fairness and justice," says Sheikh Nazeer.

The Muslim assembly is the only other sizeable Muslim body in the Cape, and its stance is more conciliatory. It appears to have adhered to the edict that Muslims living in a non-Muslim country must obey the laws of land, but does not apply the "unjust" proviso laid down by the MJC. In spite of frequent telephone calls, no official was available; but I understand it is losing ground.

A third, very much minority group is represented by Sheikh Shakier Gamaldien whose tenet is that if Muslims are not prepared to obey authority in the country in which they live they must emigrate. Mr Ismail Essop, Labour Party MP for Griqualand West apparently sympathises with this.

He said in a recent press interview that Muslims were freer in South Africa than in either Pakistan or Afghanistan, citing as one justification that a Muslim MP in the House of Representatives could remain covered "even in the presence of the State President." Mr Essop has much to learn in parliamentary procedure:

It is a long-standing Westminster tradition that hats may be worn in parliament, although it is still done only very occasionally in the House of Assembly.

It was, however, Labour Party leader the Rev Allan Hendrickse who gave a clue recently to police clampdowns on meetings of Muslim Youth. He was very worried, he said, at reports that the Islamic Bank of Jeddah had channeled money to the UDF via Harare--as much as R60-million, he alleged.

And this obviously makes Mr Hendrickse's flesh creep.

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SOUTH AFRICA

BOYCOTT ORGANIZER, TOP UDF MAN FREED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 12 Nov 85 p 11

[Text]

CAPE TOWN. — The chief organiser of the Black consumer boycott of White shops in the Eastern Cape, Mr Mkhulesi Jack, and the vice-president of the United Democratic Front in the area, Mr Henry Mutile Fazzie, have been released together with 17 others on instructions from the Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange.

The 19 were being held in terms of the emergency regulations and they were released yesterday.

The Divisional Commissioner of Police in the Eastern Cape, Brigadier Ernest Schnetler, announced their release yesterday.

He also arranged for a bus to be sent to St Albans Prison to transport the men back to their homes in the townships.

Brig Schnetler said that on Monday last week in his capacity as Divisional Commissioner of the Eastern Cape, he made several recommendations to the Minister of Law

and Order, Mr Louis le Grange.

One of the recommendations asked for the release of Mr Jack and 18 others who were being held in terms of the emergency regulations.

Brig Schnetler said the next day he met Mr Tony Gilson, director of the Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce.

Brig Schnetler said the Chamber of Commerce had made several requests and he was able to tell them that he had already approached the Minister of Law and Order on these requests. The warrants ordering the release of Mr Jack and the 18 others had to be signed by Mr Le Grange.

Brig Schnetler confirmed the release to Mr Gilson yesterday morning by telephone.

Last week it was announced that the boycott of shops in PE would be lifted for a period of two weeks from November 15.

Several demands were made for the suspension, including the release of Mr Jack and several others.

Names

Those released yesterday were Mr Jack; Mr Fazzie; Mrs Ivy Gcina, president of the Port Elizabeth Women's Organisation; Mr Dennis Sehloho Neer, general secretary of the Motor Assemblers and Components Workers' Union of South Africa; Mr Jackson Mdongwe; Mr Tango Lamani, executive member of UDF; Mr Mzisimase Mangcotoya, Mr Bonakele A Rala, Mr Mpumi M Odolo, executive member of PEYCO; Mr Michael Xhego, executive member of the Port Elizabeth Youth Congress; Mr Sipho Silas Mnyimba; Mr Zola Mtatsi, executive member of PEYCO; Mr George Nyengane; Mr Michael Zitho; Mr Ernest Malgas, an executive member of the PE Black Civic Organisation; Mr Michael Nzotoyi, acting secretary of the PE Black Civic Organisation; Mr Clifford Ntanga; Mr Temba Duze, executive member of Macwusa; and Mr Herrick Luiters. — Sapa.

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CSO: 3400/448

SOUTH AFRICA

RESEARCHERS SAY BLACK-INDIAN FRICTION NOT CAUSE OF UNREST

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 12 Nov 85 p 11

[Text]

DURBAN — Two University of Natal researchers have published a report in Durban ruling out friction between Blacks and Indians as a cause of the riots in Durban's Inanda area in August in which more than 70 people, mostly Blacks, were killed.

Dr Michael Sutcliffe and Dr Paul Wellings, of the University's built environment support group, said a survey had shown that prior to the unrest no deep-seated racist or anti-landlord sentiments existed in the Inanda area.

"We believe one cannot build a model of the

unrest which paints it as an African-Indian confrontation," they said.

The report said there were clear indications that Indian homes in Inanda were looted only after they had been vacated, and violence and looting in the area just outside Durban was not confined to Indian homes.

One of the main reasons for the looting was the poor living conditions people endured, they said, adding that their survey had also shown that a startling 45 percent of the economically active Black tenant were unemployed. — Sapa.

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CSO: 3400/448

SOUTH AFRICA

ASSISTANT EDITOR OF AFRIKAANS NEWSPAPER SPEAKS AT SECURITY CONFERENCE

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 12 Nov 85 p 8

[Text]

NO attempt to suppress news in a democratic society can be totally successful because this action undermines the bond between a government and its citizens.

This was said by Dr P J Muller, assistant editor of an Afrikaans morning newspaper at a security conference in Johannesburg yesterday.

The title of his paper was "The dilemma for the Government and the media — the suppression of news or not."

Dr Muller said that when a government attempts to suppress information, the population begin to wonder whether it is losing its grip on the forces of terrorism.

"They also begin to wonder whether the influence of terror groups is becoming too great or whether the police are committing similar acts of terror themselves," he said.

The media were also the victims of a dilemma in that if they slanted

their news in favour of the security forces they would undermine their own credibility.

"There is little or no reason for complaint at the way the situation has been reported in South African newspapers over the last decade. So far the media have acted responsibly," he said.

Dr Muller agreed that acts of terror were planned to obtain the maximum publicity and this was why the South African Government and the media often found themselves on opposing sides.

"The weapons of guerrilla warfare are not necessarily guns. A country can be brought to its knees through the use of publicity.

"Radio and television are the biggest allies of terror forces. The ANC commits acts of terror because they have to keep the interest of the public by these spectacular acts.

"If they do not do this they will be discounted as a political force and seen to have no influence on

political events.

"The electronic media are the first medium that terrorists have in mind when they plan acts of terror because this media can be so dramatic and direct and lends itself to the impact of terror," he said.

Dr Muller said that there was some degree of truth in the statement that scenes of unrest stimulated more interest and that agitators were aware of this.

"Suppressing the reporting of unrest may make the controlling of the situation easier, but it will lead to a loss of confidence and distrust in the way the unrest is being handled," he said.

The police and army could easily outwit terrorist groups by creating the news themselves.

"They could compete with their enemies for publicity. When this is done the results are often spectacular. Positive and pro-active newsmakers will find that they get much more positive media coverage," he said.

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CSO: 3400/448

SOUTH AFRICA

MEDIA ACCUSED OF BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR POLICE LOSING SUPPORT

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 12 Nov 85 p 8

[Text]

THE South African Police do not enjoy the necessary support from the public because many people now believe that the SAP is a force of violence, said Maj-Gen AJ Wandrag, senior deputy commissioner of the Counter Insurgency Unit of the SAP, yesterday.

Speaking at a security conference in Johannesburg, Maj-Gen Wandrag said that the media were largely responsible for this situation.

Before he spoke he requested local and foreign television crews not to televise his speech.

"The international Press and television networks have decided that unrest scenes in South Africa are the most important news stories of the day.

"Yet these media people only give a one dimensional view. Rioters are seen as innocent victims of a brutal police and army," he said.

Maj-Gen Wandrag said that other countries used "a much stronger arm" when dealing with similar situations, and that the

withdrawal of the SAP and the SADF was not a way to end the unrest.

"This would allow the criminal elements to organise themselves unhindered. Law abiding Blacks and their leaders have repeatedly asked the Government not to withdraw these forces, until order is restored," he said.

He added that the police only used violence to quell violence.

"At present we do not enjoy support from the public. Even those people we used to be able to rely on have dwindled.

"We dare not allow this type of wedge to be driven between the SAP and the public. It will develop into a chasm. We appeal to the public not to allow unsubstantiated rumours to cause a division between us.

"If this happens, then our enemies have gone a long way towards winning their war against us," he said.

Maj-Gen Wandrag said that the public should criticise the police, but that it should be constructive criticism.

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CSO: 3400/448

SOUTH AFRICA

FINLAND SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM FOR ANC YOUTH STARTED

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Oct 85 p 43

[Text] Sisa Nowana, the first scholarship student in Finland from South Africa's opposition party, the African National Congress (ANC), arrived in Finland Saturday. The sponsors, representatives of the Developing Countries Organization of the Nonsocialists, were at the airport to meet the student.

The Developing Countries Organization of the Nonsocialists, founded by the conservative youth, students, and women, will fund as a solidarity work the ANC member's 3 years of economic studies at Tampere. A good half of the 40,000-mark study budget will be provided from the foreign ministry's funds for development cooperation work.

Both the scholarship recipient and his hosts maintain the importance of educational help for the residents of developing countries. A second ANC student will arrive on Sunday under the care of the Free Cultural Alliance to study adult education.

Education Important

"It is important for the ANC to educate a professional population for the future, for democracy and freedom in South Africa. We have noticed that in many revolutions, for example, in Mozambique, preparation for life after the revolution has been ignored," stated a smiling and talkative Sisa Nowana.

The secretary of the Developing Countries Organization of the Nonsocialists, Juhani Nenonen, believes that for the people of developing countries education is a more effective aid in development than material help, often difficult to put into practice. The organization has tried giving material aid when it provided mills for Tanzania. Nenonen got the idea for inviting a scholarship student to Finland while he was participating in solidarity work as a member of the EELAK [Isolate South Africa] Committee.

Before this time there has not been a single ANC scholarship student in Finland. For years, however, Finnish people have given money for the education of members of Namibia's liberation organization SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization].

Practical Solidarity

Sisa Nowana has promised to speak at the solidarity functions of the Conservative Party organizations. The intention is to form around him a host circle, in which citizens paying a portion of development aid can also come into personal contact with the recipient of this aid.

Sisa Nowana burst into laughter when I asked whether he knows of the host organization's ideology and supporting forces. He said he considers the organization's interest in central questions important and added that he believes that through conversation they will certainly come to a mutual understanding.

According to Nenonen, there is enthusiasm for the scholarship student in the Developing Countries Organization of the Nonsocialists, and his organization's support has not aroused questions. "It is right and just to help an organization that struggles against an unjust system," Nenonen said.

Sisa Nowana has kept ANC's books for 5 years in the Angolan capital city of Luanda. He has lived in exile for 12 years in Tanzania and Angola and has studied on two separate occasions in Moscow.

Nowana, who has lived in Pretoria and Soweto, reported that he has participated in ANC activities since 1960, during his student days and even after the organization was prohibited in South Africa.

In any event in 1973, during the tumult of waves of strikes, he was put on the police black list and got an agitator's reputation for signing a demand for higher wages at his workplace, an asbestos factory in Johannesburg. At the encouragement of ANC, Sisa Nowana left for exile through Botswana.

He set off by bus on his dangerous journey toward the Botswana border and crossed the border in the middle of the night. In Botswana he came under police cross-examination. After a wait of many weeks he was able with ANC help to continue his journey first to Zambia and then to Tanzania.

In South Africa remain his mother, sister, and four brothers, about whose fate he has no knowledge.

Sisa Nowana told of his surprise when the ANC offered a study opportunity in Finland. He says he would like to concentrate on improving his bookkeeping. His intention is to study accounting at Tampere University and complete his business associate degree examination at a business college.

But Monday, Sisa Nowana, arriving from the sun of Angola, went shopping in Helsinki's stores to prepare for Finland's winter. Until next summer he will study Finnish at the Viittakivi College in Hauho.

13025/9871
CSO: 3617/17

SOUTH AFRICA

CONSERVATIVES CONCERNED OVER AFRICANIZATION OF WHITE UNIVERSITIES

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 28 Aug 85 p 16

[Text] A quiet Revolution--This is how the africanization of the University of Cape Town was presented on the occasion of an address by the university's Director of Public Relations, Dr James Moulder. However, the Department of Education and Culture says that it cannot make any comments on "unsubstantiated assertions" about the policy of the University of Cape Town.

The government is overlooking the increasing multiracial composition of some white universities.

Although at least one university (the University of Cape Town) has officially announced that it is going to follow a policy of "africanization," the Department of Education and Culture said that it cannot make any comments on "unsubstantiated assertions."

DIE AFRIKANER went to seek information at the department in connection with a report in an official publication of the University of Cape Town to the effect that it is trying to make its student body reflect the country's population. The report is based on a speech given before the Netherlands-South African Association by Cape Town University Director of Public Relations Dr James Moulder. Therefore this reflects the official viewpoint of the university.

A headline has branded this "the Africanization of the University of Cape Town." According to the report the change in the racial composition of the student body is reflected in the increase in the number of black, colored and Asian students from 11.7 percent in 1981 to 15 percent in 1985.

According to the government's system of reclassification the racial distribution of the student body is still far from reflecting a national distribution of 18.2 percent Whites, 10.6 percent Coloreds and 67.9 percent Blacks.

The report goes on to say: "But this is not the point. What is significant is the fact that the process has started, it is irreversible and the process is leading to a decrease in the number of students classified as whites. In other words the University of Cape Town is still far from being a university that reflects the nature of South African society."

The viewpoint of Cape Town University is totally in conflict with the policy which the government purports to follow.

In 1983, after discussions with the former minister of National Education, Dr Gerrit Viljoen and university heads, the government decided to abandon its plan to set a quota for the number of non-white students in white universities. A statement issued on 30 August 1983 reads: "In discussions held with the authorities of the Universities of Cape Town, Witwatersrand, Natal and Rhodes the minister of national education took cognizance of the policy of these universities in connection with the selection and admission of students with respect to limiting the growth in student bodies to, at most, the average growth of last year. From this the minister came to the conclusion that the policy of these universities would probably not lead to a significant change in the cooperation of their student corps in the immediate future."

DIE AFRIKANER asked the Department of Education and Culture how the declared decision of the University of Cape Town, as reflected in an official publication, could be consonant with the government's policy as established in 1983. The department's reply reads as follows: "The Department of Education and Culture cannot make any comments on unsubstantiated assertions about the policy of the University of Cape Town. The government's existing policy on the admission of non-white students in white universities has not been changed. However, the position of non-white students in white universities is being continuously examined by the Department of Education and Culture."

Recruit

Ever since the government set down its viewpoint in 1983 the number of non-white students in white universities increased from 6.3 to 7.75 percent of the total student population.

Western Cape University, which was originally established for the Coloreds, is now making an effort to recruit white students. For example, last week the university placed advertisements in Transvaal newspapers, which are read mainly by white readers. Some of these advertisements read as follows: "As an open university Western Cape is accessible to all studious students--irrespective of sex, religion or race."

7964/12951
CSO: 3401/32

SOUTH AFRICA

CONSERVATIVE CRITICISM LEVELED AT AFRIKAANS BUSINESS INSTITUTE

Pretoria DIE AFRIKANER in Afrikaans 28 Aug 85 p 2

[Text] For the first time Afrikaner businessmen opposition to the leftist course taken by the Afrikaans Business Institute (AHI) and to its controversial chairman, Mr Donald Masson, has come out in the open.

This has become evident in a statement issued by the Pretoria Chamber of Commerce in which it disassociates itself from a leftist statement made by Mr Masson. Speaking for AHI and going along with the Federated Chamber of Industries, Mr Masson has asked the government to set the fundamental requirements for carrying through its reforms in "partnership" with black leaders.

The Chamber of Commerce came out with a statement saying that the two presidents, Messrs Donald Masson and John Wilson "neither perceive nor understand the consequences of their statements."

In the press statements the two presidents expressed their regret over the fact that, in his speech of 15 August, the state president failed to convey more specific points to the world audience with respect to more positive initiatives regarding "reform" in South Africa.

The government must establish the fundamental requirements for continuing to carry through its reforms in partnership with black leaders.

In its criticism the Chamber of Commerce said that the Afrikaans Business Institute must abstain from issuing statements on political matters or meddling in such matters publicly. The policy of the Chamber of Commerce is to accept the political framework of the government in power and to promote the interests of its members within that framework.

The Chamber of Commerce furthermore states that South Africa's leaders must make decisions in the interest of South Africa and its people and must not necessarily make efforts at pleasing the outside world.

From sources inside the Afrikaans Business Institute DIE AFRIKANER has learned that the actions of the Pretoria Chamber of Commerce, in providing "less room

to talk" to left leaning AHI President Donald Masson, were the result of repeated objections by chambers of commerce to his having gone too far in his objectionable press statements.

Earlier this year Mr Masson, along with the presidents of five other business organizations who were present in the home of Mr Gavin Relly, the president of the Anglo-American, handed a memorandum to visiting U.S. Senator Ted Kennedy in which the statement is made that the six organizations are committing themselves to the promotion of the process of economic and political reform in the country, to supporting meaningful political participation by Blacks and persuading the government in seeing the necessity of important political changes in the various areas.

In March of 1985 these same six presidents, including Mr Masson, handed a memorandum to Dr Gerrit Viljoen, the minister of Cooperation, Development and Education, in which a number of political demands were made, including the repeal of the Act on Mixed Marriages and Article 16 of the Immorality Act.

When a number of black union leaders were arrested Mr Masson, once again, took the opposing side to that action.

DIE AFRIKANER's sources said that many chambers of commerce officials, including that of Pretoria, have already voiced protests against the ranks of the institute, but these protests have been fruitless. Now Mr Masson must expect to be repudiated everytime he makes controversial statements.

According to what DIE AFRIKANER has learned the unity of the Afrikaans Business Institute is not being threatened, but there is concern over the influence exercised within that organization by some large companies.

7964/12951
CSO: 3401/32

SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

UNIBO STUDENTS BACK IN CLASS--Mmbatha--Students at the University of Bophuthatswana, Unibo, yesterday attended classes after a one-day boycott on Friday. According to sources at the university, the boycott was staged because of the Government's decision to withdraw the residence permit of one of the university's Botswana students. Mr Kehumile Kgoroba was allegedly told by immigration officers at the border on his return to Bophuthatswana that his residence permit had expired. The sources said a delegation of Unibo's SRC members were to meet the Internal Affairs Minister, Mr Kgosi B.L.M. Motsatsi yesterday to discuss the Kgoroba issue. The delegation gave a report back to the students at a meeting scheduled for last night where the students were to decide whether to continue classes or not. On Friday, the Vice-Chancellor of the University, Prof W.M. Makhene, told the students to attend classes or go home. Friday's class boycott came only four days after the re-opening of the university, closed for nearly a month.--Sapa [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 12 Nov 85 p 11] /9317

CSO: 3400/448

TOGO

DETAINNESS FROM EXPLOSION INCIDENT ENUMERATED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English 30 Oct 85 pp 5-6

[Text]

The capital, Lomé, remains under tight security following the arrest last month of at least 30 people alleged by the state to have been behind a series of minor explosions in Lomé. Though President Gnassingbé Eyadema is as unpopular now as he has ever been, his regime is in no immediate danger of falling. Since seizing power in 1967, Eyadema has destroyed nearly all his adversaries. The death of army chief of staff Col. Koffi Kongo in March (AC Vol 26 No 10) in mysterious circumstances was the latest in a long line.

Perhaps co-incidentally, the first wave of minor bomb explosions began a month after Kongo's death. Three small devices blew up almost simultaneously, one at the private house of the much-feared minister of the interior, Kpotivi Laclé; the second at the HQ of the *Gendarmerie Nationale*; and the third, in front of the *French Centre Culturelle*.

The second wave was in the night of the 16-17 August. It almost co-incided with the Pope's visit to Togo. The bombs went off at three modern, luxurious buildings - symbols of Eyadema's rule: the marble-covered HQ of the *Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais* (RPT) - the sole party; the head office of the national trading company, SONACOM; and the spectacular *Hôtel du 2 Février*.

On 24 August there was an explosion in the Grand Marché headquarters of the *Caisse de Sécurité Sociale* which seriously wounded an employee. (He was promptly arrested) in Lome. Another explosive device found at the international Lomé-Tokoin airport was found and dismantled.

Only two people were hurt by the explosions. But the methods and timings showed some professional expertise. The aim, presumably, was to prove that the regime is vulnerable to such attacks - which next time could be far more potent - at the same time as creating an atmosphere of uncertainty.

Speculation about who was behind the bombings has not led to any firm conclusions. A host of exile groups and individuals, mostly in Paris, have for long mounted a noisy campaign against Eyadema. The leading exile figure, **Gilchrist Olympio**, the second son of Togo's first president, **Sylvanus Olympio**, who was assassinated in 1963, finances and leads *Le Mouvement Togolais pour la Démocratie* (MTD). Eyadema has frequently accused the Olympios of plotting to assassinate him. The foiled mercenary plot in 1977 and the alleged plot in January 1983 (AC Vol 24 No 2) were both laid at the Olympios' door. (**Benito Olympio**, Sylvanus' eldest son, lives in **Ghana** and is not thought to be involved).

The other notable Paris-based opposition movement is *Le Front National de Libération du Togo*, (FNL), which is associated with two former army officers, Col. **Merlaud Lawson** and Capt. **Francisco Lawson** (relations). Both were involved in the 1977 coup attempt, and were accordingly sentenced in absentia to death. The Olympio and Lawson families belong to the coastal elite of **Portuguese métis** origin - traditional *bêtes noires* of Eyadema, who is a northerner.

Inevitably **Edem Kodjo**, a former Togolese minister who was best known as OAU secretary-general, has also been mentioned, though there is nothing to suggest he has anything to do with the bombings. He has never asked for political exile in France, and at present is teaching at a Paris university. He is frequently interviewed in the French press on African issues. Recently he claimed that his enemies in Togo, frightened of his rising popularity there, were trying to slur him.

Then there is **Polycarpe Johnson**, Eyadema's former minister of information. Johnson, who is now based as an exile in Paris, carried out several secret

missions while still serving Eyadema. At the time he established close contacts with **Libyans**. Since then he has been credited with involvement in several strange affairs.

The Togolese authorities like to believe that none of the opposition groups is sophisticated enough to have mounted the bombing campaign by itself. Eyadema is certainly worried that "progressive" regimes such as **Jerry Rawlings**' in Ghana or **Thomas Sankara's** in **Burkina Faso** are supporting the efforts to destabilise his regime, and that Libya is somehow involved. At the time of the August bombings, the Ghanaian army was conducting manouevres just across the border.

At the summit meeting of the *Conseil de l'Entente*, held in Yamoussoukro in early September, Eyadema received messages of support from several leaders, including President **Abdou Diouf** of Senegal. The *Entente*, the oldest regional organisation in Africa, is made up of **Niger**, **Benin**, **Ivory Coast**, Burkina Faso and Togo. Until recently it concentrated its effort on economic co-operation, with President **Félix Houphouët-Boigny** footing the bill. This time, however, the final communiqué referred to the need to prevent and resist "acts of sabotage from wher-ever they may come". The president of Niger, **Seyni Kountché**, accompanied Eyadema on the trip back to Lomé as a gesture of solidarity. Capt. Sankara refused to sign the communiqué.

The fate of the detainees in Lomé is uncertain. The government says it intends to bring them to trial before the end of the year, though no date has been

fixed. It appears there are three broad groups of detainees: those considered to be connected to the MTD and FNLT; intellectuals considered to be anti-government; and those believed to have been involved in actually placing the bombs.

Two weeks ago a local lawyer, Maître Ocansey, who was detained in August, was released after the intervention on his behalf of the *L'Ordre d'Avocats de France*. We understand Ocansey met with Eyadema prior to his release. However, since Ocansey was not among the group arrested in September, his release does not appear to have any bearing on the charges of subversion that have been brought against those still in detention. Also released were three members of the family of Professor **Emmanuel Gu-Kounou**, a university geography teacher, who remains in prison. Acting for him is the well-known French lawyer, Maître Domenach.

Like many of the others, the professor was charged with possession of MTD literature. But he has always been a forthright critic of government. Doubtless the government is grateful for any excuse to detain outspoken intellectuals.

Eyadema's longstanding adviser, **Jouffre de la Pradelle**, a French lawyer based in Paris, is a key figure in most legal matters and international affairs involving the president. He is also well-connected in right-wing French political circles. Presumably he will be acting in some capacity for the prosecution, though, conversely he appears to have been instrumental in obtaining Ocansey's release ●

/9274
CSO: 3400/457

ZIMBABWE

RADIO TRUTH ASSAILS MUGABE'S LEADERSHIP

MB101323 (Clandestine) Radio Truth in Ndebele to Zimbabwe 1721 GMT 8 Nov 85

[Station commentary]

[Text] In Zimbabwe today, many people are suffering and moaning in their hearts about the situation in our country. Their concern, suffering, and moaning is caused by the irregular administrative and political methods followed by the government leaders of the Party of the Cock, the ZANU-PF of Robert Mugabe.

The majority of the people in the country are being coerced by government leaders to carry out the wishes of the ruling party. Right now in Zimbabwe, the political situation resembles that of colonial days, when whites ruled the country. The rulers have reneged on the promises they made to the people. What we see now is that a minority making up the politburo of the Party of the Cock is the only group of persons that is enjoying a wholesome life in the country.

The reason for all this is that the government of the ruling party is made up of many people who never suffered in the fight to liberate the nation. They are people who are used to subterfuge. That is why we see them failing to respond to the needs and complaints of the majority. Listeners, there is a proverb that says: Monarchy is dew. This proverb means that when a person is in a high position of authority, he ought to treat his subordinates well, so as to make sure that when the subordinates hold that position in the future, he will receive fair treatment. This proverb is seriously and regularly observed by clear-minded and mature leaders, who possess the expertise to promoting the welfare of all the people in the country. However, the leaders in the Party of the Cock are singleminded individuals intolerant of any dissent. They do not agree with the proverb since they believe they will wield power permanently until death removes them.

The leadership role is a highly respected position, because the life and welfare of all the people in the country rests in the hands of the leader, who is in charge of the country's government. We, in Radio Truth, believe that governing and leading the country is not a troublesome task, if the leaders follow the wishes of the majority within the nation. Governing a country is no difficult matter, if the leader exercises great care in matching his personal

desires and schemes, which may look attractive to him, with those of the majority of the nation. As a leader of the government, you must first carry out what the majority of the people want, so as to build the people's trust in you.

However, if the leaders are jealous, untrustworthy, and corrupt they will receive no respect from the majority of the people. There is no country that has people who respect an untrustworthy leader who imposes his will on the people, tolerating no opposition or dissent; indulges in murder; and subjects some citizens to arbitrary arrests and indefinite detention, without giving reasons. Leaders who do not brook opposition are really bad people. They spend most of their days fearing that some plotters in the country are posed to wrest the reins of government away from them. They, therefore, use soldiers and police to murder and arrest members of opposition parties without valid reasons.

Today in Zimbabwe the ZANU-PF politburo is guided by the principle of plain vindictiveness. The politburo is made up of greedy and jealous individuals who do not want to share the wealth of the country with the rest of the nation. They want to keep all the wealth of the country for themselves only. The leaders of the Party of the Cock do not want to see a non-ZANU-PF individual own a thriving business anywhere in the country. Whenever they notice a successful non-ZANU-PF businessman, they devise ways to forcibly take away the business from that individual. We hope that many of you are aware that many businessmen have lost their companies through vague trumped up charges. They were arrested and jailed after having been found guilty of acquiring the business concerns by illegal means, such as theft and fraud.

When we investigate fully, we find that Robert Mugabe and his party are characterized by envy. We say they are untrustworthy and they desire to rule the country through murder, arbitrary detentions, repression, and false promises to the majority of the people. Robert Mugabe and his Party of the Cock are presently engaged in a campaign to forcibly coerce people to buy ZANU-PF membership cards, which require a monthly service levy payable at the end of each calendar month. At the same time, Mugabe's government has hiked rents, the bicycle license tax, motor vehicle registration fees, water and sewage rates, and the dog tax! In the shops, the prices of goods have rocketed amazingly. Yet the wages paid to the workers are minimal and inadequate to cope with the escalation in the cost of living caused by Mugabe's governing party.

If we recall ZANU-PF's slogan on majority rule, who is the real majority in this country? Listeners; 5 years ago our boys and girls were in the bush fighting to topple white minority rule in Zimbabwe. Today, Zimbabwe's children are forcibly exported to Mozambique to sacrifice their lives defending the one-party state of Samora Machel. Listeners, for the sake of clarification, on 28 October Renamo's forces killed 272 Zimbabwean and Mozambican soldiers and wounded 600. However, Robert Mugabe is adamant about continuing to send other people's children off to Mozambique to go and die in defense of a country to which they do not belong.

We have repeatedly broadcast the fact that a one-party state government cannot be removed from office through democratic means, such as voting in a general election; it requires the brute force of weapons to unseat it. We can clearly see that in Zimbabwe's future there will be chaos and strife similar to that going on in Mozambique today, because Mugabe's party insists on foisting the one-party state on the people of Zimbabwe. Announcements of a pending one-party state have become a regular feature of ZANU-PF public rallies.

We definitely do not agree with the one-party state concept of government because a one-party state is a government of the few characterized by oppression. Listeners, one-party state is rule by a minority. We had better join our efforts with you dear listeners, to uproot the teachings of the Marxist-Leninist, communist philosophy that is now creeping and spreading in our country, so as to ensure true freedom in Zimbabwe.

/12712

CSO: 3400/425

ZIMBABWE

CZI SPLIT OVER SOUTH AFRICAN SANCTIONS

Harare THE HERALD in English 7 Nov 85 pp 1, 9

[Article by David Masunda]

[Text] Black members of the CZI's influential Mashonaland Chamber of Industries have dissociated themselves from national president John Mkushi's recent remarks that Zimbabwe's economy will grind to a halt if the country joins a worldwide call to impose sanctions against South Africa.

In a letter to Mr Mkushi, three representatives of the group who also sit on the MCI executive said they had no option but to "unequivocally" dissociate themselves from his views on the sanctions issue.

Copies of the letter are in the possession of The Herald while others have been sent to the Prime Minister, Cde Mugabe, and the Minister of Industry and Technology, Dr Callistus Ndlovu.

Said the letter: "The embarrassment caused to Government at a time when the Prime Minister was calling for a resolute stand on the issue of sanctions against South Africa was uncalled for."

The three--Dr Jewel Kufandada of the Coca-Cola Export Corporation, Cde Kumb'rai Katsande of the Dairy Marketing Board and Cde Basil Nyabadza of Mashonaland Holdings--told The Herald that their sentiments on the issue were shared by the other black members of MCI.

In a recent television interview Mr Mkushi noted that 20 percent of Zimbabwe's trade was with South Africa while about 95 percent of its trade went through that country. He predicted a total collapse of the economy if Zimbabwe joined in the imposition of sanctions against South Africa.

He said Zimbabwe's economy would "grind to a standstill" within a matter of months if sanctions were imposed against its powerful southern neighbour.

Said Mr Mkushi: "We cannot sustain sanctions against South Africa."

His speech--widely quoted in that country--was even splashed in the South African government's propagandist South African Digest. It was titled "Sanctions would ruin Zimbabwe."

Said the letter to Mr Mkushi: "As it turned out...The Nation on October 20 was a big disappointment for some of us who presumed that having you as president of CZI meant improved understanding and communication with Government.

"We have no option but to unequivocally dissociate ourselves from your views as expressed in the Press recently on the issue of sanctions against South Africa," said the group.

The group also questioned why Mr Mkushi never reported back to them on what had transpired during a visit which he made to South Africa with another high-ranking CZI member, Mr David Long. The visit was before the television interview.

"Why are we, as executive members, not consulted on such major issues as this?" asked one member.

The CZI was an organisation which represented a wider section of industry, including parastatals, so members should be consulted first on issues which might be in conflict with Government thinking, argued another.

Some members said they were concerned that some "elements" in CZI might be "using" Mr Mkushi--as first black president of the organisation--to say what they would have wanted to say.

For example, said one, there was a "highly confidential" CZI document on the sanctions issue which was presented to Government but members--except those of the presidential group--were not allowed to see it.

"As interested and concerned members of CZI, we requested to see copies of this paper fearing that CZI would take a contrary position to that of Government.

"The request was denied on the basis that Government had first to have sight of the document."

Asked for comment, Mr Mkushi said: "There was no document as such...it was just an economic committee point for discussion."

The Herald is in possession of this 14-page strong "point for discussion" which is marked "highly confidential" and deals on the likely effects of an imposition of sanctions against South Africa, among other things.

Mr Mkushi also said it "was not very fortunate" that the point he tried to make that "we should do something on Mozambican routes" was overshadowed by the remarks on sanctions.

"The point I wished to make then was basically that we must do a lot of work on Mozambican routes. The emphasis was put on the comment that we would come to a standstill (in the event of sanctions being imposed on South Africa)."

"We could never be opposed to Government...the main point is we should develop Mozambican routes."

He said his trip to South Africa was only to attend a conference on dis-investment held at one of the universities.

/9317
CSO: 3400/449

ZIMBABWE

MILITIAMEN PROTECT FARMERS

Harare THE HERALD in English 2 Nov 85 p 1

[Article by Tim Chigodo]

[Text] The Government is taking measures to protect Zanu (PF) officials and commercial farmers who are the main targets of dissidents in Matabeleland.

The Minister of State (Security), Cde Emmerson Munangagwa, said yesterday the Government was recruiting and training units of the paramilitary and people's militia to guard the party leaders.

Security was being intensified to protect commercial farmers whose lives were threatened by dissidents.

Cde Munangagwa told The Herald that although it was difficult to provide security on an individual basis, the security forces were doing their best to protect all Zanu (PF) leaders and the commercial farmers.

"It is difficult to guard every member of Zanu (PF), but I am happy to say that we are doing our best and that we will continue to do so," the minister said.

Cde Munangagwa said the Government had made it clear it would ensure that all people in Matabeleland were protected against the bandits.

"We will continue to pour in security forces in these troubled areas for the security of our people. I need to stress that the Government will not rest whilst its people are being killed by these bandits," the minister said.

Since banditry started in 1982 about 101 Zanu (PF) members and 11 commercial farmers had been murdered. Security forces will continue to be deployed in all areas where the presence of bandits was known.

Cde Munangagwa said between 350 and 400 bandits had been repatriated from Botswana over the years together with thousands of others who were not refugees. Although it was difficult to give the exact figure of refugees still in Botswana there were between 3 000 and 4 000.

He said most Zimbabweans at Dukwe refugee camp wanted to come back but could not do so because of threats of victimisation by some inmates.

"The Government has made its best on a number of occasions to try and get these refugees back home and at all times our successes were hampered by certain individuals who for unknown reasons still dream that Zimbabwe is still not independent," he said.

The border with Botswana was difficult to defend and it was hard to control the movement of people because there were very few natural barriers.

"It is because of these difficulties that bandits have moved quite freely across our common borders."

On the effectiveness of the defence and security agreements with Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia, he said the three countries enjoyed and exchanged cordial views on defence and security.

A number of meetings had been held by the three sister states resulting in Zimbabwe getting good response in terms of deportation of bandits from Botswana and Zambia.

/9317
CSO: 3400/449

ZIMBABWE

MWENEZI FOLK PIONEER LAND RECLAMATION REVOLUTION

Harare THE HERALD in English 7 Nov 85 pp 1, 7

[Text] More than 5 000 Mwenezi families have already destroyed their homes and rebuilt in new villages: a symbol of their faith in the radical land and social reform programme they themselves have planned and launched for their poverty-stricken and dry district.

On Tuesday night a special session of the international conference in Harare on implementing a national conservation strategy heard the people of Mwenezi and the Government officials who helped them with advice describe the revolution in the south-west of Zimbabwe.

Back in 1982 the Batanai District Council which covers the Matibi I and Maranda communal lands decided something had to be done. The district was the second poorest in Zimbabwe. Most of it was in natural region V, the people were totally dependent on cattle. Overgrazing and poor management of the patchwork of minute family plots and pastures were destroying the veld.

The census of that year found 73 327 people in the two adjacent communal lands, a density of 36 people a square kilometre, in an area where most land is only suitable for ranching.

The Provincial Administrator, Dr Ebison Munjanganja, told the session on Tuesday that the peasant community wanted to break the cycle of poverty and deprivation. The Government officials wanted to help improve the lot of the rural poor. So the two got together.

The man on the spot was the District Administrator, Cde Kumirai Mugoni, who said that the next stage was to show the people the full extent of the problem.

District councillors and political leaders in the area were flown over much of the area so they could see for themselves just how denuded it was becoming.

The nearby commercial areas were compared and--to hammer home the point--so were almost unpopulated stretches of communal land in Beitbridge district.

The people themselves agreed that the main objectives of any plan would involve the consolidation of arable, grazing and settlement areas and that it would be necessary to destock, although "the drought did a lot of the destocking for us," said Cde Mugoni.

Then came the education process, the experts and the people teaching each other. At times this in the words of the provincial planning officer, Cde Killian Munzwa, "threatened to become a bit physical."

Cde Mugoni said he was called to one meeting where the people made it plain that "they had fought the war and were prepared to fight anyone else as well," but the majority soon realised the need for the radical reform.

The then chairman of the council, Clr Francis Christmas, who is now chairman of the council's planning committee, said that once the majority of people in a ward agreed to the change the rest fell into line.

Provincial and district experts then helped the people with the detailed planning and all on the panel stressed the need for a very close working relationship, not only between Government and people but also between the officers of the different branches of Government.

The district Agritex officer for Mwenezi, Cde Kenneth Tichagowa, described what the reforms meant to the people.

The consolidation of grazing and arable land meant there was more land for grazing but a major aim of the scheme was to improve the pasture and veld legumes and pasture grasses are already being introduced. Paddocks are fenced to allow rotational grazing.

The new arable lands had to be protected which demanded a lot more labour to build the contours and the ridges.

So far 50 ha of drought-resistant macadamia and cashew nut trees have been planted to help balance efforts between biological and mechanical conservation of the land.

The people helped to erect the fences and to build all the ridges and contours, despite the fact that so many were having to build new houses in the new villages.

Cde Tichagowa said there was a possibility of a national dam in the district that could provide work for 10 000 people but in any case there were plans for small-scale irrigation schemes to improve crop production which could be implemented far sooner.

Marketing and transport had to be improved as well. There had been improvements on the nearby railway and the district road plan was being implemented but the distance from Masvingo, the nearest big town, was great, pushing up input costs. Having just one GMB depot and three cattle pens for the two communal lands also made marketing difficult.

Cde Munzwa summarised the lessons learned from the scheme.

Everyone had to be involved and work as a team. Institutions had to be built and even before the Prime Minister, Cde Mugave, had directed that village and ward development committees should be formed, the people had developed similar structures.

Problems would be faced and officials had to be careful that they identified with the people's concerns and fears. Government departments had to co-ordinate. In Mwenezi the shortage of transport actually helped. Officials would travel from Masvingo to Mwenezi in the same car and get to know each other well.

Although the people gave their labour free, money had to be found to buy fencing and other materials. Duplication had to be avoided.

Cde Munzwa said certain aspects of the scheme could be done elsewhere, taking into account local variations. The consolidation of land use zones could be reproduced.

The idea of everybody participating in the plan was vital. If the people want a programme to succeed, it will. If they do not see what the programme aims at achieving, it is likely to fail.

And finally everyone must accept the local conditions. Cde Christmas said it was important for the people to tell the planners what they wanted and not to just accept what the planners learned in colleges.

Answering questions, Cde Mugoni said the people accept there had to be a limit to the number of animals using the pasture. Some people did not own cattle but they were not going to lose their right to the range.

Commercial farmers nearby had helped, said Cde Munjanganja, with fencing and materials. They had seen the problem that could arise from poverty on one side of a fence and rich pasture on the other.

Dr Norman Reynolds, the chairman of the conference workshop on economic development said the European Economic Community had given \$1 million for a radical drought relief scheme for both peasant and commercial ranchers in the area. Commercial ranchers would repay with high quality bloodstock for the peasants and the peasants would eventually repay in cash towards a development fund.

What of the future?

So far only three of the 24 wards have been fully transformed although money is now available for a fourth ward's fencing.

Even with all wards fenced and reformed there will not be enough land for all to raise the number of cattle a family needs to live a reasonable life.

So the people are looking at industries based on cattle, such as abattoirs, tanneries and shoe factories.

The regional lands inspector for the province, Cde Phillip Manyaza, said if land became available for resettlement, the people would know how to use it having rebuilt their own resources.

Cde Mugoni was now also looking at game. Suitable species would be introduced into the paddocks to make maximum use of the grass and trees and allow more meat to be sold and eaten, and provide more products for these home industries the people wanted to set up.

Dr Reynolds said that the people are still pushing their revolution even further. Villages are discussing the complexities of the differences between rights to access to communal resources and the right to exploit these resources.

And as several panel members said afterwards, the next community to decide to transform their land for a better future will take a smaller risk. The people of Mwenezi though have staked everything on the faith they have in themselves and the soundness of the advice given them.

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ZIMBABWE

MUZENDA SPEAKS AT WEST GERMAN-ZIMBABWE PARLIAMENT SYMPOSIUM

Harare THE HERALD in English 5 Nov 85 p 5

[Text] Zimbabwe would like to create an atmosphere that engenders dignity based on personal liberty among the people, the Deputy Prime Minister, Cde Simon Muzenda, said when he opened the West German-Zimbabwe parliamentary symposium in Harare yesterday.

Cde Muzenda said he expected the symposium to reflect on the gains that Zimbabwe had achieved and to offer valuable advice on how the Government could advance.

"The one-party system is a system that will promote reconciliation of national animosities, and above all, facilitate the economic growth of our country under conditions that foster dignity and development."

People should share equally the products of their labour. By so doing, it would become possible to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor.

"The soundness of our socialist goals will only become evident when we can put more meat in the goulash and more rice in the worker's bowl."

Only then would Zimbabwe's hard-won freedom and independence become meaningful because the right to vote was meaningless to a man with an empty stomach.

The symposium, being sponsored by the Otto Benecke Foundation of West Germany, is co-chaired by the Speaker of the House of Assembly, Cde Didymus Mutasa.

Discussions will centre on improving co-operation between the two countries in education, economic development and political exchanges.

The leader of the West German delegation, the vice-president of the German Federal Parliament, Mr Heinz Westphal, said Zimbabwe could continue to count on assistance from West Germany.

"History has taught the West German people to preserve and progressively develop their existing liberal and democratic order by all constitutional means available."

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Mr Westphal said West Germany supported people in South Africa who stood for equal rights for all inhabitants of that country.

"We demand that Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners be released immediately, that detention without trial and compulsory resettlement be brought to an end."

He said his country demanded that genuine talks be held with the authentic representatives of the South African people.

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THE GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP

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ZIMBABWE

ZVOBGO SAYS SOCIALISM DOES NOT MEAN TYRANNY

Harare THE HERALD in English 5 Nov 85 p 5

[Text] The Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, Dr Eddison Zvobgo, says the unhappiness expressed by some of Zimbabwe's friends in the West over the adoption of socialism is unfounded.

In a paper presented yesterday to the Zimbabwe-West German parliamentary symposium in Harare on "Democracy in a socialist state," Cde Zvobgo said the Government believed in a one-party democracy which subordinated the interests of the individual to those of society.

This position did not advocate tyranny or totalitarianism as it meant a collective decision-making in government, he said.

The socialist vision envisaged in Zimbabwe was "neither Soviet nor German Democratic Republic, nor Chinese, nor anyone else's...it is Zimbabwean."

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cde Witness Mangwende, told the symposium that Zimbabwe sought to safeguard the rights and liberties of all its people by developing democratic institutions and instruments.

"Where else in the world can one find people who, only recently were bitterly divided by a long-drawn war, living peacefully as neighbours, working together as colleagues, and striving in harmony to build a new order within one state?

"We in Zimbabwe have done this and such an achievement can only promote a common identity, common objectives and a common will," he said.--Ziana

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ZIMBABWE

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYS RURAL GROWTH KEY TO CONSERVATION

Harare THE HERALD in English 5 Nov 85 p 5

[Text] Conservation of natural resources in the country's rural areas can succeed if it is supported by rural economic growth, the Chief Justice, Mr Justice Dumbutshena, said in Harare yesterday.

He told delegates at the conference and workshop on the implementation of a national conservation strategy at the conference centre that the law alone could not succeed in teaching the people to appreciate the importance of conservation.

"All the scientific reasons you advance to justify the preservation of our natural resources are not understood by us, the simple people. We need much more than severe penalties to make us understand," Mr Justice Dumbutshena said.

"Laws cannot succeed in encouraging hungry people to starve to death in order to preserve wild animals. People will not stop cutting trees for firewood if there is nothing else to make fire with. The solution is to move the rural population out of its depressing environment."

Natural resources were preserved through the Natural Resources Act, the Parks and Wildlife Act and the Trapping of Animals (Control) Act and 23 other pieces of legislation relating to conservation. These covered nearly all matters relevant to the country's conservation effort.

There was a board appointed by the President in terms of the Natural Resources Act which had wide powers, including that of forcing people through criminal sanctions, to adopt measures to improve or protect resources on their private land.

But the board's powers were limited. It could not order an occupier or user of land to remedy conditions that he did not cause, but it could do so to the owner of the land.

There were several other limits, which included lack of authority to issue orders affecting waterworks or mining operations without consulting the ministries responsible for water and mining.

Mr Justice Dumbutshena said the board was interested in the creation of conservation areas in the communal lands. He suggested that the areas be fenced against human occupation.

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ZIMBABWE

BRIEFS

FRG FUNDS AGRICULTURAL CENTER--A \$4 million agricultural engineering center funded by Zimbabwe and the FRG was opened in Harare yesterday by Zimbabwean Agriculture Minister Movani Mahachi, who said that the center will enter its second phase of construction next year, when the FRG is expected to give a further \$1.2 million in aid. The center's activities will include research into soil erosion. [Summary] [Harare Domestic Service in English 0400 GMT 31 Oct 85 MB] /12712

AGRICULTURE PROJECT HAILED--An agricultural extension programme started in the Midlands Province as a pilot project in 1983 has gained considerable impact in Zimbabwe and abroad. The project--based on group activity, involvement of communal farmers in the Gweru region, and the application of proper technology--has led to much of the programme's success, said Cde Farai Mandebvu, the provincial Agritex officer. Cde Mandebvu recently returned from a five-day conference in Britain to mark the 20th anniversary of the Agricultural Extension Development Centre in London where Zimbabwe was praised for its success with the pilot programme. "We were asked to attend the conference because our success in this particular scheme had impressed the national agriculture extension and research project which was supported financially by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for Agricultural Development," said the Midlands provincial Agritex officer, Mr Bob Vaughan Evans. [Text] [Harare THE HERALD in English 31 Oct 85 p 4] /9317

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